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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
For several decades now, the decentralization of policy authority to local officials has been 
a key component of development strategies around the world – emanating both from developing 
country governments themselves and the international development community as well. After 
more than thirty years of these efforts, we still have no clear consensus concerning the impact this 
strategy has had on the lives of the citizens of these countries. In the following pages, I explore 
through analysis of the case of Colombia how the local electoral context of municipalities helps 
us answer this question through its impact on budgetary choices with disparate development 
outcomes that, nonetheless, were carried out under the umbrella of a decentralized strategy of 
development.  
Decentralization both empowers and forces local authorities to make difficult choices in 
terms of which basic services to prioritize and which to leave for another day. For example, based 
on my own calculations I find that in 2008, Colombian mayors in only half of the country’s 
municipalities used discretionary funds to provide health services, but 79 percent chose to finance 
local artistic groups. Also, while 61 percent of mayors invested in building new schools, only 34 
percent chose to finance the training of teachers. Despite being bound by the same political 
institutions, fiscal rules, and administrative duties, local governments exhibit a great deal of 
variation in their spending choices. What explains such divergent spending choices within a single 
country across largely similar municipalities? Many accounts of subnational public goods 
provision stress the role of electoral motivations in setting local spending priorities. Some argue 
that the mere process of holding elections for local office alters public goods provision. Faguet 
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(2004) finds that decentralization reforms in Bolivia changed spending patterns in eight policy 
areas due in part to the greater awareness local officials had of local needs when compared to past 
priorities driven by national interests. This finding comports with one of the core theoretical 
motivations of the decentralization strategy – bringing government closer to the people will make 
that government more responsive to the needs of the community. Conversely, others have found 
that electoral competition merely heightens the role of highly visible expenditures, with the goal 
of garnering public support even if the project(s) do not address the most pressing local needs. 
Harding and Stasavage (2014) find that democracy increases spending on the more visible parts of 
education provision (e.g., reducing access fees), while less visible expenses, like education 
operating costs, do not receive a similar boost. Similarly, others find that building roads or 
electricity grids are viewed as means to offer clear signals of a politician’s ability to “deliver the 
goods,” and that politicians facing intense electoral competition will exploit that opportunity at the 
expense of less visible but more necessary projects (Drazen and Eslava 2010, Joanis 2011, Zelner 
and Henisz 2000, Mejía Guinand, Botero, and Rodríguez Raga 2008). 
This dissertation revisits the question of whether electoral competition induces officials to 
be more responsive to the welfare of most citizens by focusing on necessary areas of development 
or whether greater competition leads more often to pandering behavior on the part of officials 
targeting narrow constituencies. In the course of exploring the spending and development impact 
of decentralization, I highlight one recent trend in decentralization efforts that I argue has led 
increasingly to more negative outcomes in highly competitive electoral contexts. More and more, 
we find in developing countries pursuing decentralization that local governments have less fiscal 
autonomy than in years past but have preserved the political autonomy granted to them by 
decentralization reforms. This combination of political autonomy, and limited fiscal capacity, I 
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argue, leads to divergent spending choices across electoral contexts, thus undermining the 
development goals of decentralization. In other words, more electoral competition is not the one-
size-fits-all factor inducing officials to address most local problems. Politicians pursuing their 
political survival but having limited fiscal autonomy face a trade-off between addressing most 
problems of fewer citizens and benefiting most citizens with solutions to fewer needs. Such trade-
off gives rise to somewhat paradoxical developmental outcomes. While more electoral competition 
could induce officials to address a wider range of demands (although benefiting narrower 
constituencies), having less competitive elections could be beneficial to the general welfare 
(although only regarding select demands). 
Already some works identify ways in which national restrictions on local fiscal decisions 
harm the ability of local governments to satisfy citizens’ needs and creates a perverse set of 
incentives that bring about uneven local government performance. First, such constraints reduce 
the capacity of local governments to expand existing services and to offer new programs, which 
may in turn affect their ability to effectively respond to local demands (Dickovick 2011, Loayza, 
Rigolini, and Calvo-González 2011). Second, and related to this first point, central governments’ 
attempts to dictate local fiscal policy discourages local governments from identifying public goods 
that produce the greatest improvements in local living conditions.  In Colombia, in areas where 
mandated funding in education and health is high, students’ educational achievement and the 
proportion of the poor with health insurance tends to be lower (Salinas 2014, Faguet and Sánchez 
2014). In the U.S. as well, this lack of fiscal autonomy has been shown to prevent local 
governments from implementing policies that represent the preferences of their citizenry. Bunch 
(2014), for example, found that liberal non-chartered counties were less likely to increase 
redistributive spending when compared to chartered counties with similar liberal preferences. 
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Finally, recentralization tends to favor greater spending in areas important to the national 
government. For example, in Vietnam, this tendency led to favoring state-owned enterprises with 
increased spending on transportation and communications infrastructure rather than satisfying 
local demands for greater spending on education and healthcare (Malesky, Viet Nguyen, and Tran 
2014).  Similarly, in Colombia, although Escobar-Lemmon and Ross (2014) are not explicit about 
the existence of spending constraints, they find in an analysis of citizens’ perceptions of local 
government that individuals see their departmental governments as more accountable when those 
governments are financed with local revenue. Despite these important insights, we still know little 
about whether local electoral conditions motivate local governments to provide better public 
services even when they lack the autonomy to make spending decisions.   
I argue that variation in government spending choices across municipalities in Colombia 
reflects differences in local electoral conditions. Despite following similar electoral rules, elections 
exhibit great variation in the number candidates running for public office and the level of electoral 
competition for those offices. This variation in the number of candidates is consequential for the 
provision of public goods through its impact on the number of votes needed to be elected. Given 
a certain number of candidates, local politicians running for mayor might adapt their spending 
offerings in ways that benefit just enough supporters to succeed electorally. In this sense, my 
argument departs from those that focus solely on the closeness of elections in terms of influencing 
government choices. Such emphasis on the uncertainty brought about by competitive elections 
misses the possibility that similarly tight elections may result from contests involving a disparate 
number of candidates. Thus, although the degree of competition still should affect an incumbent’s 
behavior in office, the exact nature of that impact will depend in large part on the absolute number 
of votes needed to gain a plurality victory. We should expect those incumbents facing just a few 
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competitors to seek to develop broad support coalitions across most of the population, while those 
facing many competitors will pursue a more targeted strategy because they will likely need fewer 
absolute votes to result elected. In the remainder of this dissertation, I first develop these ideas 
further and then evaluate them through analysis of municipal-level data from Colombia.  
 
A Roadmap 
 
Chapter 1 presents my argument about how electoral conditions impacts local spending 
choices. Next, I put to a test the first implication of my theory of the political economy of local 
distributive spending patterns – that the effective number of candidates has a significant impact on 
the distribution of electoral support for a mayor. Chapter 2 begins with an overview of the 
Colombian experience with decentralization and recentralizing reforms. I highlight how common 
it is for local governments to lack spending and administrative autonomy to solve local needs. I 
then explain how, under conditions of fiscal and administrative recentralization, it is necessary to 
revise expectations from the baseline theory of distributive politics. I then posit that local 
governments should use three main strategies to adapt spending decisions to their electoral 
contexts, depending on where these contexts fall on the unitary-factional spectrum.  
In Chapter 3, I test these ides through an analysis of local government spending patterns in 
the area of education. Specifically, I look at whether local governments manipulate earmarked 
spending for education in response to their electoral contexts. Because of its great value and the 
limited ways municipalities can manipulate its delivery, education spending provides a useful 
window into the ways in which decentralization can and cannot work in a context of efforts to 
recentralize local finances and make local spending decisions more efficient. I show that local 
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governments in factional contexts are more likely than those in unitary contexts to invest in 
building new schools, and to offer additional goods (e.g., lunches, free tuition, transportation). 
However, they are also likely to compensate a more diverse spending “portfolio” investing 
significantly less. In contrast, local governments in unitary contexts are more likely to avoid 
investing in additional expenses of education provision (e.g., having well-trained teachers, or 
school transportation), focusing instead on basic expenses maintaining existing schools. But, if 
they choose to invest, they put to the task significantly more funding thus aiming to have a greater 
reach.   
Chapter 4 focuses on the use of discretionary funds. Here I show that electorally motivated 
spending decisions have a limited scope. Local governments in factional contexts are more likely 
than those in unitary contexts to fund targetable goods in specific policy areas, and to finance 
administrative reforms and administrative enhancement efforts. I also find that local governments 
in unitary contexts use discretionary funds to provide education and water supply to a greater 
extent than local governments in factional contexts. However, like results in chapter 3, investments 
by local governments in factional contexts are significantly smaller than those made by local 
governments in unitary contexts. Finally, I do not find evidence of a tradeoff between targetable 
and collective goods. Overall, spending portfolios appear to be more specific to each policy area 
than previously thought.  
In Chapter 5, I explore whether local electoral conditions influence who applies for funding 
from projects financed by the national government. I find that local governments in factional 
contexts are not generally more likely to apply for funding than local governments in unitary 
contexts. Moreover, national authorities are equally likely to support proposals made by local 
governments in unitary contexts as to support proposals made by local governments in factional 
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contexts. However, proposals made by local governments in factional contexts request 
significantly less funding than those coming from officials in unitary contexts. Thus, national 
politicians, rather than supporting co-partisans or projects from places with a greater number of 
potential supporters, allocate just enough national funding to persuade supporters of local officials 
to back electorally politicians at the national level sponsoring their projects.     
Finally, chapter 6 examines the extent to which local service evaluations are distorted by 
citizens’ expectations about local service provision. I show that citizens in factional contexts 
perceiving their governments as responsive (i.e. to deliver targetable goods) are less likely to 
evaluate positively local public services (e.g., education, health, trash collection). In contrast, I 
find that citizens in unitary contexts that perceive local officials as responsive (i.e. to deliver public 
goods) are more inclined to evaluate positively local public services. Overall, these patterns 
suggest that public service provision will be rewarded with good service evaluations only when 
those services are what citizens expect from their local governments. Otherwise, public approval 
is unlikely to motivate elected officials to provide better services.   
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CHAPTER 1  
 
DEVELOPMENTAL IMPACT OF LOCAL ELECTORAL CONTEXTS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The idea that democracy has a variety of positive outcomes, among others, promoting the 
welfare of citizens is still under intense scrutiny (Przeworski et al. 2000, Haggard and Kaufman 
2008). Despite positive evidence, it is possible for democracy to lead to undesirable outcomes. 
Among other possibilities, increased electoral competition may push incumbents to focus on the 
interests of narrower constituencies at the expense of the wellbeing of most citizens (Lizzeri and 
Persico 2005). Although possible for democratic governments at all levels, this possibility is 
particularly troubling subnationally. At this level, narrow constituencies are going to be even 
narrower in absolute terms compared to nationally elected officials. Furthermore, this potential 
drawback of increased electoral competition could dilute the expected benefits of political 
decentralization.  
The purpose of this chapter is to lay out my theory about the potential impact that increased 
electoral competition may have on government spending choices. Specifically, differences in the 
number of voters needed to result elected should push incumbents to prioritize spending 
alternatives reaching enough potential supporters with as many goods as fiscally possible. Such 
adaptations would result in governments solving basic needs of the population at a rate that also 
advances their electoral goals.   
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The next section discusses existing notions of electoral competition and distinguishes local 
electoral contexts based on the extent of electoral fragmentation. Then, I present my argument 
about how local electoral conditions impact spending choices. Afterward, I explore the distribution 
of municipal electoral contexts in Colombia using data from mayoral elections from 1997 until 
2011. Finally, I assess the geographic and demographic characteristics of the winning candidates’ 
constituencies across a range of electoral contexts that vary based on the number of candidates for 
local office.  
 
Differentiating Local Electoral Contexts 
 
Standard approaches to studying the impact of electoral competition on government 
performance postulate that greater electoral competition in a current election is understood by the 
victor of that election as a predictor of greater uncertainty in future contests. Elected officials, 
anticipating those uncertain conditions, adjust their behavior to improve the chances of getting 
reelected (Mayhew 1974). There are two types of behavioral responses to uncertain electoral 
prospects. The first aims to increase the chances of future electoral victories by introducing highly 
visible programs and policies that will enhance an incumbent’s governing reputation, while 
simultaneously cutting funding on programs that are less visible to the public. A classic example 
of this comes from Africa, where researchers have found that elected officials favored programs 
that offer free schooling but not those focused on hiring more teachers  (Harding and Stasavage 
2014). Another electorally motivated strategy involves increasing the saliency of ethnic cleavages. 
In India, ethnic parties used religious mobilizations, even at the risk of sparking violent counter-
mobilizations, to boost their identification with such parties  (Wilkinson 2006). With an eye toward 
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a possible defeat, elected officials facing a significant electoral challenge may also decide to 
moderate their behavior, implement institutional reforms to check the power of future leaders, and 
seek to coopt the opposition through power-sharing measures that limit the ability of any party to 
exploit the state for private gain (Grzymala-Busse 2007). Similarly, electoral competition has been 
found to lead to administrative reforms and privatizing utility companies to prevent future 
opposition governments from exploiting them for patronage (Geddes 1994, Murillo 2009).  
All of this work though fails to incoporate the number of candidates into their 
conceptualization of electoral competition. The principal thesis I am advancing in this chapter is 
that only when taking into account the number of candidates can we fully make sense of how 
electoral competition, and the uncertainty that comes with it, affects an incumbent’s policymaking 
behavior. The size of the electorate one must appeal to in order to win an election in large part is 
a prodcut of the number of electoral options facing voters. Moreover, these differences may lead 
to different spending choices and strategies to attract supporters (Luna 2014). For example, 
although ethnic favoritism in Kenya and Malawi influences education provision, it does not have 
the same impact in Mali and Senegal (Kramon and Posner 2013). Similar differences exist in 
Ghana, where performance evaluations and clientelistic benefits influence voters to different 
extents. Under these conditions, elected officials combine both strategies according to what each 
individual values the most (i.e., collective or private goods) (Weghorst and Lindberg 2013).  
Among the many political conditions that may produce close elections, I focus on the extent 
of electoral fragmentation. Each electoral context has its own pattern of political organization, with 
a range of viable parties operating at the local level, yet election outcomes in these distinct contexts 
will appear similar if looking solely at the margin of victory for the winning candidate. For 
example, in a mayoral election with four candidates who receive 26%, 25%, 24, and 23% of the 
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votes respectively, the vote margin for the winning candidate would be equal to that of the winner 
of a two-candidate race in which the winner receives 50% and the loser 49%. Clearly though, these 
two elections are significantly distinct in a number of ways. Most importantly, supporters of the 
winning candidate in the first example will be less numerous than supporters of the winner in the 
second example. Consequently, we should expect the incumbents to behave differently in pursuit 
of their goal of having a successful political career (Stonechash 1987).  
Subnational political contexts differ according to the number of candidates taking part in a 
given election (i.e., fragmentation) (Sartori 1976). At one extreme, there are contexts with a 
dominant candidate where challengers receive far fewer voters. In these cases, electoral 
competition is close to being unitary, and electoral support for the leading candidate is widespread 
among voters. Conversely, we can find contexts in which there are numerous viable electoral 
alternatives. In these cases, electoral competition is factional, and electoral support for any one 
candidate will be based in fewer constituencies. This range of electoral contexts will have 
important implications for the policy and spending decisions of an incumbent government. In sum, 
the particular characteristics of an incumbent’s past and expected future electoral coalitions should 
help us identify and better understand the specific distributive strategies she pursues while in 
office.  
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A Baseline Theory of Distributive Politics 
 
In developing this theory, I build my argument upon distributive politics models and the 
core voter vs. swing voter debate (Dixit and Londregan 1996, Cox and McCubbins 1986, Cox 
2009, Lizzeri and Persico 2001). However, I put less emphasis on the role played by partisan 
attachments and more on the role of the provision of material benefits between elections as 
opposed to the more explicit vote buying that takes place during an election season. By maintaining 
a relationship based on material benefits with constituents throughout their term, politicians may 
keep electoral support coalitions over time in local contexts where ideological attachments often 
play a limited role. The continued expectation of receiving some benefit from government 
dissuades supporters from moving to opposition candidates. In this sense, distributive strategies 
can both build and preserve loyalties (Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016).   
The intuition behind this approach is that politicians create “spending portfolios” based on 
a strategy of attracting and retaining just enough voters to win elections, particularly in a highly 
constrained fiscal environment. In its classical formulation, spending portfolios consist of a 
mixture of private and collective goods. Private goods such as cash benefits, subsidies, 
scholarships, dietary supplements, and supplies for agriculture can be used to target supporters and 
to punish opponents. In contrast, public infrastructures, and nonexcludable policies (e.g., education 
improvement, environmental protection, or building a water treatment plant) benefit communities 
in general. Depending on the number of voters that politicians need to reach, which is in part a 
product of the number of viable challengers, spending portfolios should entail a specific mix of 
private and public goods.  
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Budgetary limits shape feasible mixtures of public and private goods to satisfy electoral 
needs in each context. On the one hand, the cost of private benefits will increase as the number of 
recipients does, while the electoral payoff of such benefits tends to be confined to only those 
individuals that receive them. In contrast, the costs of public goods are far less sensitive to the 
number of beneficiaries, and, theoretically at least, the entire community benefits so the electoral 
payoff may be greater, albeit less certain, than the provision of private benefits. Thus, as the 
number of votes needed to be elected increases, it will become increasingly expensive to rely on 
the provision of private goods and more likely that incumbents will focus their strategy on public 
goods provision. Under these circumstances, elected officials should provide a greater share of 
public goods and fewer private goods. In contrast, when the number of votes necessary to be 
elected is lower, in an electoral context with numerous viable challengers for example, we should 
expect local authorities to focus more on the provision of private goods than collective goods.  
These distributive offers will achieve their goal of gaining recipients’ support if the 
perceived benefits are equal to or greater than any potential offer by opponents. One factor 
affecting this calculation is the strength of recipients’ ideological or partisan affiliation. For those 
recipients with particularly strong ideological or partisan attachments, distributive offers will need 
to also outweigh these preferences. If, however, voters do not have strong ideological preferences, 
the vote calculus will revolve largely around the assessment of which candidate offers a more 
beneficial portfolio of goods.  
An additional consideration is the varying levels of material need among voters. Those 
who are less sensitive to material offers likely will need bigger offers to be compelled to support 
a given candidate than someone with a high level of need for such items. Wealthier individuals 
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then should be less influenced by a basket of groceries than poor individuals (Bueno de Mesquita 
et al. 2003).  
Besides the implications for spending composition, this theory also speaks to the 
distribution of electoral support within a particular political unit. Our expectation for distributive 
strategies in factional contexts with a high number of viable candidates is that an incumbent will 
be more targeted in her spending strategy than she would in a unitary context where she must 
capture a much larger percentage of voters in order to secure a victory. As a consequence, the 
resultant electoral support for mayors in factional contexts should be more concentrated in specific 
geographic areas of the community than it would for an incumbent operating in a unitary context.  
 
Varieties of Local Electoral Contexts in Colombia  
 
In order to evaluate these theoretical implications, I now turn to an analysis of local 
electoral contexts in Colombia. As discussed in previous sections, subnational electoral contexts 
may range from those involving a dominant candidate to a two-candidate race to one with many 
viable candidates. I assess these differences using the effective number of candidates running for 
mayor in Colombia. This measure captures “the number of hypothetical equal-size parties that 
would have the same total effect on fractionalization of the system as have the actual parties of 
unequal size” (Laakso and Taagepera 1979, 4). The effective number of candidates would be equal 
to the raw number of candidates if they received the same vote share. However, when candidates 
receive unequal support, the effective number of candidates will be weighted based on each 
candidate’s actual vote share. Values closer to one, then, would reflect a unitary electoral context 
in which there is a single dominant candidate. Values between two and three reflect a context 
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where electoral support is split between two and three competitive candidates (regardless of the 
actual number of candidates competing); and values greater than three suggest that electoral 
support is factionalized among more than three effective vote-getting candidates.    
The following table exemplifies these scenarios using data from three Colombian 
municipalities in the 2011 local elections.  
 
Table 1.1 Effective Number of Candidates in Three Colombian Mayoral Elections 
Municipality C. 1 C. 2 C. 3 C. 4 C. 5 C. 6 C. 7 C. 8 MV ENC 
Amagá 25.59 18.25 13.27 13.27 13.16 7.05 3.67 3.28 7.34 6.22 
Guadalupe 51.54 44.07 2.08 1.31     7.47 2.17 
Toledo 76.93 20.57       56.36 1.57 
Source: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.  
C=Candidate; MV=Margin of Victory; ENC=Effective Number of Candidates 
 
The first row in Error! Reference source not found.Error! Reference source not found. s
hows that mayoral elections in Amagá involved eight candidates, and several of them received a 
sizeable vote share. In contrast, electoral support in Guadalupe concentrated in two out of four 
candidates. Despite differences in the effective number of candidates (ENC), elections in both 
municipalities had a similar margin of victory (MV). However, Amagá’s mayor had a smaller 
following compared to Guadalupe’s. While Amagá’s elections involved 6.22 effective vote-getting 
candidates and the mayor received 25.59% of vote share, Guadalupe had just 2.17 effective 
candidates and its elected mayor received 51.54% of the votes. Thus, although elections in these 
two municipalities are similarly close, they are examples of how we can arrive at similar electoral 
outcomes from very different electoral contexts. Amagá is a case of factional electoral competition, 
while Guadalupe’s elections are more akin to a two-candidate competition. On the other extreme, 
large margins of victory reflect unambiguously the existence of a unitary electoral context as we 
see in the case of Toledo where the winning candidate recorded a 56.36% margin of victory with 
just 1.57 effective vote-getting candidates.  
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These differences in the level of fragmentation across mayoral elections will influence the 
number of votes needed to be elected.  The following graph presents the distribution of electoral 
fragmentation (i.e., the effective number of candidates) for each mayoral election held in 
Colombia’s 1,122 municipalities between 1997 and 2011. Also included is the average vote share 
(V.S.) received by the winning candidate for those elections with less than two effective 
candidates, between two and three, and more than three effective vote-getting candidates. Also, 
between parenthesis is the corresponding 95% confidence interval.  
Figure 1.1 Distribution of Effective Number of Candidates in Colombia, 1997-2011 
 
As should be expected, the vote share of winning candidates appears tightly connected to 
the effective number of candidates running for mayor in Colombia (see Figure 1.1). 
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Unsurprisingly, candidates in unitary contexts win elections with the largest support while the 
winning vote share for elections in more factionalized contexts is far lower. These figures also 
reveal the gradual decline in the number of unitary elections across time. In 1997, 55 mayoral 
elections involved less than 1.5 effective vote-getting candidates, while in 2011 that number had 
dropped to eight. Consequently, there is a gradual increase in the number of elections involving 
higher numbers of effective candidates. While in 1997, only 167 elections involved more than 
three effective candidates, 347 municipalities had highly factional elections in 2011. These trends 
highlight the importance of understanding and incorporating variations in the local electoral 
context when identifying the spending strategies of local governments. 1  
 
Different Subnational Electoral Contexts, Different Constituencies 
 
Though the larger goal of this project is to explain the mix of private and public goods that 
politicians offer to entice supporters, the most immediate implication of the theory outlined above 
is that different electoral contexts (e.g. factional or unitary) will be associated with distinct 
electoral support distributions that will range from highly concentrated to diffuse. The clear 
expectation is that electoral support will be more concentrated in factional contexts, and distributed 
more evenly in unitary contexts.  
I test these implications by taking advantage of the way elections are conducted in 
Colombia, with most municipalities having several polling places spread geographically to ease 
access to most citizens.2 As is the case in many countries, voters must cast their vote at the polling 
                                                     
1 Mayors in Colombia may run for reelection only after a term. However, it is not uncommon for them to run for a 
seat in the local legislature or at the departmental of national level.  
2 In 2007, there were 9853 polling places across Colombia. Only 143 municipalities, out of 1100, had only one polling 
place.  
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place where they are registered, and this typically is the poll closest to their home. Furthermore, 
inside each polling place, voters ought to cast their vote at the polling station (mesa de votación) 
corresponding to their national identification number. Importantly, each polling station serves 
groups of citizens determined by ordering identification numbers in ascending order and dividing 
them at regular intervals (typically, every 300 or 400 individuals).  
This arrangement, that obliges voters to go to a specific polling place and to a specific 
polling station within it, allows me to assess how electoral support distributes in two ways. First, 
I can compare vote patterns across voting places, providing an indication of the spatial distribution 
of electoralsupport patterns across a municipality. Therefore, for example, if a candidate receives 
greater support in rural compared with urban polling places, such differences would suggest that 
electoral support is not uniform but concentrated in rural areas. Second, identification numbers 
correlate with individuals’ age, and gender. When citizens reach 18 years, they receive their 
identification number consecutively as they apply for it. In addition, citizens that reached 18 years 
before 2003 got a number within a range of numbers for females and within a different range for 
males. Thus, vote patterns across polling stations within each polling place should also tell us 
whether there are differences in support across gender and age cohorts.  
I exploit these features of elections in Colombia to assess differences in support across 
locations and demographic groups. According to the argument outlined above, politicians in 
different electoral contexts should offer a mix of private and public goods depending on the 
number of votes needed to get elected. 3  Therefore, electoral support should distribute more 
                                                     
3 Although candidates cannot anticipate an exact number, past elections provide a good estimate of the number of 
votes needed to have a chance to result elected. Overall, the effective number of candidates across elections remains 
relatively stable. Between 2003 and 2015, the standard deviation of the effective number of candidates is just 0.6.  
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unevenly in more factional contexts, where targeted appeals should be more common, than in a 
more unitary context where distributive offers should be cast more widely.  
In order to determine the distribution of electoral support across a municipality I rely on 
work done on the question of party nationalization (e.g. Caramani (2004)). Although existing 
measures of party nationalization focus on electoral support across a country, the logic is the same. 
A party is considered nationalized if its electoral support is similar across districts (Caramani 
2004). Thus, rather than comparing support across electoral districts in a country, I compare 
support levels across polling places and polling stations in each Colombian municipality.  
Although there are several measures of party nationalization, Gini-based measures are the 
most accepted. In one of its versions, party nationalization is equal to subtracting 1 from the Gini 
coefficient calculated on a candidate’s vote share across districts. Therefore, a value of 1 means 
that a given candidate received the same vote share in every district. In contrast, values closer to 0 
mean that a given party received 100% of its votes in just one district and none in others (Jones 
and Mainwaring 2003). Here, I use a variant of this Gini-based measures that weights the size of 
each district and their quantity (Bochsler 2010). Again, for this measure, I will compare electoral 
results across polling places and polling stations in each Colombian municipality. For this analysis, 
I use electoral data from the 2007 and 2011 mayoral elections in Colombia.  
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Figure 1.2 Distribution of Electoral Support in Two Colombian Mayoral Elections, 2007 and 
2011 
 
 
Figure 1.2 shows the results for my assessment of electoral support distribution for all 
municipalities during the 2007 and 2011 mayoral elections. The x-axis of each graph represents 
the measure of party nationalization based on votes for the winning candidate across polling places 
(first column) and across polling stations (second column). Again, values closer to 1, mean that 
the elected mayor received similar levels of support across all voting places and polling stations. 
Those closer to 0 represent cases where electoral support for the winning candidate was highly 
concentrated in certain polling sites. I divide municipalities into three categories: (1) places with 
less than two effective candidates (unitary); (2) those with more than two and less than three 
effective candidates (Two-candidate), and (3) places with more than three effective candidates 
(Factionalized). I also present as dotted lines the mean of this measure of support distribution for 
each of these electoral contexts.  
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As my theory suggest, we find from these results that that more factional a municipality’s 
electoral context is the higher the level of constituency concentration. This is the case when 
comparing geographic constituencies grouped by voting place, but it also applies across what we 
might call “demographic constituencies” using the grouping by age and gender across polling 
stations. It is remarkable that we see similar patterns using both measures. While the place where 
citizens vote is mostly a function of their place of residence, the polling station they use is 
determined by their identification number, which reflects individual’s age and gender. 
Consequently, these results provide a first step in supporting the larger argument that candidates 
will adjust the scope of their distributive offers to their electoral contexts.  
 
Table 1.2 Linear Regression Models Predicting Support Distribution 
 Support 
Distribution, 
Voting Places 2007 
Support 
Distribution, 
Polling Station 
2007 
Support 
Distribution, 
Voting Places 2011 
Support 
Distribution, 
Polling Station 
2011 
Effective Number 
of Candidates 
-0.045 
(0.005) * 
-0.018 
(0.001) * 
-0.0473 
(0.005) * 
-0.017 
(0.001) * 
Poverty -0.001 
(0.000) * 
-0.000 
0.000* 
-0.001 
(0.000) * 
-0.000 
(0.000) * 
Partisan attachment 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Logged Voting 
Population 
0.050 
(0.010) * 
0.027 
(0.003) * 
0.050 
(0.009) * 
0.024 
(0.002) * 
Constant 0.7844 
(0.041) * 
0.892 
(0.012) * 
0.803 
(0.039) * 
0.900 
(0.011) * 
N 1088 1088 978 978 
R-squared 0.104 0.227 0.121 0.208 
Note: *: p<0.001 
Observed mean differences for support distribution across electoral contexts are 
statistically significant in all four analyses. Results in Table 1.2 confirm this, even after controlling 
for poverty 4 , logged voting population, and a measure of partisan attachment that uses the 
difference between the vote share of elected mayors and the share received by the mayor’s party 
                                                     
4 I measure poverty using the unsatisfied basic needs index. 
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list for municipal council (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). OLS results reveal that, for the 2011 
mayoral elections, each additional effective party is associated with a decrease of 0.047 in the 
measure of support distribution across voting places, and with a decrease of 0.017 across polling 
stations. These same analyses for 2007 reveal a decrease of 0.045 for the measure of support 
distribution across voting places, and of 0.018 across polling stations. In more simple terms, let us 
set the value for the measure of support distribution for mayors in unitary contexts at 0.88 (the 
mean in 2011). This is equivalent to having every voter in 88% of voting places supporting them. 
For every additional effective candidate, support for elected mayors would decline by 5% of the 
total number of voting sites. That is, votes for mayors become far more concentrated across 
geographic areas and demographic groups as the number of candidates increases.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Electoral competition involves much more than just uncertain outcomes. I argue that an 
additional, but critical component of highly competitive contexts is the possibility of greater 
electoral fragmentation. Although both factors are correlated, the political dynamics stimulated by 
each of them are completely different. While electoral uncertainty fosters both political 
responsiveness and preemptive measures to a possible loss, greater electoral fragmentation should 
shape the scope of distributive choices.  
I explore the role of electoral fragmentation in shaping distributive choices though the 
analysis of the geographic and demographic distribution of local electoral support in Colombia. I 
find that Colombian mayors that faced a greater number of competitors are more likely to have 
supports concentrated both geographically and demographically. In contrast, mayors elected in 
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contexts where there is are fewer competitive candidates are elected by citizens more evenly 
distributed across a municipality and demographic groups.     
Although indicative of the role of the extent of electoral fragmentation in shaping local 
distributive choices, it is necessary to adapt this general frame to the distributive choices available 
in a context like Colombia that is facing increasing fiscal and administrative recentralization, while 
maintain vibrant electoral competition. The strategies used by mayors in Colombia to advance 
their political goals under these conditions are the topic of the next chapter.    
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CHAPTER 2  
 
FISCAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE RECENTRALIZATION IN COLOMBIA 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Before moving on to assess the question of how different electoral contexts affect the 
spending choices of local governments across Colombia, it is important to first situate Colombia’s 
municipalities in the larger trend of decentralization that has prevailed across Latin America since 
the late 1980s. In great contrast to the early years of this regional strategy, recent trends among 
decentralized regimes in Latin America increasingly involve some degree of recentralizing rules 
that have served to reduce local autonomy. Fiscal and administrative constraints are far from 
uncommon across Latin America, and Colombia offers just one of many examples of this move 
toward the recentralization of the power of the purse that local governments had more control of 
during the 1990s (Eaton 2014, Dickovick 2011). By underscoring these constraints on local 
autonomy, I highlight an issue in recent research on decentralization where there has been a 
tendency among scholars continue to downplay the significance of differences in the source of 
funding for local government operations (Bonvecchi and Lodola 2010). I argue that the rules 
governing each funding source are crucial to understanding how local electoral contexts shape 
local government spending decisions. Recognizing these nuances of decentralization is a critical 
step towards understanding the larger question of how local democratic competition affects 
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development outcomes in the context of increasing constraints on local administrative and fiscal 
autonomy.  
 
Decentralization in Latin America in a Context of Recentralizing Regulations 
 
Throughout the 1980s, to varying degrees Latin American countries began to decentralize 
political, administrative and fiscal power to subnational units of government (Falleti 2010). This 
wave of decentralization reforms led to the election of subnational authorities, devolution of 
authority over certain policy areas, and the transferal of funds from the national treasury to local 
authorities. With these reforms came an assortment of goals and aspirations among proponents of 
the decentralization strategy including the more effective delivery of public services, development 
policies that were better tailored to the demands of the local citizenry, better citizen oversight over 
local officials, and shifting many municipality-specific development responsibilities away from 
national officials in order to allow them to focus more on planning and implementing larger-scale 
development strategies and policies (Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema 1983). Among these different 
goals, each country had a different experience in the timing, order, and reach of their 
decentralization reforms.       
When looking at the region-wide implementation of this broad strategy, we first must 
recognize that there is no country that is completely centralized or decentralized. Also, the scope 
of local administrative responsibilities, amount of intergovernmental transfers, and whether 
citizens have the power to elect local officials can all change over time, particularly in unitary 
systems where such powers are not constitutionally guaranteed (Rodden 2005). For example, 
recentralizing reforms in many of the Southern Cone countries during the Great Depression greatly 
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affected local powers to collect revenue, but also contributed to the consolidation of power of 
authoritarian regimes during the 1960s and 1970s (Eaton 2004). However, more recent efforts by 
the central government to recover control from subnational levels of government are a response in 
many ways to the fundamental contradiction of decentralization. While devolving authority to 
subnational governments may foster policy innovation and participation, it also opens the 
opportunity for subnational governments to incur debt that ultimately are the responsibility of the 
national government. This tendency resulted in, for example, enormous budgetary shortages in 
Brazil and Argentina during the 1980s and 1990s. Faced with this risk, national governments set 
hard-budget constraints that prevented local governments from engaging in fiscal decisions that 
could erode national budgetary stability. These restrictions include the reduction of local spending 
discretion and the ability of local governments to borrow money. Through these instruments 
national authorities have constrained the fiscal powers of local governments without having to 
exert much oversight and, at the same time, avoid the need to commit themselves to bailing out 
local governments in need (Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack 2003). Overall, recent recentralization 
reforms have been in response to the fiscal imbalances of recent years which led local governments 
to sacrifice their autonomy in order to at least partially resolve their dire economic conditions 
(Dickovick 2011).  
As a result of these recentralizing efforts, what I identify as the fundamental contradiction 
of decentralization makes conditioned national transfers the norm rather than the exception across 
Latin America. Local governments across the region now have a wide but generally limited range 
of fiscal autonomy, and with most of that discretion allowed for an increasingly limited percentage 
of total national transfers. For example, the percentage of national transfers available for local 
discretionary spending in Argentina and Chile amounts to 83% and 75% respectively, while in 
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Ecuador only 5% of national transfers are for discretionary use. The remaining portion of national 
transfers then are those with targeted policy areas and specific spending conditions attached 
(Rezende and Veloso 2012). In this context of efforts to limit local spending autonomy, Colombia 
exhibits many of the challenges that emerge when local governments with democratically elected 
officials try, with these extensive fiscal constraints, to fulfill the role decentralization assigns to 
them of bringing government closer to the people.  
 
Fiscal and Administrative Recentralization in Colombia 
 
Decentralization efforts in Colombian began during the late 1960s. The 1968 constitutional 
reform mandated that the national government be required to share its revenue with subnational 
governments. Since 1973, subnational governments began to receive a growing share of national 
funds, moving from 13% in 1973 to 15% in 1975 (Bonet, Pérez V., and Ayala 2014) although local 
spending autonomy remained limited, with 74% of these funds directed toward education, and the 
other 26% toward health care. Opportunities for greater fiscal autonomy appeared during the 1970s 
(Law 46 of 1971) and 1980s (Law 14 of 1983) when local taxation received a significant push, 
allowing local authorities to tax property, commercial activities, the use of cars, and consumption 
of gasoline, liquors, and cigarettes. Building on these early efforts of fiscal decentralization, the 
1991 Constitution kept existing local taxes and restrictions on the use of national transfers in place 
but altered distribution formulas. Under this new scheme, much of national transfers to 
municipalities were targeted specifically to education, health, water supply, and recreation.  
The fundamental contradictions of decentralization without fiscal autonomy did not take 
long to manifest themselves. The new scheme of national transfers did not promote local effort to 
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collect their own revenue. On the contrary, local spending on personnel and debt grew enormously. 
Overspending in personnel was financed with debt that went from 1.1% of the national GDP in 
1990 to 3.5% in 1999. In addition to local deficit spending, Colombia faced during the late-1990s 
a severe economic recession and a rapid growth in expenditures on pensions, transfers to local 
governments, and debt interests. Under these dire conditions, in 1999 the Colombian government 
signed an agreement with the IMF to receive loans, conditioned on carrying out a series of reforms. 
Overall, the Colombian government committed to reduce spending and to increase the overall 
revenue through new taxes (Amador Cabra 2007).  
Adjustments included increasing taxes on gasoline, restricting local governments’ ability 
to acquire new debt5 or to use it to pay for personnel, and reforming transfers to local governments. 
Also, new regulations clarified competencies of national, departmental and municipal authorities 
on each policy area. Overall, most transfers continued to be earmarked to ensure that subnational 
governments used the transfers to effectively provide the most basic services. Particularly, most 
transfers were targeted to health and education services, and beginning in 2007, to fund water 
supply projects. These reforms also set goals for health and education that local governments ought 
to prioritize. Municipalities failing to reach these nationally set goals were forced to implement a 
special improvement plan designed by the Ministry of Finance, and in extreme cases, departmental 
authorities were granted the power to take control of transfers to failing municipalities. As should 
be clear in all of these reforms, the recentralizing efforts on the part of the national government 
ran directly counter to much of the theoretical rationale for decentralization that centered on 
bringing government closer to the people and empowering citizens with a greater role in oversight 
and decision-making processes. 
                                                     
5 Law 358 of 1997 
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From the perspective of proponents of these recentralizing reforms, the driving logic was 
that the new rules would increase funding for health and education, and relieve local fiscal deficits. 
Also, these reforms were expected to improve the quality of education, health, and other local 
services by bringing about a reorganization of the administrative apparatus charged with basic 
service delivery. Finally, legislators believed that by forcing local governments to manage more 
expenses and responsibilities, they were increasing their administrative autonomy. In 
compensation for these reforms reducing local fiscal and administrative autonomy, local 
governments benefited with a one-time authorization to use savings from oil extraction to pay local 
debt.6  
The resulting transfers system included specific spending options allowed for each source 
of funding. Table 2.1 presents each policy area where municipal governments have responsibilities 
and potential funding sources for projects in each of them. Overall, the new transfers scheme 
creates three distinct choices for local governments. First, given that discretionary funds could be 
used in any number of policy areas, local authorities willing to build a road, for example, would 
have to spend much of their limited discretionary funds on it at the expense of other potential 
projects. Thus, choosing which actions would be prioritized, at the expense of other possible 
actions, become a central strategic decision for local authorities. Second, since funding for 
education, health and water are the targets for most national transfers, and local budgets in general, 
spending decisions in those areas become a central part of local affairs and an important tool to 
achieve electoral goals. Finally, local authorities must decide how much effort and resources they 
are willing to expend in order to secure additional financial support from national or departmental 
governments for local projects.  
                                                     
6 Decree 1939, 2001.  
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Table 2.1 Possible Funding Sources for Projects in Each Policy Area, Colombia 
Policy area Potential Funding 
Education 58.5% of National Transfers/ Own 
resources/Additional funding from Projects 
funded by the National and Departmental 
Governments. 
Health  24.5% of National Transfers/ Own 
resources/Additional funding from Projects 
funded by the National and Departmental 
Governments. 
Water supply and sanitation 11.6% of National Transfers/ Own 
resources/Additional funding from Projects 
funded by the National and Departmental 
Governments. 
Education, Health, Water Supply and 
Sanitation, Public utilities, Culture, 
Tourism, Housing, Social Security, 
Transportation, Environment, Sports 
and Recreation, Disaster Prevention and 
Relief, Public Security, Land Use 
Planning, and Support for Victims of 
Political Violence   
Remaining 5.4% of National Transfers/ Own 
resources/Additional funding from Projects 
funded by the National and Departmental 
Governments. 
 
The partition of local spending decisions into three distinct choices allows us to categorize 
potential distributive spending portfolios in Colombia. To restrict local spending alternatives, 
national authorities use at least three mechanisms. First, fiscal reforms shape local choices by 
earmarking most of national transfers. Through this mechanism, local governments must spend 
earmarked national transfers on predefined areas. Such restrictions reduce the range of collective 
and constituency-specific projects and goods local governments may offer. Second, the devolution 
of many responsibilities to local authorities without parallel funding, in other words unfunded 
mandates, has come to characterize the situation many local governments in Colombia now face. 
Although assuming new responsibilities seemingly expands local authority, these competencies 
overcrowd available funds to the point where there is little room for local initiative. Finally, 
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national authorities actively approve or discard local initiatives to receive additional funding for 
programs funded by the national government. National authorities get to design and grant funding 
for projects that promote their interests, while local authorities are subject to an oftentimes 
arbitrary grant application process in their efforts to secure funding for specific projects.  
These mechanisms limiting local autonomy in Colombia are another expression of existing 
strategies used by national authorities to relocate the power of the purse back in the national capital. 
Other strategies include creating new subnational institutions with which local governments have 
to bargain, or mobilizing social support for national programs (Dickovick and Eaton 2013). For 
example, national authorities in Senegal, Uganda and Nepal have limited the autonomy of local 
governments to manage forest resources by selectively devolving control over some areas, while 
keeping control over the most profitable (Ribot, Agrawal, and Larson 2006). National authorities 
may also have the final say over local affairs. Peruvian national authorities have made access to 
additional funding for local governments conditional on their satisfaction of national demands for 
the implementation of local territorial regulations (Eaton 2015). Also, national governments can 
also limit the reach of local policy decisions by reducing the administrative and fiscal resources 
necessary to actually implement those policies. Through this strategy, local governments depend 
on receiving national support to manage complex administrative tasks and to fund programs that 
satisfy their constituencies’ needs (Wunsch 2001).  
 
Strategies to Manipulate Local Spending in a Context of Recentralization 
 
Distributive offers amid recentralization reforms go beyond a simple choice between 
collective and private goods. In contexts like Colombia, where fiscal and administrative 
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recentralization coexists with lively electoral competition, local authorities face a range of choices 
when determining what type of distributive strategy will reap the most useful electoral benefits. 
These options include an exclusive focus on private or public goods or a mix of both. Moreover, 
the menu of private and collective that a local government is equipped to provide are not equally 
useful in terms of gaining electoral support. Delivering books to children may be less effective 
than delivering cash subsidies, for example, even if their monetary cost were equal. Finally, some 
scholars argue that politicians also have an eye toward capturing unused government monies for 
their personal benefit, though in a context of limited resources this seems unlikely to be too 
common (Gervasoni 2010). Because of these considerations, and building on existing theories of 
distributive politics, I argue that local governments may respond to their limited spending 
alternatives using one or several of three strategies to construct the most useful, in electoral terms, 
spending portfolio.  
First, local governments that depend to a great extent on earmarked national transfers can 
prioritize certain areas within the more general mandated policy areas. Thus, even though local 
governments are required to spend national transfers in specific policy areas, they still have some 
flexibility to direct funds to specific targets within the broader mandated area. For example, in the 
area of education, a mayor facing multiple points of electoral opposition and thus seeking to 
maximize the electoral returns on education spending may choose to build schools in certain places 
rather than improve the quality of education through better staffing and supplies. In contrast, 
mayors in more unitary contexts will likely focus on sustaining the provision of education services 
to most of the population, even if that entails less visible expenses. This choice should also prevent 
them from funding the most visible expenses of education provision.  I will refer to this as the 
“local adaptation strategy.” 
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Another approach local incumbents may follow when faced with tight fiscal constraints 
and a competitive electoral context is to spend their few discretionary funding in a way that has 
the most potential of boosting their short-term public approval. Given the combination of a wide 
range of governance responsibilities alongside limited budgets, we should expect an incumbent to 
focus her manipulation efforts on a narrow range of specific spending projects that are certain to 
produce results rather than undertaking a wide range of possibly less effective actions. In factional 
contexts, we should see the former approach with a high degree of targeting. This might include, 
for example, small sums of money on public events (e.g., celebrating Mother’s Day, or Peasant’s 
Day), the distribution of low cost items such as tools for agriculture, or clothing to a small group 
of individuals. Since the winning electoral coalition for politicians in these contexts will likely be 
more concentrated geographically we may see more of these smaller, low-cost, but highly targeted 
spending project. In such a context, we may also see more emphasis on the prioritization of 
spending alternatives away from public sight that, for example, benefit local bureaucracies.  
In contrast, we should expect local governments that face fewer electoral competitors to 
spend on projects that may be less visible but are designed to benefit a larger number of 
constituents. This includes guaranteeing with additional funds the provision of education and 
health services. Also, needing to reach a greater number of individuals, local governments in more 
unitary contexts should be less likely to allot funds to less visible actions, such as taking steps to 
improve local bureaucracies. I will refer to this strategy as the “targeted pandering strategy”. 
The third strategy local politicians may pursue as they face diverse electoral contexts 
amidst fiscal recentralization efforts is to highlight as much as possible their involvement in the 
execution of nationally funded programs. Such efforts at credit-claiming will likely result in an 
increased politicization of the program but exploits the fact that national governments increasingly 
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control the execution of major social programs while local authorities still retain some role in the 
implementation stage (Dickovick and Eaton 2013).  For example, in Brazil, mayors benefit from 
the nationally controlled program Bolsa Escola, as evidenced by work that shows mayors exert 
more effort executing the program when running for reelection (de Janvry, Finan, and Sadoulet 
2012). The involvement of mayors executing national programs is also common in Colombia, 
where public documents and presentations of local governments’ executions make frequent 
reference to how they are supported by the governor or the national government.  
Importantly, local governments are not always passive recipients of these resources. 
Although it varies by program, using this strategy requires that local governments exert some 
effort, for example, applying for national grants or contributing local resources to the execution of 
the program. Local governments following this strategy then have an incentive to support the 
electoral success of national authorities to the extent that further enjoying the benefits of important 
national programs is contingent on who is ruling at the national level.  The pursuit of this strategy, 
then, can lead to the loss, or deterioration, of the independent political voice of local officials as 
their electoral success becomes dependent on the electoral success of the incumbent national 
government. Moreover, local electoral needs are likely to shape the reach of national programs. 
Particularly, local governments facing highly factional competition should be more likely to apply 
to national programs but requesting fewer funding than public officials in contexts with more 
unitary electoral support. I will refer to this strategy as the “local appropriation strategy” of 
responding to the electoral incentives in a context of reduced spending autonomy.   
The extent to which local governments exploit each of these three strategies depends on 
the type of electoral context they face and the degree of flexibility they have. For example, local 
governments who are forced to supplement education funding from the national government with 
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their own funding should be less likely to invest in improving local bureaucracies. Therefore, their 
emphasis on the provision of education with earmarked funds also shapes spending of 
discretionary funds and ultimately harms their administrative capacity to apply for projects funded 
by the national government. In contrast, local governments in factional contexts likely will be less 
interested in having an extensive reach when using earmarked and discretionary funds. These 
choices should allow them to invest in having local bureaucracies better equipped to navigate the 
technicalities of presenting projects to national agencies.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Decentralization reforms are increasingly facing recentralizing efforts to avoid the risks of 
having local autonomy to foster local innovation, but at the same time, opening the opportunity 
for damaging fiscal deficits. In this context of shrinking autonomy, local governments face varying 
choice sets depending on the rules governing their various funding sources. In consequence, local 
officials facing different electoral contexts ranging from factional to unitary are expected to 
implement any of three spending strategies. Local adaptations to earmarked funds, targeted 
pandering of supporters, and the local appropriation of national programs are possible local 
responses to national efforts to limit local spending choices. These strategies may be relevant to 
many countries around the world to the extent that existing decentralization efforts are plagued 
with restrictions beyond what proponents of this development strategy anticipate.   
Coming chapters evaluate how Colombian local officials under disparate electoral contexts 
adapt their behavior to advance their electoral goals. In contrast to existing theories of distributive 
politics, proposed response strategies consider national efforts to limit local autonomy through 
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earmarked funding, overcrowding local responsibilities, and making final decisions about 
nationally funded projects. Under these challenging conditions, expected benefits of greater 
electoral competition may become an unfulfilled promise.     
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CHAPTER 3  
 
LOCAL ADAPTATION TO RECENTRALIZATION IN COLOMBIA 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The provision of education services in a highly constrained fiscal environment places a 
premium on the few decisions local political officials make with respect to the limited spending 
discretion available to them. Although electoral considerations may motivate these choices, 
recentralizing rules also determine which areas of education spending are most vulnerable to 
political manipulation. In the case of Colombia, contrary to the widely publicized decentralization 
of education services carried out during the 1990s, the country’s municipalities now confront a 
classic case of unfunded mandates in which they are still stuck with the responsibilities of 
providing education but have very limited fiscal autonomy with which to carry out these duties 
(Falleti 2010). Recentralizing reforms in 2001 earmarked 58.5% of national transfers to education 
provision. However, only large cities and departmental governments are provided sufficient fiscal 
autonomy with which to manage these funds. Most Colombian municipalities are far more 
constrained, having spending discretion for only 2% of earmarked transfers for education. Despite 
such enormous financial limitations, municipalities are responsible for improving the quality of 
education being offered to the vast majority of students who attend public schools. In such a 
context, local officials have a limited choice set with respect to how they might go about addressing 
the quality of education in their communities. These include building and maintaining schools, 
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buying supplies and didactic materials, offering school transportation, and training teachers. These 
alternatives, although limited, still offer the opportunity to strategically direct the limited available 
funds to one area over another and it is this question of the political strategies employed in a context 
with a highly limited menu of options that I explore in the following pages.  
Using evidence from disaggregated spending information, geolocation of schools, and the 
number of schools and teachers across time, I find that municipal officials in Colombia do indeed 
respond in fairly systematic ways to their electoral contexts by manipulating the few earmarked 
funds for education under their control. In a context where resources for education are scarce and 
subject to strong restrictions, I find that incumbents facing a factional electoral context, that is one 
with multiple viable opposition parties, tend to prioritize spending choices that entail investments 
like building new schools and complimentary expenses (i.e., supplies for new schools), and 
programs that make local authorities’ influence visible to citizens through goods benefiting 
individuals directly (i.e., free schooling, receiving lunches). Moreover, although investing in more 
components of education, I find that such a diverse spending portfolio necessarily entails dividing 
their limited budgets into several actions but with a limited scope. In contrast, this set of choices 
is electorally unfeasible to reach enough potential supporters in unitary contexts. Local 
governments in contexts where one party dominates tend not to undertake actions that benefit only 
a limited constituency, like targeting specific neighborhoods with a new school or other education 
infrastructure, because they would then risk losing support from their supporters in other areas of 
the town. Additionally, local governments in unitary contexts cannot afford to focus primarily on 
particularistic benefits because of the fiscal constraints they face. Thus, their preferred approach 
is to focus on delivering collective benefits through the continued provision of education services, 
even if that entails less visible actions. We therefore should expect, for example, to see fewer high 
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profile education projects in these contexts and more attention to the daily operation of the existing 
education system.  
These analyses provide a fine-grained perspective on how a public service like education, 
subject to nationally imposed regulations, is manipulated to satisfy the needs of incumbents 
seeking to advance their political careers across distinct local electoral contexts. Although political 
motivations are often obscured by the universal nature of access to education and the fact that the 
recentralization of most education expenditures in Colombia has greatly reduced the discretion of 
local officials, I find that these factors only make more significant the political manipulation of 
local spending on public goods like education (Min 2015).  
 
Local Adaptation in Education Provision in Colombia 
 
Decentralization of education provision in Colombia started in 1987, when municipalities 
were granted both the fiscal and administrative capacity to oversee and manage the construction, 
supply, and maintenance of the local education system. Not under their control during this period 
were teachers and administrative staff, an area of responsibility assigned to department 
governments. This changed in 1988 when municipal authorities were given these powers as well.  
In 1993, new legislation established the basic framework that continues to exist today. 
Departments were granted the authority to certify whether municipal authorities have the capacity 
to manage national transfers, teachers, and administrative personnel. Otherwise, the corresponding 
department controls those functions. This plan became further consolidated in 2001, when new 
rules for national transfers established that, beginning in 2004, national transfers for education 
would have two lines of funding. One of them would go exclusively toward the funding of the 
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operation of local schools. This includes the salaries of teachers and administrative personnel. 
However, only departmental capitals and municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants or 
adequate administrative capacity manage these funds. Thus, departmental authorities were charged 
with overseeing the payment of teachers´ salaries and other operation costs in municipalities 
lacking this authority. The second line of funding falls under a more discretionary category of 
“quality improvements” that allows municipal officials greater flexibility in terms of where those 
funds are directed. Spending options include designing new schools, school construction and 
maintenance, supplies and didactic materials, financing for public utilities of schools, student 
transportation, teacher training, providing meals to students, education quality improvement plans, 
and student scholarships and subsidies  
Figure 3.1 Average Percentage of Municipalities that Spent Money on Each Component, 2008-
2015 
 
Despite existing regulations, Colombian mayors control spending decisions dealing with a 
limited number of education expenses. One way mayors exercise their limited autonomy is by 
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allotting no funding to some expenses. Figure 3.1 displays the average proportion of municipalities 
between 2008 and 2015 allotting any funds in each allowed expense of education provision. 
Overall, most expenses in control of municipalities are financed by a large proportion of 
municipalities. The most salient exception is paying for free schooling. This national policy began 
in 2008, but only was put into practice in 2011. Although national authorities transferred new 
resources to finance this policy, not all municipalities took advantage of those funds. It is also 
notable that there are about 40% of municipalities that do not allot any funds to building new 
schools, and about 90% that do not spend any money on teacher training. Through analysis of 
these choices, I hope to gain insight into the political motivations of local authorities that opt to 
target spending choices that have a limited number of beneficiaries versus those that use their 
limited discretion to sustain widespread education services.  
One implication of the theory I laid out above is that we should find more attention to 
targeted, limited beneficiary spending in factional electoral contexts where incumbents must 
secure the electoral support of a limited but specific constituency. Also, lower costs of reaching 
limited constituencies allows to have funding for alternative components of education provision. 
Thus, we should see more of a focus in these contexts on building schools and a greater inclination 
to invest at improving local education (e.g., training teachers). In more unitary contexts, 
conversely, we should see attention to less visible expenses associated to the daily operation of 
schools. Similarly, regarding a second choice that local officials face, governments in factional 
contexts should invest in the more visible components of education provision (e.g., free schooling, 
building new schools) at the expense of school inputs (e.g., school supplies). In contrast, local 
governments in unitary contexts should be more likely to finance less visible components of 
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education provision at the expense of more visible actions that benefit selected groups (Harding 
and Stasavage 2014). 
Local officials in Colombia face a third choice regarding these discretionary funds. In 
addition to selecting where to target funds, these officials must also decide how much to spend in 
those areas they do target. In this regard, the amount should be a function of the reach it is expected 
to have. Thus, officials in more unitary contexts should spend more on those areas that have a 
wider reach, while officials in more factional contexts will not only target, but also spend smaller 
amounts on projects that have a more limited number of beneficiaries.  
These strategic choices imply that spending efficiency goes beyond whether local or central 
authorities make spending decisions. Most decentralized contexts involve a mixture where both 
local and national authorities play a role in shaping local spending patterns. In this interaction, 
while national rules may define a constrained set of spending alternatives, local governments may 
still respond to their electoral contexts by prioritizing certain areas and the amount spent, at the 
expense of other components. These choices that I view as at least in part driven by local electoral 
conditions are what I refer to as the local adaptation strategy.    
Classic theories of fiscal federalism posit that local governments are more efficient and 
effective in spending decisions than central authorities since they have better information about 
local needs. Also, local governments are expected to compete among themselves to provide better 
public goods and services (Tiebout 1956). Such competition would prevent corruption and 
wasteful spending decisions. However, effective competition also requires that local governments 
have enough discretion over expenditures to be able to effectively ensure implementation of 
whatever policies they decide to pursue. Lacking such fiscal autonomy, local officials will be 
unable to effectively tailor spending decisions to solve local needs.  
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Additionally, when local revenue generation simply is funneled into the coffers of the 
national government, and then re-distributed back to local governments, this will reduce the 
incentives to increase local revenue. If local governments were to try to increase their revenue, 
they would receive only a fraction of additional funds collected through their effort. Very often, 
national authorities redistribute funds without considering the contribution made by any given 
local government to generate additional revenue. This outcome, known as the common-pool 
problem, has an additional implication for the local provision of goods and services. Distribution 
of national transfers becomes a coalition-building tool that incentivizes national authorities to 
allocate funds in a way that does not reflect the needs of the population. To the contrary, spending 
restrictions are designed to favor national policy goals.  
Finally, the resulting influence of the national government on local policymaking distorts 
local accountability. Local governments may blame national authorities for failures and claim 
credit for policies initiated by the national government (Weingast 2009). These effects of fiscal 
recentralization on the behavior of local authorities curtails the possibility that spending decisions 
respond efficiently to local needs. On the contrary, in contexts where national authorities control 
funding, policy, and credit-claiming opportunities while at the same time, local authorities 
continue to depend on the public approval to advance their political careers, local governments 
will prioritize spending choices that advance their electoral goals over efforts to maintain and 
improve the quality of local services.  
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Data and Methods 
 
I assess the extent to which the local adaptation strategy I describe above is used in 
Colombia with information from two mayoral terms (2008-2011 and 2012-2015) for which I have 
detailed spending and electoral data.7 My empirical approach addresses several challenges to 
studying political manipulations of spending decisions. Most studies testing the political use of 
public spending have two critical weaknesses: incompleteness and clustering. Incompleteness 
occurs when scholars focus on specific programs and neglect others. These choices, many times 
based on convenience, produce different conclusions depending on which expenses scholars 
choose to analyze  (Kramon and Posner 2013).8 On the other hand, clustering refers to a situation 
where researchers combine or compare various sources of revenue without considering whether 
each of the component spending areas conforms to similar or different rules (Bonvecchi and 
Lodola 2010). To avoid using handpicked types of spending (e.g., education, health, or 
infrastructure), I analyze all of the spending areas related to education provision that municipal 
governments control. Also, I restrict analyses in this chapter to expenses paid with funds 
earmarked to education. 
Another challenge comes from the possibility that past spending patterns influence the 
number of candidates that decide to compete for local office. Existing strategies to address the 
possibility of reverse causation include taking advantage of natural experiments such as off-cycle 
elections (Fukumoto, Horiuchi, and Tanaka 2011), or using the size of municipal legislatures as 
an instrumental variable (Arvate 2013). This chapter and the following chapters in this dissertation 
                                                     
7 Although electoral data is available since 1997, information detailing the source of funding for each payment exists 
only since 2008. Nonetheless, available information covers enough time to uncover general patterns.   
8 This selectiveness also raises the possibility of publication bias by which we only get to know about spending choices 
that support the possibility of electoral manipulation.  
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rely on the fact that the number of seats in Colombian municipal legislatures (Consejos 
municipales) reflect the population size of the municipality. For example, municipalities with 
populations between 5,001 and 10,000 people elect nine councilors, while those between 10,001 
and 20,000 elect eleven.9 This arrangement allows me to exploit the fact that one effect of having 
larger electoral districts is to incentivize more candidates to participate (Cox 1997). Importantly, 
population ranges defining the size of local legislatures and the resulting increase in electoral 
fragmentation are independent of past spending patterns (Arvate 2013). In consequence, the 
resulting instrumented effective number of candidates reflects the average change in electoral 
fragmentation due to this somewhat arbitrary population thresholds. It is important to emphasize 
that although the number of seats in municipal legislatures reflect larger populations, the specific 
thresholds at which the number of seats changes are completely exogenous to future spending 
patterns. Moreover, given such institutional setup, it is very unlikely that municipalities will 
manipulate their populations to have a desired number of seats. In this study, that possibility is 
completely discarded since the number of seats during the period of study (2008-2015) was 
defined, and remained fixed, based on the 2005 Census. Although enabling, this strategy requires 
us to be cognizant of its limitations. Following analysis refer to the impact of increased electoral 
fragmentation due to changes in the number of seats in local legislatures rather than to the overall 
electoral fragmentation. Although the later involves a more complete assessment of local electoral 
contexts, they involve many unobservable determinants that may bias any estimation of the impact 
of greater electoral fragmentation on local spending patterns.10   
                                                     
9 For the two terms studied here (2008-2011 and 2012-2015), the size of local councils reflects the 2005 census. 
10 I most analyses, I present results for the instrumented effective number of candidates. The use of instrumental 
variable estimation and results for the instrumented independent variable are clearly noted. Otherwise, I am using the 
raw effective number of candidates.  
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Given that mayors are making a series of distinct choices with respect to education funding 
at the local level, I employ separate models of local spending decisions. The first model assesses 
whether mayors spend any funds on a given area of education spending (see Figure 3.1) or decide 
not to fund it at all. In a second stage of the analysis, for those municipalities that do spend money 
on a given area, I analyze variations in how much they spend (measured in thousands Colombian 
pesos per capita). With the first analysis, I test whether local governments in more factional 
contexts are more likely to target certain areas of education than mayors in unitary contexts due to 
their need to direct limited funds to specific constituencies. Through the second analysis, I look at 
whether officials in factional electoral contexts spend significantly different amounts than officials 
in unitary contexts.  
A third analysis explores the degree to which local authorities finance some education 
projects at the expense of underfunding systematically other components of education provision 
(i.e., build schools at the expense of training teachers).  To capture these dynamics, I use existing 
tools for compositional analysis. Proportions of funds spent in each component of education 
services are transformed into log-ratios before using regular statistical techniques. Specifically, I 
use as my dependent variable the ratio of the proportion spent in any two education expenses. This 
is known in compositional analysis as balances. For example, I compare the proportion spent in 
school construction versus buying supplies. A positive balance means that project investments for 
the numerator receives greater emphasis than expenses in the denominator (with the reverse for 
negative balances). Through this analysis, I will test whether local governments in factional 
contexts put greater emphasis on the larger and more visible components of education provision 
at the expense of the less visible components of education compared to mayors in unitary contexts. 
I also examine whether local governments in unitary contexts emphasize sustaining education 
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services for most of the population at the expense of more visible investments that I expect mayors 
in more factional contexts will be more likely to pursue.  
In these three analyses, I use the same set of control variables in a series of instrumental 
variable analyses. My main independent variable is the effective number of candidates running for 
mayor to measure the extent of local electoral fragmentation. However, I rely on the shifts in the 
number of seats in the local legislature (i.e., instrumental variable) to estimate exogenous variation 
in the effective number of candidates. Additionally, I include a series of controls for other factors 
influencing spending choices. First, I control for the margin of victory to assess the extent to which 
local electoral fragmentation has an impact on spending decisions independent of how close are 
electoral outcomes. Also, I control for the size of discretionary budgets. Larger budgets should 
allow local governments to spend greater amounts across policy areas, and citizens should feel 
more compelled to keep their governments accountable for what they paid in local taxes (Paler 
2013). I also control for local turnout in the previous mayoral election. I expect that if those who 
abstain are different from those voting, then electoral outcomes should reflect the preferences of 
the voting population to a greater extent when turnout is higher (Fowler 2015). Also, places with 
a more engaged citizenry are more likely to make effective demands to their governments (Cleary 
2007). I control for the partisan affiliation of the mayor, coded as 1 if the mayor’s party aligns with 
the party of the president and 0 otherwise. Co-partisan mayors should be more willing to advance 
national policies through local decisions. I also include a measure of local partisan loyalties that 
consists of the difference between the vote share for mayor and for his party´s list running for the 
local legislature. Spending manipulations should be more frequent in contexts where partisan 
attachments are weaker than in places where electoral choices follow partisan loyalties  (Luna 
2014, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Finally, I also control for poverty, using an index of 
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unsatisfied basic needs based on census data; the logged population density; the proportion of rural 
population; whether a municipality is a departmental capital; and year fixed effects.   
 
Local Adaptation of Education Spending in Colombia 
 
Table 3.1 summarizes results of a series of instrumental variable probit analyses testing the 
effect of the instrumented effective number of candidates on the probability that local governments 
spend any funds in each of the education expense categories (first column). I note whether the 
effect is positive or negative if coefficients were statistically significant, and I leave cells shaded 
with blue when the effect is null. In general, compared with unitary contexts, local governments 
in factional contexts are more likely to allot funds to design and build new schools, train teachers, 
operation costs, and school improvement plans. Conversely, local governments in unitary contexts 
are more likely to leave these areas without funding and instead devote funds to maintenance costs 
for existing schools. Overall, these results support my expectation that local officials in factional 
contexts are more likely to invest in the targeted improvement of education provision with new 
schools, training teachers, and actions to improve education quality. Given lower costs to reach 
targeted populations, local officials in factional contexts are significantly more likely to invest in 
several components of education provision. Conversely, local officials in unitary contexts choose 
to simply upkeep existing infrastructures.    
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Table 3.1 Models Predicting Education Priorities and the Amount Spent 
Education Expense 
(Effect of the I.V. ENP) 
IV. Probit 
Whether Local Governments 
Spent any Funds 
IV. Regression 
Amount Spent 
Designing New Schools +  
School Construction + - 
School Maintenance - - 
School Supplies  - 
Didactic Supplies  - 
Public Utilities  - 
Transportation  - 
Training + - 
Other Running Costs + - 
Lunches  - 
Improvement Plans +  
Free Schooling  - 
 
Running a second set of analyses using instrumental variable regressions predicting the 
amount spent I find that the effective number of candidates influences the amount spent in every 
spending category except for designing new schools and actions to improve local education (see 
Table 3.1). All other categories receive greater funding in more unitary contexts. This is consistent 
with the idea that local governments in less fragmented contexts, in an effort to reach a broader 
segment of the population, attempt to distribute the available funds more widely. 
 
Table 3.2 Effect of the Instrumented Effective Number of Candidates on the Balance of 
Spending Priorities 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Designing New Schools  - - - - - - - - - - - 
2. School Construction +  + + + + + + + + + + 
3. School Maintenance + -    -    - - - 
4. School Supplies + -    -    - - - 
5. Didactic Supplies + -    -    - - - 
6. Public Utilities + - + + +  + + + + +  
7. Transportation + -    -    -  - 
8. Training + -    -    - - - 
9. Other Running Costs + -    -      - 
10. Lunches + - + + + - + +    - 
11. Improvement Plans + - + + + -  +    - 
12. Free Schooling + - + + +  + + + + +  
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Table 3.2 summarizes the results of a series of regressions with an instrumental variable 
predicting the balance across pairs of spending alternatives in education. Since we are dealing with 
132 pairs (i.e., 132 different regressions), I focus on the results for the effective number of 
candidates in each of them. I indicate with cells colored in blue that balances between pairs of 
expenses are equal across electoral contexts (i.e., null effects). Cells with a positive (+) sign 
indicate that a greater number of effective candidates is associated with a greater emphasis on the 
category in each row compared to the corresponding column category. On the contrary, a negative 
(-) sign indicates that greater electoral fragmentation is associated with a greater emphasis on the 
expense in the column compared to the expense in the row.  
Through these series of analyses, we can gain insight into those areas that certain local 
governments systematically ignore in exchange for spending in other categories. Local 
governments in factional contexts systematically favor the construction of schools over every other 
spending categories (see the positive sign along the second row). Similarly, local officials in 
factional contexts prioritize spending for public utilities, lunches, and free tuition at the expense 
of most components of education provision. Local governments facing less electoral fragmentation 
finance their spending priorities by underfunding school construction, public utilities (given that 
there will be fewer schools), and the possibility of offering free tuition.  
Overall, these results suggest that electoral needs in places with more factional competition 
leads to a focus on more visible spending alternatives like building new schools and paying more 
on public utilities, and tangible benefits like free lunches and tuition. However, reflecting the 
number of voters needed to result elected, such investments have a significantly narrower scope. 
These choices appear to be inappropriate for unitary contexts given that it would take away 
significant funds that are necessary to reach a broader segment of constituents with regular 
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education services. This approach allows local governments in factional contexts to deliver 
benefits to credibly signal a politician’s commitment to the interests of some constituencies. 
Prioritizing these more durable and visible expenses in education (i.e., building new schools and 
offering free tuition) becomes central to the efforts of politicians in factional context to build 
loyalties (Albertus 2013). In contrast, since politicians in unitary contexts face the need to reach 
more voters with limited resources, they prioritize those expenditures categories that are guided 
by the effort to provide regular access to education services to most of the population without 
risking its funding by increasing the number of schools or offering free tuition to a few.  
 
Impact on Education Access of the Local Adaptation Strategy 
 
 To summarize, the local adaptation strategy manifests itself in distinct ways across 
factional and unitary electoral contexts. In the former, we find a focus on more durable and visible 
spending targets, while local governments in unitary contexts focus on sustaining regular education 
services. These choices also have important implications for the quality of local education. In 
factional contexts, where the building of new schools takes precedence over the proper staffing 
and maintenance of existing schools, the quality of education will suffer. The geographic 
distribution of schools should in many ways be a reflection of these political choices to benefit 
some groups over others  
We can explore this implication a bit more through the analysis of geolocation data of 
schools in each municipality.11 Using this information, I construct a version of the Clark and Evans 
aggregation index that captures the extent to which points (i.e., schools) are clustered or distanced 
                                                     
11 I was able to access the geolocation of schools in 853 out of 1100 municipalities as of 2012. 
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to a greater extent than what would happen at random (Clark and Evans 1954). According to this 
measure, values lower than 1 represent a more clustered geographic distribution of schools than 
what we would find if they were distributed randomly across the municipality. We should expect 
schools to be clustered around specific places, mainly inside the urban center. As an example, 
Figure 3.2 charts the distribution of schools according to their longitude (x-axis) and latitude (y-
axis) for two municipalities. The area of the rectangle is determined based on the farthest school 
in each direction. Panel A depicts the location of the 22 schools in La Paz (Santander), where the 
Clark and Evans aggregation index is equal to 0.49.  
In contrast, when this index is higher than 1, it means that schools are, on average, further 
away from each other compared to what a random distribution would produce. This is the case in 
panel B that represents the location of the 20 schools in Achí (Bolívar). Here we have a Clark and 
Evans index score of 1.37.   
Figure 3.2 Geographic Distribution of Schools in Two Colombian Municipalities 
 
Note: x-axis reflects schools’ longitude, y-axis corresponds to schools’ latitude. Squared 
areas comprise the space between the farthest schools in each direction within a given 
municipality.  
 
Using the Clark and Evans aggregation index as my dependent variable, I run a linear 
regression with an instrumental variable for the effective number of candidates and use the control 
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variables included in previous analyses, along with the number of schools per municipality. Results 
for this model appear in the first column of Table 3.3. I find that, on average, for each additional 
effective candidate, schools are 17% closer to each other than what is expected if schools were 
located at random. This is consistent with the tendency of local governments in factional contexts 
to benefit some groups, while local governments in less fragmented contexts spread schools across 
their municipalities.  
 
Table 3.3 Models Predicting Schools Geographic Distribution of Schools, and the Availability of 
Teachers 
 Clark and Evans 
Aggregation Index 
Teachers per 
1000 students- 
2008 term 
Teachers per 
1000 students- 
2012 term 
Effective Number of 
Candidates 
-0.831 (0.284)* -17.813 (6.273)* -6.976 (2.385)* 
Teachers per 1,000 
students at the end of the 
previous term 
 0.513 (0.067)* 0.718 (0.038)* 
Number of Schools -0.001 (0.000)*   
Margin of Victory -0.017 (0.007)* -0.431(0.161)* -0.134 (0.056)* 
Turnout -0.807 (0.609) -18.663 (9.510)* -2.119 (4.203) 
Partisan Loyalty -0.005 (0.002)* -0.003 (0.015) -0.040 (0.017)* 
Mayor aligned -0.178 (0.127) 0.150 (0.865) -2.313 (0.909)* 
Poverty 0.001 (0.002) -0.041 (0.028) -0.040 (0.016)* 
Logged Population 
Density 
0.128 (1.789) -47.859 (24.089)* -19.916 (12.942)* 
Department Capital 0.231 (0.219) 0.567 (2.761) 2.497 (1.563) 
Proportion of Rural 
Population 
-0.423 (0.309) 0.889 (3.829) 0.654 (2.030) 
Constant 4.621 (1.482)* 89.969 (29.209)* 44.549 (12.922)* 
N 714 1094 982 
R-squared 0.419 0.899 0.407 
Note: *p<0.05 
  In addition to shaping the location of schools, the tendency for local officials in factional 
contexts to underfund less visible aspects of education provision also should manifest itself in 
variations in the number of teachers per student we find. All else equal, factional contexts should 
have lower teacher-student ratios than unitary contexts given their tendency to invest in the more 
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visible components of education rather than securing a regular provision of education for most of 
the population. I run two regression models with instrumental variable predicting the number of 
teacher per 1000 students for two mayoral terms (2008 and 2012).12 In these models, I control for 
the same set of variables used in previous models, but I include the number of teachers per 1000 
students at the end of the previous administration to assess the increase during each term in the 
number of teachers.   
On average, by 2013,13 for each additional effective candidate, public schools have almost 
7 fewer teachers per 1000 students. Similarly, holding constant the number of teachers per 1000 
students at the end of the previous term in 2007, on average, by the end of that term in 2011, for 
every additional effective candidate, schools had 17 fewer teachers per 1000 students. So, 
consistent with my expectations, we find in factional contexts a situation where more schools have 
been built but fewer teachers have been hired. Also, efforts to limit local governments from using 
teacher positions for patronage require that new hires ought to be funded with local revenue. Such 
limitations produce this gap between building new schools and undertaking the additional effort 
needed to hire new teachers.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Overall, varying needs to reach citizens across electoral contexts produces completely 
different ways to provide education services. Municipalities with more factional electoral 
competition offer a greater number of schools that are clustered close together but have fewer 
                                                     
12 Data on the number of teachers and students per school come from the CEDE municipal panel, available here: 
https://datoscede.uniandes.edu.co/microdatos-detalle.php/263/panel-municipal-del-cede/ 
13 Although this term ends in 2015, I do not have information on the number of teachers for that year. However, during 
two years in office, there is already a sizable difference in the availability of teachers.  
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teachers staffing them. Such deficiency of teachers results from a general inclination to spend 
systematically less on every component of education provision than local officials un unitary 
contexts. In contrast, municipalities in unitary contexts are more likely to distribute schools more 
widespread and to guarantee the operation of regular education services. This approach to 
education provision results from prioritizing education expenses associated with the daily 
workings of schools, and from investing greater sums.  
These results suggest that local governments have a limited capacity to shape the provision 
of services subject to earmarking rules. However, different emphases are still visible across 
electoral contexts. The ability of local governments to adapt spending choices to varying electoral 
contexts should be even more apparent in the next chapter which explores spending choices under 
complete spending autonomy. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
TARGETED PANDERING IN A RECENTRALIZED CONTEXT 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Local governments in Colombia face a limited set of spending choices even when using 
discretionary funds. Although discretionary funding should offer local governments the 
opportunity to solve local needs effectively by directing money toward those areas most in need, 
the trend toward increased local government responsibilities and decreased fiscal autonomy has 
created a situation where the goals of decentralization are being undermined. Instead of targeting 
money to those areas most in need, local officials in competitive electoral contexts target these 
limited funds toward areas they expect will generate the most political returns in terms of votes on 
election day. The implication of this approach is that, contrary to what proponents of 
decentralization expected, electoral incentives are going to have a limited impact promoting 
solutions to most local problems. I refer to making electorally motivated spending choices with a 
limited scope as the targeted pandering strategy.    
As I did with the education in the previous chapter, in the following pages I expand my 
analysis of local spending decisions and the prevalence of this local pandering strategy by 
empirically evaluating whether local governments prioritize specific types of goods as a function 
of the local electoral context, how much of available funds are spent on specific areas, and the 
degree to which non-priority areas of local government responsibility are ignored. Overall, I find 
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that local electoral conditions influence a likelihood of addressing more problems and scope of 
those efforts. In particular, local officials in more factional contexts are more likely to address 
problems with a broader set of actions across  policy areas, but they devote significantly less 
funding than officials in more unitary contexts. In contrast, officials elected in more unitary 
contexts tend to pursue a more expansive political spending strategy in education than those 
officials in factional contexts. Beyond these findings, however, evidence of a systematic 
preference for collective or targeted goods is limited. 
 
Targeted Pandering in Colombia 
 
The 2001 reforms of national transfers identified and targeted problems in fifteen of 
eighteen policy areas in which municipal governments depend almost exclusively on their own 
revenue to fund. Facing numerous responsibilities but having limited budgets, local governments 
must make strategic choices about how to divide their budgets in a way that does not jeopardize 
the support of their electoral constituents. Specifically, Colombian local politicians face three 
distinct choices. Initially, local officials decide how to address problems in each policy area. Here, 
I classify every possible expense into four types of goods that encompasses common features 
across policy areas. First, investments to build new or to upkeep existing infrastructures. These 
actions include, for example, building new roads, schools, parks, public spaces, or new water pipes. 
Second, projects that can be targeted to some individuals. They include welfare programs 
benefiting specific groups (i.e., the elderly, peasants) or programs providing agriculture supplies. 
Third, projects that benefit entire communities. This includes projects related to environmental 
protection or health services. Finally, other expenses associated with the operation local 
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administrations. Although central to the work of local bureaucracies, these investments remain 
unnoticed to the population. They include, among others, training of local bureaucrats, advancing 
administrative reforms, social security costs of local employees, or paying for past deficits.  
Overall, from 2008 to 2015, local governments spent discretionary funds on 474 different 
budgetary items. Of these, 263 were collective projects, 74 involved building infrastructure, 51 
fell under administrative expenses, and 86 entailed actions that benefitted individuals directly. 
Given these alternatives, politicians elected by a large following should select collective goods 
with the potential to benefit most of the population to a greater extent than politicians in factional 
contexts. In contrast, local politicians in factional contexts who need to be more strategic in their 
“pandering efforts” should be more likely to prioritize targetable goods than governments in 
unitary contexts. For example, a mayor winning an office with only 20% of the vote due to the 
presence of multiple competitive candidates should be more likely to pursue direct cash subsidies 
that benefit specific groups than a mayor who entered office with the support of 50% of voters. In 
the latter case, such a selective targeting strategy would be of limited use and would possibly 
generate opposition among those not receiving the targeted benefits. Mayors elected in crowded 
elections therefore will have greater flexibility in deciding to whom they should target limited 
funds while those elected in a two-person race ought to commit most of their discretionary budgets 
to provide collective goods to their many supporters.   
The second question facing local officials in Colombia is how much they should spend on 
their preferred policy areas. Following distributive politics theories, I expect that mayors in 
factional contexts will need to spend less on their preferred areas than governments in more unitary 
contexts due to the more limited constituency size of the former. This should be the case 
independent of whether mayors deliver targetable or collective goods because the cost of both will 
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be higher for officials in unitary contexts who are trying to reach a larger (in relative terms) 
constituency.  
Finally, mayors must make a choice in terms of how much they want to finance their 
preferred types of goods by systematically underfunding less electorally effective alternatives. I 
expect that local governments in factional contexts will be more likely to focus on targetable goods 
at the expense of collective goods in each policy area. In contrast, local governments in unitary 
contexts should privilege collective goods, which benefit more people, at the expense of targetable 
alternatives. This choice should result in distinct approaches to address local problems. For 
example, when addressing health needs, unitary contexts should enjoy better equipped hospitals, 
but at the same time they should underfund programs subsidizing health insurance for the poorest.    
 
Data and Methods  
 
As I did in the previous chapter’s analysis of education spending, I proceed here with an 
analysis first of the overall spending patterns of local governments with the expectation that 
mayors in factional contexts will be more likely to focus on targetable goods than mayors in unitary 
contexts. I then turn to an analysis of the amount spent in specific policy areas. Here I test whether 
local governments in factional governments spend fewer funds on the areas they decide to target 
than officials in unitary contexts. The expectation, again, is that once deciding on an area to target, 
officials in unitary contexts will have to devote a higher level of spending (per capita) in order to 
reap the expected electoral benefits because they must target a broader constituency. Conversely, 
in more factional contexts, officials can get away with spending less on a specific area and still 
benefit electorally. The third set of analyses follows the approach I applied in the previous chapter 
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in order to explore whether local governments systematically fund some goods at the expense of 
others in any given policy area (i.e., collective versus targetable goods).  Here, I use as dependent 
variable the ratio between the share of discretionary budgets spent in any given type of goods and 
the share spent in any of the other three alternatives. For example, I compare the proportion spent 
on targetable goods versus collective, or infrastructure expenses. A positive balance means that 
expenses in goods in the numerator receive greater emphasis than goods in the denominator (and 
conversely for negative balances). Through these analyses, I test whether local governments in 
factional contexts spend in targetable goods by cutting expenses in collective goods more 
frequently than mayors in unitary contexts. Also, whether local governments in unitary contexts 
finance collective goods at the expense of targetable goods compared to mayors in more factional 
contexts.  
Overall, theses sets of analyses go beyond past studies that focus solely on how political 
conditions affect the amount spent in a specific policy area (Golden and Min 2013). In order to 
provide a more comprehensive assessment of local spending strategies, I include every expense 
grouped into four types of goods across the eighteen policy areas over which local governments 
have responsibilities. Also, I restrict analyses in this chapter to discretionary funds to avoid 
combining funding types subject to different rules. That is, this chapter focuses on expenses paid 
with local taxes and fully discretionary national transfers. Finally, these three sets of analyses also 
exploit the exogenous nature of the number of seats in local legislatures (consejos municipales), 
using it as an instrumental variable to exogenously estimate the effect of the effective number of 
candidates on various spending choices. Consistent with analyses in chapter 3, I use the same set 
of control variables throughout this chapter.   
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Evidence of Targeted Pandering in Colombia 
 
Colombian mayors do not allot funds on every policy area to the same extent. Figure 4.1 
reveals the extent to which mayors in Colombia have invested in each of the 18 policy areas 
between 2008 and 2015. Through this period, almost every municipality spent some funds in social 
programs for vulnerable groups, transportation, efforts to improve local administrative, and 
security. In contrast, less than 60% of municipalities invested in strengthening communal 
organizations, economic development, and water supply. Unless these places benefit from 
programs funded by national and departmental authorities, many citizens are likely to see their 
needs in many areas unmet by their local governments.   
Figure 4.1 Average Percentage of Colombian Municipalities Making Any Investment by Policy 
Area, 2008-2015 
 
Although the number of municipalities making any investments in every policy area has 
been growing, their prevalence is very similar throughout this period. Consequently, if local 
governments manipulate spending decisions for electoral reasons, such manipulations are likely to 
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take place within each policy area rather than prioritizing some areas over others. Otherwise, we 
should observe greater variation across policy priorities through time associated with swings of 
electoral conditions.  I assess the extent to which local governments facing different electoral 
contexts approach each policy area using particular goods in the first set of models. These models 
predict whether local governments spend any money at all on a given type of goods (coded as 1) 
or not (coded as 0) to address the needs of each policy area. Given the binary nature of the 
dependent variable and the possibility of reverse causality, I use instrumental variable probit 
models.  
Table 4.1 summarizes the results related to whether the effective number of candidates 
influences the probability of approaching problems in each policy area with a particular type of 
goods. Given that this set of analyses involves 61 different I.V. probit regressions, I represent 
results for the main variable of interest (i.e., the instrumented effective number of candidates) in 
the following way. Cells in black represent those areas in which no local governments spent 
discretionary funds, and cells in blue represent those areas in which the effective number of 
candidates had an insignificant effect on the probability that a government devoted funds there. In 
those cases where there was a significant effect, I note whether the effect is positive (+) or negative 
(-).  
Table 4.1 Effect of the Instrumented Effective Number of Candidates on Whether Local 
Governments Spent in Specific Types of Goods, by Policy Area 
 Types of Goods 
 Infrastructure Administrative Targetable Collective 
Education  + - - 
Health +  +  
Water and Sewage    - 
Sports and Recreation     
Culture     
Other Public Utilities (not sewage) -  - + 
Housing -    
Agriculture  +   
Transportation    + 
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Environment  + + + 
Jails + -  + 
Disaster Prevention  + + + 
Economic Development  + +  
Vulnerable Groups +    
Public Buildings  +   
Communal Capacity   +  
Administrative Capacity    + 
Justice and Security + +   
 
Overall, and largely consistent with the findings from the previous chapter, I find that local 
governments in more unitary contexts are more likely to allot funds to education services than 
governments in factional contexts. This includes teachers’ salaries, lunches, equipment for schools, 
and offering school transportation, among other items. Additionally, local governments in more 
unitary contexts are more likely to invest in public illumination, subsidizing electricity bills, and 
expanding electric grids to rural areas. Finally, governments in less fragmented contexts are more 
likely to invest in subsidizing housing projects, and paying for debts of jails. All of these areas 
tend to be ones with a wide range of beneficiaries across the entire municipality. Conversely, these 
officials are less likely than those in more factional contexts to spend any funds on hospitals, health 
insurance for the poor, natural disaster preparation, environmental protection activities, or 
improving local bureaucracies. These areas, among others, are more likely to get funding by local 
governments in more factional contexts.  
These patterns are somewhat inconsistent with the idea that local governments in factional 
contexts should prioritize targetable goods while governments in more unitary contexts should 
emphasize collective goods. Although I find that local governments in unitary contexts are more 
likely to use discretionary funding to ensure the regular provision of education services, local 
governments in more factional contexts are left with funds to allot to any of the existing spending 
alternatives rather than just on targetable goods. Consequently, although local governments in 
more unitary contexts are more likely to offer regular education services, they are also more likely 
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to abstain from addressing local problems in other policy areas. In sum, it appears that education 
is a sector that best reveals the distinct spending priorities and strategies of officials in unitary and 
factional electoral contexts. It remains to be seen, however, whether a more nuanced assessment 
of spending priorities will further reveal these strategic differences.  
My second set of analyses assesses whether the amount spent in each type of goods vary 
across electoral contexts. Here, my dependent variable is the amount of money (per capita) spent 
on a particular area among those municipalities that decided to spend at least some money on a 
particular type of good. For these analyses, I use instrumental variable regressions and the same 
set of control variables as in past analysis. Again, since we are dealing with 62 different 
regressions, Table 4.2 presents results for the impact of the effective number of candidates on the 
amount per capita spent in each type of good by policy area. Cells in blue indicate insignificant 
results, and in those cases where there was a significant effect, I note whether the effect is positive 
(+) or negative (-).  
 
Table 4.2 Effect of the Instrumented Effective Number of Candidates on the Amount Spent in 
Each Type of Goods, by Policy Area 
 Types of Goods 
 Infrastructure Administrative Targetable Collective 
Education - - - - 
Health -  - - 
Water and Sewage -  - - 
Sports and Recreation - -  - 
Culture - - - - 
Other Public Utilities (not sewage) - - - - 
Housing -  -  
Agriculture -  -  
Transportation - -  - 
Environment  -  - 
Jails -   - 
Disaster Prevention - - - - 
Economic Development   - - 
Vulnerable Groups -  -  
Public Buildings - -   
Communal Capacity   - - 
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Administrative Capacity  -  - 
Justice and Security -   - 
 
Overall, when investing in a given type of good, local governments in factional contexts 
spend on average less than governments in more unitary contexts. Although there are a couple of 
goods, particularly administrative expenses, that do not seem to respond to electoral 
considerations, there is consistent evidence that the amount local governments spend in any given 
activity is associated with size of the electoral coalition that put them in power. Moreover, although 
local governments in factional contexts are more likely to invest in most of these spending 
alternatives, their actions are going to have a limited scope.  
 
The final set of analyses seeks to test theories of distributive politics asserting that 
preferences for some goods entail underfunding other goods. That is, governments offering 
collective goods should also underfund targetable goods. I test this possibility, as before, 
classifying spending items within each policy area into four general types of gods: infrastructure, 
targetable, collective, and administrative. Within each policy area, using a measure of their relative 
balance, I assess if local governments, for example, allot a greater proportion of funds to targetable 
projects and underfunded new infrastructures. I ran independent models for each pair of types of 
goods in each policy area. That is, I run twelve models for each of the eighteen policy areas 
predicting the extent to which the effective number of candidates influences the balance of funds 
allotted to pairs of types of goods (e.g., targetable versus collective). The following table presents 
the policy areas in which the effective number of candidates have a significant effect on the balance 
between the type of good in the row relative to the good in the column. For clarity, I do not note 
analysis resulting in null effects for the effective number of candidates. In parenthesis, I note 
whether the effect is positive (+) or negative (-).     
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Table 4.3 Effect of the Instrumented Effective Number of Candidates on the Balance between 
Types of Goods by Policy Area 
 Targetable Collective Infrastructure Administrative 
Targetable  Education(-)  
Health(+) 
Water(+) 
Environment(-) 
Disaster Prevention(-) 
Economic Development(+) 
Education (-) 
Health(+) 
Water(+) 
Environment(-) 
 Disaster Prevention(-) 
Economic Development(+) 
Education (-) 
Health(+)  
Water(+)  
Environment(-) 
Disaster Prevention(+)  
Economic Development(+) 
Collective Education(+)  
Health(-)  
Water(-)  
Environment (+)  
Disaster Prevention (+) 
Economic Development(-) 
 Education(+) 
Transportation(-) 
Environment(+) 
Jails(+)  
Economic Development (-)  
Security(+) 
Education(+) 
Transportation(-) 
Jails(+) 
Disaster Prevention(+) 
Economic Development(-)  
Vulnerable Groups(-) 
Administrative Capacity(-) 
Security(+) 
Infrastructure Education(+) 
Health(-) 
Water(-)  
Environment(+) 
Disaster Prevention (+) 
Economic Development(-) 
Education (-) 
 Transportation (+) 
 Environment(-) 
Jails(-) 
Economic Development(+) 
Security(-) 
 Health(+)  
Transportation(+) 
Jails(-) 
Disaster Prevention (+) 
Security(-) 
Administrative Education(+) 
 Health(-) 
Environment(+) 
Disaster Prevention(-) 
Economic Development(-) 
Education (-) 
Water(-) 
Transportation(+) 
Jails(-) 
Disaster Prevention(-) 
Economic Development(+) 
Vulnerable Groups(+) 
Administrative Capacity(+) 
Security(-) 
Health(-) 
Transportation(-) 
Jails(+) 
Disaster Prevention(-) 
Security(+) 
 
 
It is important to keep in mind that some policy areas do not involve some types of spending 
alternatives (black cells in Table 4.1). There are six policy areas that do not involve targetable 
goods, three that do not involve building infrastructures, and two that do not include any collective 
goods. Also, results summarized in  
Table 4.3 indicates that local governments in factional contexts prioritize the type of goods 
in the rows over the type of goods in the columns when the effect is positive (+). On the contrary, 
local governments in more unitary contexts prioritize the type of goods in the rows over the type 
of goods in the columns when the effect is negative (-). Overall, this set of analysis reveals that 
there does not seem to exist a tradeoff between collective and targetable goods. While sometimes 
local governments in factional contexts spend in targetable at the expense of collective gods (e.g., 
when dealing with health, water supply, and economic development), other times it is local 
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governments in unitary contexts make that choice (e.g., when dealing with education, environment, 
and disaster prevention). Overall, tradeoffs between types of goods seem contingent on the policy 
area. Contrary to theories of distributive politics, electoral conditions do not appear to affect in a 
systematic way the mixture of various types of goods being offered by local governments across 
Colombia. This is far from surprising given that distributive politics theories assume that 
governments only allot collective and private goods. In that setup, it is a necessary implication that 
increasing spending in collective goods is going to decrease spending in targetable goods. But, 
once we incorporate more alternatives (i.e., infrastructure building and administrative costs) and 
assess different policy areas, there is no evidence of consistent substitution between different types 
of goods.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Overall, we have evidence that local governments do indeed adjust discretionary spending 
decisions to their electoral conditions. However, spending decisions appear to be less structured 
than expected. Electoral conditions shape local officials’ flexibility to undertake additional 
projects without risking their public approval. Lower electoral needs in factional contexts allow 
local officials a chance to act on the various policy areas under their purview. However, even if 
electoral conditions in factional contexts do not seem favor specific spending choices, it 
systematically favors a greater emphasis on education provision among local officials in unitary 
contexts. Efforts to reach a large number of supporters with regular education services with the 
local adaptation strategy are complemented with discretionary spending choices.  
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  Local officials in factional contexts generate distinct spending patterns in a different way. 
Investments are systematically smaller than those of local officials in unitary contexts. This is the 
case of infrastructure projects, administrative, targeted, and collective expenses. Thus, although 
local electoral context allows innovative spending choices, their reach is generally limited. 
Moreover, I find that any given action does not systematically undermine others, increasing the 
opportunities for any innovative action.   
Among the spending alternatives that local governments in factional contexts may 
prioritize are actions reforming local institutions, training local bureaucrats to comply with 
national regulations, and improving their equipment. The possibility of initiating administrative 
improvement actions appears to be a way through which electoral competition impacts local 
administrative modernization efforts (Grindle 2009). Moreover, this effect of local electoral 
conditions has important implications for how local governments perform administratively in 
general, but also, for their ability to look for additional funding from national authorities. Efforts 
to get new funding supposes having the technical ability to develop a project, knowledge of 
national regulations, and having the necessary equipment to exchange information online. The 
extent to which local governments succeed at fulfilling these conditions is the topic of the next 
chapter.      
 
 
 
  
62 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
LOCAL APPROPRIATION IN COLOMBIA 
 
 
Introduction 
 
I now turn to an evaluation of what I have referred to as the “local appropriate strategy.” 
One consequence of the increasing re-centralization of fiscal authority in Colombia has been the 
need for local elected officials in the country to appropriate, or credit-claim, whenever possible 
national-level programs. To successfully carry out such a strategy, local officials must ensure such 
national programs devote sufficient program resources to their locality in order to reap any 
electoral benefits that may come from the program. And while there is ample evidence that national 
politicians use their discretion to allocate public resources for political purposes, there is very little 
research on the role that local governments play in actively seeking to capture national program 
funds as part of incumbents’ local electoral strategies. This chapter addresses the impact of local 
governments on the allocation of national programs suggesting that often national distributive 
choices depend on local governments self-selecting themselves as possible beneficiaries of 
national funds. While I am only able to offer indirect evidence in support of this posited role for 
local officials in capturing national monies, I do put forth a set of results that indicates such a role 
does indeed exist. Thus, although national authorities make final decisions with respect to resource 
allocation, local officials appear to be active participants in capturing resources from nationally 
administered programs. These findings support the works of scholars like Grindle who focused on 
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the lobbying efforts of local officials as a key to successful local governance in Mexico. Here I 
find that such efforts are shaped in part by the local electoral context incumbents confront, with 
those operating in unitary contexts appearing to pursue a higher level of resources from national 
programs than their counterparts in factional contexts.  
Through analysis of a unique set of municipal government fund solicitations and approvals 
for two nationally administered programs, I am able to explore these questions in ways that shed 
light not only on what local governments receive from national governments, but also what local 
officials ask for in the first place. Analysis of these data then offer a far more nuanced picture of 
the determinants of program fund allocations between national and local governments than we 
have seen before. I find first that local electoral conditions do not appear to influence the extent to 
which local governments seek funding from other levels of government, nor do they directly affect 
the spending decisions of national authorities. Rather, local electoral conditions influence the 
amount that local governments request from programs funded by the national government, and in 
this way, influence indirectly the final deployment of national programs. I find that local politicians 
in factional contexts who rely on the support of fewer voters tend to ask for significantly less funds 
than local governments with a broader electoral support.  
Thus, although this process is driven by local demands, both national and local politicians 
advance their interests. On the one hand, local governments receive funding proportional to what 
they asked, and national programs get distributed in a way that is proportional to the number of 
supporters that local politicians could persuade to support national politicians. This pattern 
suggests an alternative account to the role of partisan alignment across administrative levels. In 
fact, I find that, in the contexts of the two demand-based programs I examine, partisan alignments 
do not seem to influence approval decisions, nor the amount being delivered.   
64 
 
National Distributive Politics 
 
Most studies on distributive politics focus on the electorally motivated choices by national 
politicians (Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016, De la O 2013, Blaydes 2011). Although 
their portrayal of distributive politics offers a general frame useful to understand the drivers behind 
local distributive choices, missing from this research is attention to the needs and demands of local 
officials themselves. Rather than focus solely on the strategic concerns of national officials, then, 
I highlight the role that local officials, and their electoral concerns, play in the distributive choices 
of national officials when allocating program funds.  
National distributive politics involve choices about which locales receive national 
transfers. These choices many times involve electoral considerations that result in targeting places 
with greater electoral potential for national incumbents. In this context, a large body of work has 
debated over which political strategy we should most likely find – one that targets the incumbent’s 
core followers or her swing voters (Dixit and Londregan 1996, Cox and McCubbins 1986, Díaz-
Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016, Stokes et al. 2013). According to one perspective, 
politicians should target core supporters. Risk-averse politicians should deliver material rewards 
to those they are most certain will return the favor with electoral support rather than targeting 
swing voters with unknown preferences and unreliable loyalties (Cox and McCubbins 1986). The 
alternative side of this debate argues that politicians should in fact target swing voters because 
loyalists will vote for the incumbent regardless and the support of swing voters is “cheaper” than 
that of voters whose partisan attachments are hard to sway using material rewards. Given that 
swing voters are likely less ideologically committed, material rewards can be decisive to increase 
electoral support beyond loyal core followers (Dixit and Londregan 1996).  
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Although these theories are centered on the exchange between incumbents and individual 
voters, when looking at program allocation decisions, national officials will be likely to consider 
the political leaning of entire localities rather than individuals. Thus, while national politicians 
could focus on the aggregate political preferences in a place, local allies may take care of the finer 
targeting of distributive efforts. Distributive efforts at this higher level, therefore, will leverage 
national discretion embedded in social policies (either formally or informally) to reward or punish 
local allies based either on a common partisan leaning of the community or the community’s 
electoral profile from previous elections. Under this logic, distributive rewards are offered in hopes 
of local electoral support, but also promote the persistence of local electoral conditions. On the 
other hand, when national politicians avoid transferring additional funds to particular places, they 
are also preventing potential challengers from rising by exploiting the electoral returns of offering 
the benefits of nationally funded programs (Giraudy 2010)14.  
Overall, there is an agreement that partisan alignments between politicians at different 
levels of government plays a critical role in the distribution of monies for nationally funded 
programs. However, past studies portray local governments as inert receivers of funding from the 
national government. This depiction of the passive role of local authorities in distributive processes 
neglects the local political challenges politicians face, particularly in an era of recentralization, and 
how this can affect the degree to which local officials actively lobby for national level funds. For 
many local incumbents, their ability to secure support from other administrative levels becomes a 
key asset to succeed electorally. That was the case in Chile before the ascent of Pinochet, where 
legislative brokers were key in setting meeting between mayors and national authorities 
(Valenzuela 1977). In Zambia as well, Baldwin (2013) found that the ability of traditional chiefs 
                                                     
14 More generally, distributive choices can be used to prevent potentially destabilizing situations. For example, using 
national assistance to dissuade regions aiming to secede, or that threatened civil unrest (Toha 2009)  
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to secure financial support from national politicians was a critical determinant of their electoral 
appeal.  
The role of local demands in the spending decisions of national program officials should 
be most apparent in places undergoing fiscal recentralization policies. Local governments with 
limited spending autonomy should be more likely than those with control over sufficient resources 
to lobby for funding from national authorities to deliver a larger portfolio of goods and services to 
their constituencies. Through this strategy, that I refer as the local appropriation strategy, local 
politicians advance their political goals by claiming credit for the benefits of programs brought to 
their community and funded by the national government.  
For many national programs that are based on fund solicitation from local governments, all 
local governments may submit applications for program funds, but not all do. For those that do 
decide to submit an application for funds, their officials also face the decision of how much to ask 
for. By exercising their discretion, local politicians have some influence over which programs they 
claim credit for, and potentially, which programs reach each locality. Although results for 
applicants are uncertain, local politicians actively seeking support are betting on the possibility of 
appropriating national programs to serve their own political needs.  
This strategy implies a key compromise. While local governments may selectively seek 
access to more funding, their chances of using this strategy continually depend on the political 
success of the national authorities. In consequence, local governments that benefit from this 
strategy have incentives to support the agenda of the national incumbent party to some extent in 
order to also promote their local political goals (Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Weingast 2003). 
Moreover, national politicians also have an incentive to allow local demands shaped by the number 
of local supporters that are most persuadable to support their own electoral objectives. Thus, 
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national politicians, by opening opportunities for the local appropriation of national programs, take 
advantage of their more fine- grained knowledge of potential local supporters.    
 
National Social Programs in Colombia 
 
The demand-based approach of many social programs, in which local actors apply for 
support before national authorities make a final decision about how to distribute funding, supposes 
that local authorities are better suited to identify local needs, even if approval decisions depend on 
national preferences. Under these conditions, local politics should influence the spending patterns 
of national programs to the extent that local politicians decide to take part in the application process 
and the amount of program funds they attempt to solicit.  
Local governments in Colombia play a role in getting access to numerous programs funded 
by national authorities. In 2016, 47 national agencies offered 382 programs to which local 
governments could apply after complying with some requisites. As such, access to these social 
programs is conditional on the willingness of local officials to submit funding requests. These 
demands, however, do not come without costs. On the one hand, some programs are designed to 
benefit individuals with pre-defined characteristics set by the national program. For example, eight 
national agencies use a large database of eligible citizens to deliver 22 major nationally funded 
programs. Critically, municipal authorities are responsible for administering an eligibility survey 
and submit it to program officials. Yet, local efforts to collect these data and keep them updated 
involves substantial costs and potentially affects supporters if they move in or out of eligibility 
status.  
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Local authorities also pay additional significant costs to take part in nationally funded 
programs. Fiscal reforms in 2001 forbade national authorities to have regional offices fulfilling 
local roles. Thus, local governments have to pay for personnel and additional expenses associated 
with carrying out nationally funded programs. For example, the main conditional cash transfer 
program, Familias en Acción, involves an agreement between mayors and the national agency 
leading the program (i.e., Department of Social Prosperity). Mayors agree to do whatever the 
program needs in order to successfully implement it in a particular community. This agreement 
includes a commitment to secure health and education services in their town, to create an office 
with enough staff, supplies and means of communication to manage the program, and to facilitate 
citizen oversight of the program. By fulfilling these agreements, mayors commit local funds and 
their political will to benefit newly formed interest groups. Because of these costs, local authorities 
face a choice about whether to apply to a program, and if they apply, they are likely to limit the 
scope of their demands to avoid wasting local funds beyond what is necessary in their local 
electoral contexts.  
Given these real constraints on local officials in soliciting program funds, it becomes a 
question, in part, of the political payoff that these officials might expect from program involvement 
when considering whether or not to submit an application and how much money to solicit. In this 
chapter, I analyze two such programs in which local governments need to apply to receive any 
funding from the national government: Colombia Humanitaria, and Pacto Agrario,  
Colombia Humanitaria.  
From mid-2010 until mid-2011, Colombia faced a significant increase in rainfall due to 
that year’s La Niña. This phenomenon led to heightened soil saturation that caused several 
landslides and river breaches throughout the country. During this time, 1098 out of 1119 
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municipalities reported damage of some sort related to the increased rainfall, with over 3.2 million 
individuals, or 7% of the national population, affected. More importantly, the vast majority of 
those affected were among the poorest in the country, with 67% those individuals reporting being 
a beneficiary of some national poverty relief program.  
One of the responses to this emergency was to create a temporary fund with national 
funding to address immediate needs and rebuild basic infrastructures. The Colombia Humanitaria 
fund administration was in the hands of a board composed of a representative of the President, 
four representatives of private entities selected by the President, the Minister of Finance, the 
Minister of the Interior, and the heads of the National Department of Planning, and the 
Administrative Department of the Presidency. This board handled requests for funding coming 
from subnational authorities.   
Colombia Humanitaria began to work in January 2011 and by June of that same year, all 
applications from local governments had been submitted. Throughout this period, Colombia 
Humanitaria received 6362 municipal requests for funding, but only 3499 were approved. It is 
important to note that to speed up solutions to this emergency, local authorities faced fewer 
administrative and technical requirements to apply for funding. Thus, local authorities needed less 
effort in applying to this program than that required for most non-emergency social programs.  
Pacto Agrario 
In 2013, amid large protests by peasants across Colombia, the ministry of Agriculture 
agreed on a program designed to support local projects addressing the needs of rural areas. This 
program was intended to increase the participation of civil society groups by calling for them to 
propose projects that would advance agricultural production, expand rural housing, and/or provide 
temporary employment opportunities. However, applicants had to undertake several costs, for 
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example, paying at least 20% of the costs of each project. Additionally, proposals had to include a 
full evaluation of their technical and economic feasibility.  
In the first stage of the program funding and project selection process, local organizations 
were to present their ideas to local selection committees headed by the mayor (Consejos 
Municipales de Desarrollo Rural). Approved proposals then went to the Ministry of Agriculture, 
and thereafter, to the corresponding agency to evaluate them. Agricultural production projects 
were considered by the Ministry of Agriculture, rural housing projects by the Agrarian Bank, and 
temporary employment opportunities by the Administrative Unit of the Public Service of 
Employment. Proposals received a score, along with other criteria including the number of 
beneficiaries and the availability of local funding. Those getting a passing score are then subject 
to a financial and technical evaluation before their final approval.   
The application period resulted in 4794 municipal projects being put forward. Among the 
three types of projects receiving funding, 8.5% of proposals were for temporary employment 
opportunities, 7.9% were for proposed housing projects, and the remaining 83.6% were for 
agricultural production projects. Overall, only 14% of projects received approval. Yet, approval 
rates vary by type of project, going from 10% for agricultural projects, 22% for housing projects, 
and up to 46% of approval for temporary employment opportunities.   
 
Method 
 
Although most studies about intergovernmental transfers focus on the role of national 
authorities, local governments play an important role in deploying demand-based national social 
programs. Methodologically, this setup means that local governments are self-selecting into the 
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pool of potential recipients of funding, that is, receiving funding is conditional on having applied 
for it. Any analysis failing to recognize this procedure is likely to reach biased conclusions about 
the distributive outcomes of these social programs. Beneficiaries can only come from the subset 
of local governments that submitted applications for program support.  
As such, assessing the role of local governments in this process requires information about 
which governments applied for funding from national programs, and not just who received support 
from national authorities. In contrast to previous studies, I have collected a unique set of 
information on both applications submitted and approval decisions. Using this information, I may 
carry out three different sets of analyses that reflect the different stages of this process. First, I 
model whether or not local governments applied for funding from the two national programs. Here, 
I code as 1 local governments that applied for any funding, and 0 if they did not apply at all. 
Second, among applicants, I model if any of their proposals was approved. I code as 1 if any project 
received support and 0 if none. Next, I model the amount of money (per capita) requested by local 
officials in order to assess the role of electoral context on the fiscal ambitions of local incumbents 
with respect to these national programs.15 Finally, I model the winners and losers of this fund 
application process, again focusing here only on those municipalities that actually submitted 
applications, and the amount of money (per capita in thousands of Colombian pesos) they received. 
Overall, these analyses offer a more complete assessment of the role of local authorities when 
looking for funding and of whether national authorities advance their own political goals by 
supporting specific local applicants.  
Like in previous analysis, I use the number of seats at the local legislature as an 
instrumental variable for the effective number of mayoral candidates. In addition, I also explore 
                                                     
15 As an alternative, I did similar analysis using the number of projects presented by each local government. Overall, 
results were substantively similar.  
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the impact of partisan alignments between local and national authorities as a key explanatory factor 
of national distributive choices. Here I use a dummy variable coded as 1 when a mayor belongs to 
a party that is part of the national government coalition, and 0 otherwise. Finally, I use the same 
set of control factors used in past analysis.16  
This set of analyses allows me to test the following expectations. First, since local 
governments in factional contexts are more likely to have additional funds to invest in projects 
supported by the national government, I would expect a greater inclination to appropriate national 
programs by applying more often than local officials in more unitary contexts. However, to the 
extent that local officials in factional contexts aim to reach to fewer supporters, their requests for 
support should be less ambitious than those coming from officials in unitary contexts. Adjusting 
proposals for funding to local electoral contexts is not just the best strategy for local officials, it 
also offers national politicians an opportunity to put supporters of local politicians on their side 
when elections for national office arrive. In consequence, national authorities should be more 
likely to approve projects coming from electoral contexts involving many more potential 
supporters than those proposed by officials supported by fewer voters.     
 
Local Applicants to Programs Funded by the National Government  
 
Analysis of projects proposed as part of the Colombia Humanitaria relief effort centered 
on road repairs, fixes for landslides, building bridges, channeling water flows, improving 
aqueducts, building dikes, and acquiring machinery. Projects proposed in the contexts of the Pacto 
Agrario program refer to funding new businesses, rural employment opportunities, and rural 
                                                     
16 That is: margin of victory, a measure of partisan vote, poverty, turnout, proportion of rural population, and the 
logged population density.  
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housing projects. Given the large number of models (four models for each of seven lines of 
funding), Table 5.1 synthesizes results for the main variable of interest (i.e., the instrumented 
effective number of candidates) indicating the direction (i.e., positive or negative) and if effects 
are statistically significant (highlighted in orange). I run four models predicting whether local 
governments made any proposals, whether any of those proposals were approved, the amount per 
capita requested by local governments, and the amount per capita approved by national authorities.  
 
Table 5.1 Analysis of Projects Presented to the Colombia Humanitaria Program 
 Roads Landslide 
Fixes 
Bridges Water 
Channeling 
Aqueducts Dikes Machinery 
Any Project 
Proposed 
I.V.ENC: 
+ 
I.V.ENC: + I.V.ENC: + I.V.ENC: - I.V.ENC: + I.V.ENC: 
+ 
I.V.ENC: - 
Any Project 
Approved 
I.V.ENC: 
- 
I.V.ENC: - I.V.ENC: + I.V.ENC: - I.V.ENC: + I.V.ENC: 
- 
I.V.ENC: - 
Funds 
Requested 
I.V.ENC: 
- 
I.V.ENC: - I.V.ENC: - I.V.ENC: - I.V.ENC: - I.V.ENC: 
- 
I.V.ENC: - 
Funds 
Approved 
I.V.ENC: 
- 
I.V.ENC: - I.V.ENC: - I.V.ENC: - I.V.ENC: - I.V.ENC: 
- 
I.V.ENC: - 
 
As should be evident, the findings from this analysis are less than overwhelming. Local 
governments in more factional contexts appear more likely to propose projects for road 
construction and aqueducts, and they tend to ask for less money than for similar projects coming 
from authorities in more unitary contexts. However, approval rates do not vary significantly across 
electoral contexts. To further confirm these tendencies, I offer results for projects presented to the 
Pacto Agrario program.  
Table 5.2 Analysis of Projects Presented to the Pacto Agrario Program 
 New Businesses Rural Employment Rural Housing 
Any Project Proposed I.V.ENC: - I.V.ENC: - I.V.ENC: + 
Any Project Approved I.V.ENC: + I.V.ENC: - I.V.ENC: + 
Funds Requested I.V.ENC: - I.V.ENC: - I.V.ENC: - 
Funds Approved I.V.ENC: - I.V.ENC: - I.V.ENC: + 
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Here again, these do not provide consistent support for my expectations. Results in Table 
5.2 reinforce the idea that local electoral contexts are not consistently associated with the choice 
to apply tor additional funding, nor with approval decisions. However, consistent with the implicit 
size of support coalitions, local governments in factional contexts solicit fewer funds than local 
governments supported by wider constituencies.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Summing up, although electoral considerations do not seem to influence whether to apply 
for funding, they do appear to influence the scope of local demands, and the amount received to 
the extent that approved funds are significantly associated to the amount requested. Thus, although 
local governments facing different electoral conditions apply and receive approval for projects at 
a similar rate, demands coming from local governments in factional contexts tend to have a more 
limited reach than those proposed by local governments in more unitary contexts. Finally, these 
results suggest that local electoral conditions influence the extent to with which local governments 
exploit the distribution of national programs in ways not captured by previous work on this issue 
that has focused exclusively on the national-level strategic calculations. Contrary to past studies 
on national distributive politics, the partisan alignment between mayors and the national 
government coalition was not a significant predictor in any of my analyses. In the end, this process 
by which local governments appropriate nationally funded programs coordinate efforts by local 
and national politicians to advance their electoral interests without preventing the other 
administrative level from receiving the electoral benefits of distributive choices.     
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Up to this point I have explored the strategies used by local governments to benefit a 
varying number of supporters in a context of fiscal and administrative recentralization. Although 
their impacts on local service provision are enormous, these set of strategies also have important 
effects on individuals’ expectations about local services, and ultimately, on their inclination to 
reward the provision of local services. Such a key component of political accountability is the topic 
of the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER 6  
 
EVALUATION OF LOCAL SERVICES UNDER DIFFERENT POLITICAL 
CONTEXTS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Service evaluations are critical in the process of keeping local authorities accountable for 
failing to fulfill citizens’ expectations. However, service evaluations go beyond the objective 
performance of services being received by citizens. In this chapter, I evaluate the proposition that 
electoral contexts play a critical role in shaping citizens’ assessments of local services. 
Specifically, as suggested by previous chapters, electoral conditions influence which spending 
choices are common, and as a result, they shape citizens’ expectations about local services. 
Citizens in more unitary contexts are likely to expect and reward collective goods like education 
and health services than citizens in factional contexts where particularistic gods are the preferred 
strategy of local incumbents. Under these expectations, citizens in more unitary contexts should 
be more likely hold positive evaluations of local public services when they feel local governments 
are responsive to their demands (i.e., better collective goods), while perceptions of government 
responsiveness when expecting particularistic goods in factional contexts should be less likely to 
influence service evaluations of broad-reaching services. 
Previous chapters showed that local governments needing fewer votes to result elected 
choose expenses of a more limited scope than governments elected by a greater following. Citizens 
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experiencing such spending patterns should find spending choices that benefit most of the 
population less valuable compared to the prospect of receiving targeted benefits (Dixit and 
Londregan 1998). Based on this proposition, citizens in factional contexts feeling that their local 
governments fulfill their expectations (i.e., officials deliver particularistic goods) should be less 
inclined to reward the provision of public services with more positive evaluations than citizens in 
places where investing in collective services is to be expected (i.e., unitary contexts).  
Testing this argument supposes a methodological challenge to disentangle idiosyncratic 
biases in service evaluations from their real quality. Equal survey responses may correspond to 
different service qualities, due among other factors, to holding different expectations about local 
services. To address this problem, I use evaluations of national institutions to “bridge” responses 
about local services. Once evaluations are on the same scale, I reach two main findings. First, 
citizens perceiving their local government as responsive to their demands are more critical of local 
services in more factional than in more unitary electoral contexts. Second, I find that individuals 
perceiving their local government as responsive are more likely to reward it with more positive 
service evaluations in more unitary contexts, while evaluations of local services are not used to 
reward government responsiveness in factional contexts.   
These results suggest that spending choices used across electoral contexts impact service 
evaluations. On average, citizens in factional contexts are less likely to reward or punish through 
their service evaluations the ability of local governments to provide basic public services. This 
finding implies that greater electoral competition is unlikely to promote better local services. On 
the contrary, citizens in unitary electoral contexts are likely to encourage local authorities to 
provide basic local services with the hope of getting better performance evaluations.  
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Expectations and Service Evaluations 
 
Performance evaluations are essential to democratic accountability. On the one hand, 
citizens use economic performance cues, although with a limited scope, to keep national 
incumbents accountable (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000, Healy and Lenz 2014). This is also the 
case for more tangible signals of performance. For example, government responsiveness to fix 
potholes around citizens’ homes have a significant impact on support for  incumbents (Burnett and 
Kogan 2017). Similarly, performance of school districts influences support for administrators 
among the least politically engaged individuals (Holbein 2016, Payson 2017).  
Although important, evaluations of local services are not based purely on objective 
information. First, performance information has diverse impacts on citizens’ evaluations. For 
example, performance information has a greater influence when presented in a negative way and 
when it involves comparisons rather than absolute levels (Oliver and Moseley 2014). A second, 
but critical consideration, is that citizens evaluate public services comparing performance 
assessments with their expectations. This is the idea behind the expectation disconfirmation theory 
of service evaluations. This theory claims that service evaluations reflect the gap between 
perceived performance and individuals’ expectations. Thus, citizens express greater satisfaction 
when perceived performance is better than expectated. On the contrary, evaluations are going to 
be negative when perceived performance is worse than expected, regardless of any objective 
assessment of those services. Even more, disconfirmed expectations have a greater influence on 
negative service evaluations than the impact of fulfilled expectations on positive evaluations 
(Oliver 2009, Van Ryzin 2004, Roch and Poister 2006).  
79 
 
Expectations are a product of several factors. In the U.S., for example, ideological 
preferences and party identification are key predictors of expectations about federal services 
(Morgeson III. 2012). Additionally, experiences influence future expectations. For example, 
citizens used to a growing economy are likely to expect continued prosperity, and therefore, to 
punish any setback. When dealing with Colombian local governments, citizens should become 
used to receiving some types of goods more often than others depending on local electoral 
conditions. Thus, as suggested by the findings in previous chapters, citizens in factionalized 
contexts are more likely to see local officials delivering particularistic benefits rather than public 
services. Therefore, receiving particularistic goods becomes the expectation in more factionalized 
contexts. In contrast, citizens immersed in more unitary electoral contexts are more likely to 
experience local governments delivering collective services. Thus, individuals in unitary electoral 
contexts should expect the continued provision of public goods rather than particularistic benefits. 
Consequently, I will be testing whether citizens in more factional contexts are more critical of 
public services that do not satisfy their expectation of receiving particularistic goods than citizens 
in more unitary contexts. Moreover, I test whether citizens use service evaluations to reward 
perceptions of government responsiveness to citizens’ expectations (i.e., a continued delivery of 
particularistic or collective goods) to a greater extent in more unitary than in more factionalized 
electoral contexts.      
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Data and Methods 
 
I test my expectations about local service evaluations using data from the 
AmericasBarometer for Colombia between 2004 and 2007. 17  Although this survey is 
representative to the region level, I pooled four waves of the AmericasBarometer to increase as 
much as possible the number of interviews per municipality. The pooled dataset contains 5,788 
observations for 51 different municipalities.18 This sample includes diverse political conditions. 
The mean number of effective candidates is 2.66, ranging from a minimum of 1.25 effective 
electoral candidates to a maximum of 6.14. The number of observations per municipality varies 
according to their population size. While the national capital has 924 interviews, smaller 
municipalities as few as 48 observations.  
In this study, I use questions asking respondents to evaluate local water, health, electricity, 
trash collection, and education. For each of these questions, respondents rate local services in a 
five-category scale going from “very good” to “very bad”. Since respondents in each municipality 
evaluate different service providers (i.e., these are all local services), evaluations refer to five 
different services in each of the 51 municipalities in the sample, for a total of 255 local service 
evaluations.  
To disentangle the quality of local services from the impact of local expectations on service 
evaluations, it is necessary to address a problem known as scale invariance. Individuals facing 
survey questions answer in a way that reflects their idiosyncratic understanding of the starting 
                                                     
17 The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org. I thank 
the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and its major supporters (the United States Agency for 
International Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, and Vanderbilt University) for making the data 
available.  
18 I dropped four municipalities that were not surveyed every year.  
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point and of each unit of the scale being used. In the context of local service evaluations, 
expectations about local spending choices become a point of reference to assign a score, 
independent of their objective quality.  
 In other contexts, scholars address the issue of scale invariance using survey items 
common to every respondent. Differences between answers to the questions of interest (i.e., service 
evaluation questions) are put in terms of the differences between bridging items. For this study, I 
use as “bridges” two survey questions asking respondents to evaluate services from two national 
institutions associated with the judicial system that are outside the influence of local officials. 
Using the common experience with the Comisarias de familia and the Prosecutor’s office as a 
benchmark across municipalities, I can put citizens´ experiences with local services on the same 
scale. This procedure is used to estimate legislative preferences using roll-call data (Jackman, 
Clinton, and Rivers 2004), or to put preferences of parties and voters on a common space (Saiegh 
2015). The logic behind these studies can be extended to other areas in which citizens evaluate 
some common stimuli, such as local services.  
I estimate a model in which service evaluations (𝜁𝑖𝑗) by each respondent (i) about each 
local service (j) result from a process in which the “true” quality of the service being assessed 
(𝜉𝑗) is adjusted depending on each individual’s understanding of the magnitude of each unit in the 
scale (𝛽𝑖), and their inclination to place service providers closer to either extreme of the scale (𝛼𝑖). 
This later parameter will capture each respondent tendency to evaluate local services more 
positively when their expectations are satisfied.  
Summing up, the process giving rise to service evaluations can be approximated through 
the following model: 
𝜁𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝜉𝑗+℧𝑖𝑗    (1) 
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Although this model could be estimated using maximum likelihood, Bayesian techniques 
allow me to include interviews with missing responses to any service evaluation questions (Hare 
et al. 2015). Table 6.1 presents non-response rates to the items of interest, ranging from a 0.6% for 
electricity to a maximum of 9.5% when respondents evaluate trash collection services.  
 
Table 6.1 Non-Response Rate of Local Service Evaluations 
Local Service % Non-response 
Water 3.78 
Health 3.27 
Electricity 0.6 
Trash collection 9.5 
Education 2.97 
 
Bayesian estimation assumes that 𝜁𝑖𝑗is normally distributed: 𝜁𝑖𝑗~ N(𝜇𝑖𝑗, 𝜏𝑖𝑗) 
𝜇𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝜉𝑗  (3) 
𝜏𝑖𝑗 = 𝜏𝑖 + 𝜏𝑗   (4) 
I use noninformative uniform prior distributions for 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 : 𝛼𝑖~U(−100,100)  and 
𝛽𝑖~U(−100,100) 
Also, I use a normal prior distribution for the estimated quality of local services: 𝜁𝑗~N(0,1) 
I use the quality of two national services (i.e., Comisarías de familia, and the Prosecutor´s 
office) to set the polarity and meaning of each unit in the scale used in service evaluations. I achieve 
this goal setting the quality of the Prosecutor´s office to -1, and that of Comisarías de familia to 1. 
Although these values are arbitrary, the numeric distance between these two institutions (i.e., two 
units) represents their differences in quality, and the estimated quality of local services will be 
measured as a fraction of those differences. An estimated service quality closer to -1 means that it 
is more alike to that of the Prosecutor´s office, while values closer to 1 indicate that their quality 
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is similar to that of Comisarias de familia. Intermediate values indicate a middling service quality 
proportional to the differences in quality of the two national offices used as reference.  
Finally, I estimate error parameters for each stimulus (𝜏𝑗) and interviewee (𝜏𝑖) to allow 
them to be heteroscedastic. I use inverse gamma distributions as priors for both errors (𝜏𝑗and 𝜏𝑖).  
𝜏𝑗~Gamma(0.1,0.1) 
𝜏𝑖~Gamma(v, w) 
𝑣~Gamma(0.1,0.1) 
𝑤~Gamma(0.1,0.1) 
I estimate this model using JAGS (Version 3.4.0). I run two chains, discarding the first 
50,000 iterations, and saved one in every 10 of the following 200,000 iterations. According to 
Geweke diagnostics, the effective number of observations, and graphical inspection of posterior 
distributions, I conclude estimations converged.    
In the following section I explore if citizens are systematically more critical of local 
services depending on their local electoral context.  
 
Results 
 
Service evaluations reflect idiosyncratic perceptions of local public services. Through the 
model presented above and its assumptions we learn that service evaluations reflect both different 
experiences and different expectations about local services. That individuals experience local 
services differently is apparent when we put one of the model assumptions to a test.  
The model presented above assumes that each individual uses the same criteria to evaluate 
different services and that individuals in the same municipality have the same experience with 
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each local service. Regarding the latter assumption, if citizens were having a similar experience 
with local services, we would expect a correlation between the estimated “true” quality (𝜁𝑗) and 
objective measures of services performance. I put to a test this expectation by comparing the 
estimated “true” quality (𝜁𝑗) of education, water, electricity and health with objective measures of 
performance19, but I find no correlation at all. Although puzzling, this result suggests that we 
cannot assume individuals have similar experiences with local services. Consequently, given that 
the model assumes similar experiences, answers to service evaluation questions should reflect both 
diverse experiences with local services and differences in the criteria used to evaluate them. Since 
both local service provision and expectations are shaped by local electoral contexts, we can still 
assess if local electoral contexts shape service evaluations through these two mechanisms.  
Further analysis of service evaluations (i.e. particularly on the α parameter in the model) 
reveals that the impact of perceptions of responsiveness by municipal governments vary depending 
on the electoral context. Figure 6.1 is based on a hierarchical model that predicts the tendency of 
individuals to use a portion of the evaluation scale: higher values of the α parameter indicate a 
tendency to express more positive evaluations. In contrast to previous analysis, I include individual 
sociodemographic control variables: age, gender, education level, and urban/rural residence. 
However, I also include the same control variables used in previous chapters: margin of victory in 
the 2003 mayoral elections, a measure of partisan vote, poverty, turnout in 2003, the logged 
population density, and year fixed effects for the period 2004-2007. This model nests individuals 
within regions, departments and municipalities. Overall, the point of interest is the interaction 
between the effective number of candidates and the perceived responsiveness of municipal 
                                                     
19 I used average math scores in the 2007 national standardized tests, the percentage of population without treated 
water, the percentage of the population with access to electricity, and the percentage of the population without access 
to health services.  
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governments in Colombia. I measure the latter variable using a question in the AmericasBarometer 
in Colombia prompting respondents to estimate how frequently their municipality responds to the 
will of the people20. Figure 6.1 presents the marginal effect of the effective number of political 
parties across degrees of perceived government responsiveness.   
 
Figure 6.1 Predicted Effects for the ENC and Feelings of Gov. Responsiveness 
 
Overall, individuals perceiving that their local government never responds to their interests 
do indeed evaluate local services more negatively than individuals feeling that their local 
governments is almost always responsive. However, these differences are greater among 
individuals living in more unitary contexts. This is consistent with my expectations. Since citizens 
in unitary contexts are more likely to experience and expect public services than particularistic 
                                                     
20 Response options include: “Never”, “Almost Never”, “From time to time”, “Most of the time”, and “Almost 
Always”. For the sake of clarity, Figure 6.1 only depicts the estimated effect for individuals answering “Never”, “From 
time to time”, and “Almost always”.  
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benefits, it is natural that individuals finding their expectations confirmed (i.e., feeling their local 
government is responsive) are going to reward them with more positive evaluations. On the 
contrary, individuals in unitary contexts perceiving that their local government is never responsive 
are going to evaluate local public services significantly worse. As we move to more factional 
electoral contexts, however, citizens are less likely to reward perceptions of government 
responsiveness with better evaluations of public services.  In factional electoral contexts, 
individuals should be more likely to reward government responsiveness when dealing with 
particularistic rewards.    
These results imply that government responsiveness is not always rewarded with good 
service evaluations. Such unwillingness of citizens in factional contexts to reward incumbents for 
delivering basic public services is critical for the possibility of promoting local development. The 
local pandering, the local adaptation, and the local appropriation strategies translate electoral 
conditions into distinct spending patterns. However, these spending patterns also shape citizens’ 
expectations, and ultimately, prevents democratic accountability from promoting developmentally 
good outcomes when they are not valued by citizens.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Overall, public service evaluations appear to be systematically shaped by what citizens 
expect from local governments. While citizens in more unitary contexts reward government 
responsiveness with more positive evaluations of public services, citizens in factional contexts are 
less inclined to reward them for doing it. Such disconnect between citizens’ expectations under 
factional contexts and the provision of public services makes feelings of government 
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responsiveness less of a factor at promoting solutions for basic needs. However, although failing 
to promote the general welfare, electoral conditions in factional contexts may promote better 
targeting of particularistic goods.  
Although this dissertation focuses on the implications for local development of having 
electoral competition in a context of fiscal and administrative recentralization, analysis in this 
chapter makes clear that such a mix of conditions has far reaching implications. Critically, 
resulting spending patterns seem to undermine the very conditions under which electoral 
incentives are effective to promote better local services. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
Democracy is not a one-size-fits-all solution to most social needs. The impacts of having a 
democratic governance depend, among many factors, on the number of votes needed to result 
elected. Although a seemingly instrumental consideration, it has far reaching implications for the 
decisions of elected officials. Politicians looking for their electoral survival face a trade-off 
between addressing a wider set of demands for select groups and providing solutions to select 
problems that benefit most of the population. Unfortunately, such choices entail the possibility of 
negative impacts which are further amplified in contexts that combine electoral competition with 
fiscal and administrative restrictions.  
This dissertation begins to explore the perils of having electoral competition when local 
authorities have limited fiscal and administrative autonomy. Overall, I find that local responses to 
a recentralized context, such as Colombia, lead to divergent spending choices across electoral 
contexts. While local officials in unitary contexts are more likely to prioritize education provision 
with both earmarked and discretionary funds, local officials facing a factional electoral context are 
more likely to address a wider set of local problems for a limited number of groups. Moreover, I 
find that differences in the scope of local efforts to address social problems also exist when it 
comes to programs funded by the national government. Although local officials across electoral 
contexts apply at similar rates to receive funding for projects in their municipalities, projects 
coming from officials facing a more factional electoral environment demand significantly less 
funding than those proposed by officials in a more unitary electoral environment.  Finally, I also 
find that local spending choices do not underfund in a systematic way other expenses. Thus, 
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contrary to theories of distributive politics, when considering the full range of possible 
expenditures there is no evidence that collective goods are funded at the expense of targetable 
goods.  
Overall, these spending patterns limit the ability of both local and national policies to solve 
citizens’ more pressing needs. While in factional contexts policies that address various problems 
have a limited scope, spending choices in unitary contexts reach most of the citizenry but offer 
solutions to fewer problems. Moreover, these deficiencies are not corrected by the intervention of 
national agencies deploying their own programs. Programs funded by the national government 
simply affirm local requests to take advantage of the greater local knowledge about potential 
electoral supporters.      
Additionally, these spending patterns also erode the effectiveness of the “electoral 
connection” to promote better public services in factional contexts. The inclination of local 
officials in factional contexts to offer targeted goods encourages citizens to expect a similar 
behavior in the future. Consequently, citizens in factional contexts are less likely to value and 
reward public services with more positive evaluations. Lacking a positive citizen response, 
incumbents should be less likely to feel compelled to provide better public services.  
Although these results offer a negative picture of having greater electoral competition, it is 
important to recognize the true reach of democratic governance at promoting the well-being of 
citizens. Based on a more accurate appreciation of electoral competition, policy-makers may 
design appropriate responses to social problems; even if they are not beneficial electorally. 
Moreover, these results suggest that recent recentralizing reforms are unlikely to solve regional 
inequalities; on the contrary, the combination of electoral competition and fiscal recentralization 
appears to deepen developmental differences across electoral contexts.       
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A for Chapter 3 
 
Table A1. Instrumental Variable Probit Models Predicting Whether Local Governments Spend 
any Funds in Various Education Expenses 
 Designing New 
Schools 
School 
Construction 
School 
Maintenance 
School Supplies 
     
I.V. ENP 1.121*** 1.253*** -0.570* 0.335 
 (0.118) (0.067) (0.244) (0.199) 
Margin of Victory 0.025*** 0.029*** -0.014* 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) 
Turnout 1.251*** 1.178*** -1.475*** -0.392 
 (0.363) (0.332) (0.375) (0.362) 
Rural 0.765*** 0.932*** -0.064 0.175 
 (0.139) (0.129) (0.214) (0.161) 
Departmental Capital -0.009 0.076 -0.147 -0.039 
 (0.189) (0.187) (0.182) (0.136) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.081* 0.026 0.047 0.124*** 
 (0.040) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031) 
Partisan Attachment 0.003** 0.003*** -0.002* 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Partisan Alignment 0.113* 0.104* -0.105* 0.005 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.045) 
Log(Pop. Density) 1.975 2.443** -1.480 -0.860 
 (1.051) (0.937) (1.062) (1.068) 
Poverty 0.009*** 0.008*** -0.001 0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
2009 0.141* 0.100* 0.135 0.819*** 
 (0.057) (0.051) (0.070) (0.063) 
2010 0.219*** 0.217*** 0.131 0.915*** 
 (0.055) (0.050) (0.071) (0.060) 
2011 0.168** 0.108* -0.084 0.394*** 
 (0.053) (0.048) (0.060) (0.058) 
2012 0.141** 0.197*** 0.005 0.335*** 
 (0.053) (0.048) (0.064) (0.056) 
2013 0.048 -0.054* -0.025 0.163** 
 (0.038) (0.025) (0.048) (0.056) 
2014 0.061 0.041 0.072 0.163** 
 (0.035) (0.022) (0.043) (0.050) 
2015 -0.007 -0.012 -0.138*** 0.011 
 (0.033) (0.021) (0.039) (0.048) 
Constant -6.631*** -5.895*** 2.984** -2.795*** 
 (0.396) (0.379) (1.013) (0.807) 
athrho     
Constant -1.045*** -1.456*** 0.436* -0.223 
 (0.222) (0.205) (0.210) (0.152) 
lnsigma     
Constant -0.336*** -0.336*** -0.336*** -0.336*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Observations 7800 7800 7800 7800 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
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Table A1. Instrumental Variable Probit Models Predicting Whether Local Governments Spend 
any Funds in Various Education Expenses (cont.) 
 Didactic Supplies Public Utilities Transportation Training 
     
I.V. ENP 0.114 0.412 -0.362 0.925*** 
 (0.244) (0.315) (0.286) (0.178) 
Margin of Victory 0.002 0.015 -0.009 0.023*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) 
Turnout -0.946* 1.111* -0.645 0.654 
 (0.397) (0.501) (0.536) (0.452) 
Rural 0.062 0.337 0.564* 0.187 
 (0.178) (0.233) (0.262) (0.218) 
Departmental Capital 0.160 -0.020 -0.344 0.100 
 (0.130) (0.198) (0.175) (0.190) 
Log(Total Budget) -0.018 0.112** 0.024 0.163** 
 (0.030) (0.040) (0.034) (0.051) 
Partisan Attachment 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Partisan Alignment -0.003 0.102 0.004 0.096 
 (0.045) (0.061) (0.064) (0.053) 
Log(Pop. Density) -0.631 4.824* -4.726*** 3.652* 
 (1.022) (1.910) (1.422) (1.419) 
Poverty 0.003* -0.001 -0.011*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
2009 0.228*** -0.157* -0.404*** 0.488*** 
 (0.062) (0.070) (0.060) (0.078) 
2010 0.296*** -0.090 -0.311*** 0.336*** 
 (0.062) (0.070) (0.060) (0.058) 
2011 0.533*** -0.159* -0.251*** 0.195*** 
 (0.059) (0.069) (0.058) (0.056) 
2012 0.444*** -0.099 -0.267*** 0.161** 
 (0.058) (0.065) (0.058) (0.055) 
2013 0.096 -0.000 -0.187*** 0.017 
 (0.052) (0.042) (0.051) (0.040) 
2014 0.235*** -0.002 -0.023 0.078* 
 (0.050) (0.035) (0.046) (0.037) 
2015 0.016 0.017 -0.086* 0.011 
 (0.044) (0.032) (0.038) (0.031) 
Constant 0.303 -2.744* 2.512* -6.229*** 
 (1.033) (1.340) (1.274) (0.537) 
athrho     
Constant -0.084 -0.316 0.181 -0.858*** 
 (0.176) (0.246) (0.216) (0.234) 
lnsigma     
Constant -0.336*** -0.336*** -0.336*** -0.336*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Observations 7800 7800 7800 7800 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A1. Instrumental Variable Probit Models Predicting Whether Local Governments Spend 
any Funds in Various Education Expenses (cont.) 
 Other Running 
Costs 
Lunches Improvement 
Plans 
Free Schooling 
     
I.V. ENP 0.743*** 0.366 1.023*** -1.004*** 
 (0.207) (0.295) (0.173) (0.197) 
Margin of Victory 0.017*** 0.007 0.026*** -0.021*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) 
Turnout -0.341 0.106 0.881 -0.474 
 (0.487) (0.507) (0.479) (0.471) 
Rural 0.405* 0.344 0.698*** -0.628*** 
 (0.172) (0.221) (0.174) (0.184) 
Departmental Capital 0.269 0.186 0.328 -0.361 
 (0.196) (0.198) (0.197) (0.251) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.060 0.080* 0.046 0.433*** 
 (0.037) (0.034) (0.040) (0.064) 
Partisan Attachment 0.003** 0.002* 0.004*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Partisan Alignment 0.015 0.035 0.135* -0.239** 
 (0.053) (0.056) (0.055) (0.077) 
Log(Pop. Density) 1.855 0.775 1.825 -3.018* 
 (1.031) (1.479) (1.109) (1.283) 
Poverty 0.003 0.001 0.003 -0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
2009 -0.113 0.004 0.389*** 0.000 
 (0.075) (0.064) (0.078) (.) 
2010 0.002 -0.010 0.670*** 0.000 
 (0.070) (0.067) (0.104) (.) 
2011 0.888*** -0.069 0.209*** -3.020*** 
 (0.085) (0.068) (0.064) (0.520) 
2012 1.010*** 0.017 0.076 0.000 
 (0.093) (0.064) (0.068) (.) 
2013 0.012 -0.051 -0.007 -0.346*** 
 (0.046) (0.051) (0.053) (0.086) 
2014 -0.056 -0.066 0.053 -0.112* 
 (0.041) (0.046) (0.048) (0.045) 
2015 -0.042 -0.095* -0.022 -0.002 
 (0.037) (0.044) (0.040) (0.037) 
Constant -3.881*** -2.936* -6.090*** 1.482 
 (0.843) (1.238) (0.583) (1.049) 
athrho     
Constant -0.569** -0.252 -0.891*** 0.889** 
 (0.205) (0.227) (0.257) (0.270) 
lnsigma     
Constant -0.336*** -0.336*** -0.336*** -0.347*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.032) 
Observations 7800 7800 7800 4891 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A2. Instrumental Variable Regression Models Predicting the Amount Spent (in thousands 
of Colombian Pesos) in Various Education Expenses 
 Designing New 
Schools 
School 
Construction 
School 
Maintenance 
School Supplies 
I.V. ENP -4,382.6 -7,198.9*** -4,979.2*** -4,297.7*** 
 (2,303.5) (1,629.3) (1,056.7) (1,131.1) 
Margin of Victory -120.3 -178.7*** -116.2*** -107.3*** 
 (62.6) (42.8) (25.7) (29.7) 
Turnout -4,669.6 -7,952.0* -4,218.0* -5,320.2* 
 (3,300.2) (3,172.9) (1,801.2) (2,185.5) 
Rural -1,579.5 -2,450.9* -2,074.9** -1,695.2* 
 (1,293.9) (1,149.3) (803.2) (797.6) 
Departmental Capital -2,108.1 -2,358.4 -1,488.3 -1,099.8 
 (1,108.7) (1,223.8) (1,019.9) (891.1) 
Log(Total Budget) 1,139.2* 1,945.7*** 1,477.5*** 1,003.1*** 
 (498.7) (287.9) (157.7) (145.0) 
Partisan Attachment -13.5 -17.2** -12.4** -10.2* 
 (8.3) (6.1) (4.1) (4.1) 
Partisan Alignment -433.3 -920.1* -349.3 -385.5 
 (349.2) (393.0) (204.8) (224.0) 
Log(Pop. Density) -8,503.7 -13,667.5* -11,156.9* -9,215.3* 
 (6,905.4) (6,276.7) (4,430.9) (4,259.8) 
Poverty -20.1 -28.0** -15.9** -18.9** 
 (11.1) (9.9) (6.0) (6.7) 
2009 127.3 234.3 353.1 1.6 
 (372.9) (359.8) (207.1) (277.8) 
2010 -123.9 -393.6 229.7 -265.6 
 (367.9) (354.9) (197.4) (280.6) 
2011 -270.1 -177.7 57.0 -236.4 
 (390.2) (346.8) (207.0) (288.1) 
2012 106.1 -318.5 44.8 -114.9 
 (419.2) (337.6) (202.2) (269.6) 
2013 257.9 257.6 163.4 91.5 
 (293.2) (187.2) (123.4) (195.6) 
2014 253.6 200.7 -92.4 -162.7 
 (273.6) (155.0) (99.4) (195.3) 
2015 134.5 233.0 -60.5 -104.4 
 (221.0) (159.8) (97.1) (193.9) 
Constant 9,810.6 14,872.7* 8,056.4 10,922.6* 
 (7,837.4) (7,140.2) (4,401.3) (5,203.0) 
Observations 1657 4884 5173 3232 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A2. Instrumental Variable Regression Models Predicting the Amount Spent (in thousands 
of Colombian Pesos) in Various Education Expenses (cont.) 
 Didactic Supplies Public Utilities Transportation Training 
I.V. ENP -4,548.2*** -2,495.3*** -5,015.2*** -1,969.1** 
 (1,231.0) (549.7) (1,150.2) (644.5) 
Margin of Victory -107.5*** -57.1*** -112.1*** -45.0** 
 (30.1) (13.1) (26.4) (15.9) 
Turnout -4,416.4* -2,039.6* -4,305.6* -2,144.2 
 (1,949.9) (852.8) (1,888.6) (1,114.5) 
Rural -1,833.0* -1,122.5** -1,649.9* -709.6 
 (828.1) (423.8) (778.7) (458.2) 
Departmental Capital -990.7 -858.6* -1,225.9 -780.6* 
 (814.7) (399.6) (974.1) (381.1) 
Log(Total Budget) 1,086.5*** 631.1*** 1,348.1*** 452.6*** 
 (181.4) (88.3) (186.9) (93.2) 
Partisan Attachment -13.6** -7.0** -9.1* -4.5 
 (4.4) (2.2) (4.0) (2.3) 
Partisan Alignment -663.9** -96.9 -184.6 -137.8 
 (248.7) (100.1) (199.0) (126.5) 
Log(Pop. Density) -8,602.6* -4,983.5* -7,826.5 -6,059.9 
 (4,254.9) (2,128.4) (5,317.2) (3,161.6) 
Poverty -10.6 -10.0** -18.6** -7.3* 
 (5.9) (3.3) (6.6) (3.6) 
2009 -99.0 150.8 329.7 129.7 
 (239.2) (110.0) (202.6) (143.1) 
2010 -250.6 33.6 -172.3 -130.0 
 (242.2) (103.5) (210.3) (152.9) 
2011 -155.0 -105.9 -214.6 -199.7 
 (217.5) (105.5) (202.1) (163.6) 
2012 -278.4 -155.8 -219.6 25.7 
 (230.3) (104.2) (201.9) (149.1) 
2013 381.3* 99.4* 167.1* 236.6 
 (170.0) (40.3) (75.1) (122.9) 
2014 11.9 15.4 59.7 47.1 
 (108.8) (31.3) (79.0) (93.2) 
2015 96.3 32.4 25.4 -14.9 
 (114.6) (27.8) (68.3) (74.6) 
Constant 10,208.1* 5,055.0* 8,790.3* 4,563.9 
 (4,949.3) (2,219.6) (4,480.3) (2,682.6) 
Observations 4743 5640 5882 1727 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A2. Instrumental Variable Regression Models Predicting the Amount Spent (in thousands 
of Colombian Pesos) in Various Education Expenses (cont.) 
 Other Running Costs Lunches Improvement Plans Free Schooling 
I.V. ENP -3,471.1** -3,680.4** -5,555.5 -4,919.5** 
 (1,309.3) (1,274.1) (4,231.8) (1,754.1) 
Margin of Victory -83.0* -88.6** -134.1 -113.1** 
 (32.3) (33.2) (105.5) (41.0) 
Turnout -3,873.7* -2,792.3 -5,878.0 -2,169.5 
 (1,971.7) (1,870.9) (5,763.3) (1,939.0) 
Rural -960.8 -1,519.2 -2,096.6 -2,518.2* 
 (745.1) (917.5) (2,462.1) (1,212.7) 
Departmental Capital -1,640.0* -813.0 -716.5 -1,414.5 
 (707.5) (996.4) (1,728.8) (1,011.5) 
Log(Total Budget) 895.4*** 882.3*** 592.1 1,629.6*** 
 (250.2) (176.9) (369.5) (493.5) 
Partisan Attachment -9.0* -4.7 -4.0 -32.1** 
 (4.4) (4.4) (7.9) (11.7) 
Partisan Alignment -226.7 -207.8 -411.5 -1,151.2* 
 (199.2) (236.0) (565.1) (497.6) 
Log(Pop. Density) -6,328.1 -15,182.5 -9,359.1 -13,109.1* 
 (3,675.0) (8,180.7) (9,777.3) (6,391.6) 
Poverty -19.2* -10.5 -27.8 -19.3 
 (8.0) (6.9) (19.5) (9.9) 
2009 343.3 309.1 -567.9  
 (335.9) (261.6) (939.7)  
2010 -504.5 -66.1 -1,600.0  
 (332.9) (291.7) (1,590.7)  
2011 -67.0 -76.7 -484.3 1,958.0 
 (227.3) (294.8) (833.5) (2,206.8) 
2012 132.9 -134.7 -1,054.4  
 (221.3) (264.6) (1,129.1)  
2013 225.0 118.7 -873.4 233.1* 
 (180.7) (162.9) (1,008.8) (104.2) 
2014 210.6 109.9 -329.6 2.8 
 (167.1) (156.0) (557.4) (72.5) 
2015 -85.8 128.1 -75.3 104.3 
 (149.5) (148.0) (372.6) (68.6) 
Constant 7,521.7 7,525.7 19,904.4 7,168.4 
 (4,517.5) (5,382.1) (20,073.1) (5,138.2) 
Observations 2222 1800 798 3074 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A3. Instrumental Regression Models Predicting the Balance Between Expenditures in 
School Design and Other Education Expenses 
 School Construction School Maintenance School Supplies Didactic Supplies Public Utilities 
I.V. ENP -1.085*** -0.263** -0.221** -0.231** -0.837*** 
 
(0.150) (0.106) (0.097) (0.106) (0.132) 
Margin of Victory -0.025*** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005* -0.018*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Turnout -1.196*** 0.069 -0.193 -0.161 -0.298 
 
(0.238) (0.169) (0.154) (0.169) (0.211) 
Rural -0.861*** -0.275*** -0.100 -0.098 -0.053 
 
(0.108) (0.076) (0.070) (0.076) (0.095) 
Departmental Capital 0.176** 0.087 0.083 0.040 -0.274*** 
 
(0.082) (0.058) (0.053) (0.058) (0.073) 
Partisan Attachment   -0.003*** -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001) 
Partisan Alignment -0.063** -0.034 -0.009 0.005 -0.078*** 
 
(0.031) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.027) 
Log(Pop. Density) -1.979*** 0.024 -0.225 -0.931** -1.928*** 
 
(0.651) (0.462) (0.421) (0.460) (0.575) 
Log(Total Budget) -0.095*** -0.056*** -0.023 -0.023 -0.041** 
 
(0.022) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.020) 
Poverty -0.011*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 0.0003 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
2009 -0.090* -0.257*** -0.122*** -0.264*** -0.128*** 
 
(0.053) (0.038) (0.034) (0.037) (0.047) 
2010 -0.210*** -0.262*** -0.106*** -0.266*** -0.204*** 
 
(0.053) (0.038) (0.034) (0.037) (0.047) 
2011 -0.140*** -0.163*** -0.055 -0.177*** -0.184*** 
 
(0.052) (0.037) (0.034) (0.037) (0.046) 
2012 -0.215*** -0.154*** -0.035 -0.148*** -0.119*** 
 
(0.052) (0.037) (0.034) (0.037) (0.046) 
2013 0.059 -0.046 -0.014 -0.099*** -0.093** 
 
(0.050) (0.036) (0.032) (0.035) (0.044) 
2014 -0.052 -0.097*** -0.017 -0.038 -0.043 
 
(0.050) (0.036) (0.032) (0.035) (0.044) 
2015 0.044 -0.018 -0.029 -0.005 -0.024 
 
(0.050) (0.036) (0.032) (0.035) (0.044) 
Constant 5.848*** 1.498*** 1.243*** 1.409*** 3.479*** 
 (0.622) (0.442) (0.403) (0.440) (0.550) 
N 7800 7800 7800 7800 7800 
R-squared -0.692 -0.025 -0.034 -0.016 -0.446 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A3. Instrumental Regression Models Predicting the Balance Between Expenditures in 
School Design and Other Education Expenses (cont.) 
 Transportation Training Other Running 
Costs 
Lunches Improvement Plans Free 
Schooling 
I.V. ENP -0.333*** -0.227** -0.410*** -0.567*** -0.474*** -0.815*** 
 
(0.109) (0.093) (0.097) (0.101) (0.087) (0.116) 
Margin of Victory -0.009*** -0.005** -0.009*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.019*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Turnout -0.567*** -0.424*** -0.699*** -0.697*** -0.618*** -0.837*** 
 
(0.173) (0.148) (0.154) (0.160) (0.138) (0.184) 
Rural -0.715*** -0.102 -0.204*** -0.265*** -0.294*** -0.439*** 
 
(0.078) (0.067) (0.069) (0.072) (0.062) (0.083) 
Departmental 
Capital 
0.029 0.051 -0.158*** -0.113** 0.062 -0.037 
 
(0.060) (0.051) (0.053) (0.055) (0.047) (0.063) 
Partisan Attachment   -0.001*** -0.00002 -0.001*** -0.0005 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Partisan Alignment -0.080*** -0.013 -0.048** -0.027 -0.025 -0.067*** 
 
(0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.024) 
Log(Pop. Density) 0.018 0.493 -0.671 -0.802* -0.564 -1.095** 
 
(0.473) (0.405) (0.420) (0.437) (0.376) (0.502) 
Log(Total Budget) -0.025 0.030** -0.026* -0.041*** -0.017 -0.080*** 
 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017) 
Poverty 0.002** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.001* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
2009 0.128*** 0.099*** -0.017 -0.004 -0.084*** 0.661*** 
 
(0.038) (0.033) (0.034) (0.036) (0.031) (0.041) 
2010 0.065* 0.042 -0.048 -0.047 -0.130*** 0.608*** 
 
(0.038) (0.033) (0.034) (0.036) (0.031) (0.041) 
2011 0.081** 0.065** -0.335*** -0.027 -0.045 0.621*** 
 
(0.038) (0.032) (0.034) (0.035) (0.030) (0.040) 
2012 0.105*** 0.037 -0.336*** -0.009 -0.031 0.633*** 
 
(0.038) (0.032) (0.033) (0.035) (0.030) (0.040) 
2013 0.039 0.004 -0.072** 0.001 -0.020 0.001 
 
(0.036) (0.031) (0.032) (0.034) (0.029) (0.039) 
2014 0.021 0.017 -0.034 -0.002 -0.020 -0.063 
 
(0.036) (0.031) (0.032) (0.034) (0.029) (0.039) 
2015 -0.027 -0.005 -0.029 -0.001 -0.022 -0.095** 
 
(0.036) (0.031) (0.032) (0.034) (0.029) (0.039) 
Constant 1.677*** 0.822** 2.209*** 2.895*** 2.283*** 3.382*** 
 (0.452) (0.387) (0.402) (0.418) (0.360) (0.480) 
N 7800 7800 7800 7800 7800 7800 
R-squared -0.078 -0.031 -0.135 -0.396 -0.367 -0.295 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
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Table A4. Instrumental Regression Models Predicting the Balance Between Expenditures in 
School Construction and Other Education Expenses 
 School 
Maintenance 
School 
Supplies 
Didactic 
Supplies 
Public Utilities 
Transportation 
I.V. ENP 0.822*** 0.864*** 0.854*** 0.248** 0.752*** 
 
(0.146) (0.140) (0.146) (0.126) (0.143) 
Margin of Victory 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.007** 0.016*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Turnout 1.265*** 1.003*** 1.035*** 0.898*** 0.629*** 
 
(0.232) (0.222) (0.232) (0.201) (0.227) 
Rural 0.586*** 0.761*** 0.763*** 0.808*** 0.146 
 
(0.105) (0.100) (0.105) (0.091) (0.103) 
Departmental Capital -0.089 -0.093 -0.136* -0.450*** -0.146* 
 
(0.080) (0.077) (0.080) (0.069) (0.078) 
Partisan Attachment   0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.001) 
Partisan Alignment 0.029 0.055* 0.068** -0.015 -0.016 
 
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.026) (0.029) 
Log(Pop. Density) 2.002*** 1.753*** 1.047* 0.051 1.996*** 
 
(0.634) (0.607) (0.634) (0.549) (0.621) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.039* 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.054*** 0.070*** 
 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021) 
Poverty 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
2009 -0.167*** -0.032 -0.174*** -0.039 0.217*** 
 
(0.052) (0.049) (0.052) (0.045) (0.051) 
2010 -0.053 0.104** -0.056 0.006 0.275*** 
 
(0.052) (0.049) (0.052) (0.045) (0.051) 
2011 -0.023 0.085* -0.036 -0.043 0.222*** 
 
(0.051) (0.049) (0.051) (0.044) (0.050) 
2012 0.061 0.180*** 0.067 0.096** 0.320*** 
 
(0.050) (0.048) (0.050) (0.044) (0.049) 
2013 -0.105** -0.073 -0.158*** -0.152*** -0.020 
 
(0.049) (0.047) (0.049) (0.042) (0.048) 
2014 -0.045 0.035 0.014 0.010 0.073 
 
(0.049) (0.047) (0.049) (0.042) (0.048) 
2015 -0.062 -0.072 -0.049 -0.067 -0.070 
 
(0.049) (0.047) (0.049) (0.042) (0.048) 
Constant -4.350*** -4.605*** -4.439*** -2.369*** -4.171*** 
 (0.606) (0.580) (0.606) (0.525) (0.594) 
N 7800 7800 7800 7800 7800 
R-squared -0.339 -0.441 -0.370 0.098 -0.178 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A4. Instrumental Regression Models Predicting the Balance Between Expenditures in 
School Construction and Other Education Expenses (cont.) 
 Training Other Running 
Costs 
Lunches Improvement 
Plans 
Free Schooling 
I.V. ENP 0.859*** 0.675*** 0.518*** 0.611*** 0.270*** 
 
(0.139) (0.123) (0.114) (0.111) (0.102) 
Margin of Victory 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.006** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Turnout 0.772*** 0.497** 0.500*** 0.578*** 0.360** 
 
(0.221) (0.196) (0.181) (0.176) (0.163) 
Rural 0.759*** 0.657*** 0.596*** 0.568*** 0.422*** 
 
(0.100) (0.089) (0.082) (0.079) (0.074) 
Departmental Capital -0.125 -0.334*** -0.289*** -0.113* -0.213*** 
 
(0.076) (0.068) (0.062) (0.061) (0.056) 
Partisan Attachment   0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Partisan Alignment 0.051* 0.016 0.037 0.039* -0.004 
 
(0.029) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) 
Log(Pop. Density) 2.472*** 1.308** 1.177** 1.415*** 0.883** 
 
(0.604) (0.537) (0.495) (0.481) (0.445) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.125*** 0.069*** 0.054*** 0.078*** 0.015 
 
(0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) 
Poverty 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
2009 0.189*** 0.073* 0.086** 0.005 0.751*** 
 
(0.049) (0.044) (0.040) (0.039) (0.036) 
2010 0.251*** 0.161*** 0.163*** 0.080** 0.818*** 
 
(0.049) (0.044) (0.040) (0.039) (0.036) 
2011 0.206*** -0.195*** 0.114*** 0.096** 0.762*** 
 
(0.048) (0.043) (0.040) (0.038) (0.036) 
2012 0.251*** -0.122*** 0.205*** 0.183*** 0.848*** 
 
(0.048) (0.043) (0.039) (0.038) (0.035) 
2013 -0.055 -0.131*** -0.058 -0.079** -0.057* 
 
(0.047) (0.041) (0.038) (0.037) (0.034) 
2014 0.069 0.019 0.051 0.032 -0.011 
 
(0.046) (0.041) (0.038) (0.037) (0.034) 
2015 -0.049 -0.073* -0.045 -0.065* -0.138*** 
 
(0.047) (0.041) (0.038) (0.037) (0.034) 
Constant -5.026*** -3.639*** -2.953*** -3.566*** -2.466*** 
 (0.578) (0.513) (0.473) (0.460) (0.425) 
N 7800 7800 7800 7800 7800 
R-squared -0.431 -0.240 -0.134 -0.243 0.247 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A5. Instrumental Regression Models Predicting the Balance Between Expenditures in 
School Maintenance and Other Education Expenses 
 School 
Supplies 
Didactic 
Supplies 
Public Utilities 
Transportation Training 
I.V. ENP 0.043 0.032 -0.574*** -0.069 0.037 
 
(0.109) (0.116) (0.131) (0.121) (0.108) 
Margin of Victory 0.0001 0.0004 -0.013*** -0.004 0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Turnout -0.262 -0.230 -0.366* -0.636*** -0.492*** 
 
(0.173) (0.185) (0.208) (0.192) (0.171) 
Rural 0.175** 0.177** 0.221** -0.440*** 0.172** 
 
(0.078) (0.084) (0.094) (0.087) (0.077) 
Departmental Capital -0.004 -0.047 -0.361*** -0.058 -0.036 
 
(0.060) (0.064) (0.072) (0.066) (0.059) 
Partisan Attachment   0.0001 -0.00001 -0.001** -0.0004 0.001* 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Partisan Alignment 0.025 0.039 -0.044 -0.046* 0.021 
 
(0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.022) 
Log(Pop. Density) -0.249 -0.955* -1.952*** -0.006 0.469 
 
(0.473) (0.506) (0.569) (0.526) (0.468) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.032** 0.033* 0.015 0.031* 0.086*** 
 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) 
Poverty 0.001 -0.001* 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.002** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
2009 0.135*** -0.007 0.129*** 0.385*** 0.356*** 
 
(0.038) (0.041) (0.046) (0.043) (0.038) 
2010 0.156*** -0.003 0.059 0.328*** 0.304*** 
 
(0.038) (0.041) (0.046) (0.043) (0.038) 
2011 0.108*** -0.014 -0.020 0.245*** 0.229*** 
 
(0.038) (0.040) (0.046) (0.042) (0.037) 
2012 0.119*** 0.006 0.035 0.259*** 0.190*** 
 
(0.038) (0.040) (0.045) (0.042) (0.037) 
2013 0.032 -0.053 -0.047 0.085** 0.051 
 
(0.036) (0.039) (0.044) (0.040) (0.036) 
2014 0.080** 0.060 0.055 0.118*** 0.115*** 
 
(0.036) (0.039) (0.044) (0.040) (0.036) 
2015 -0.011 0.012 -0.006 -0.009 0.013 
 
(0.036) (0.039) (0.044) (0.041) (0.036) 
Constant -0.256 -0.089 1.980*** 0.179 -0.676 
 (0.452) (0.484) (0.544) (0.502) (0.448) 
N 7800 7800 7800 7800 7800 
R-squared 0.008 0.005 -0.128 0.046 0.036 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A5. Instrumental Regression Models Predicting the Balance Between Expenditures in 
School Maintenance and Other Education Expenses (cont.) 
 Other Running 
Costs 
Lunches Improvement 
Plans 
Free Schooling 
I.V. ENP -0.147 -0.304*** -0.210** -0.552*** 
 
(0.103) (0.103) (0.092) (0.110) 
Margin of Victory -0.004 -0.008*** -0.006** -0.014*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Turnout -0.768*** -0.765*** -0.687*** -0.905*** 
 
(0.164) (0.165) (0.146) (0.174) 
Rural 0.071 0.010 -0.019 -0.164** 
 
(0.074) (0.074) (0.066) (0.079) 
Departmental Capital -0.245*** -0.200*** -0.025 -0.124** 
 
(0.056) (0.057) (0.050) (0.060) 
Partisan Attachment   -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.001 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Partisan Alignment -0.014 0.007 0.009 -0.033 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.023) 
Log(Pop. Density) -0.695 -0.826* -0.588 -1.119** 
 
(0.448) (0.450) (0.398) (0.476) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.029* 0.015 0.039*** -0.024 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) 
Poverty 0.001* -0.001** 0.001 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
2009 0.240*** 0.253*** 0.173*** 0.918*** 
 
(0.036) (0.037) (0.032) (0.039) 
2010 0.214*** 0.215*** 0.133*** 0.870*** 
 
(0.036) (0.037) (0.032) (0.039) 
2011 -0.172*** 0.136*** 0.119*** 0.785*** 
 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.032) (0.038) 
2012 -0.183*** 0.144*** 0.122*** 0.787*** 
 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.032) (0.038) 
2013 -0.025 0.047 0.027 0.048 
 
(0.034) (0.035) (0.031) (0.037) 
2014 0.064* 0.096*** 0.077** 0.035 
 
(0.034) (0.035) (0.031) (0.037) 
2015 -0.011 0.017 -0.004 -0.077** 
 
(0.034) (0.035) (0.031) (0.037) 
Constant 0.711* 1.396*** 0.784** 1.883*** 
 (0.428) (0.430) (0.381) (0.456) 
N 7800 7800 7800 7800 
R-squared 0.032 -0.070 -0.034 0.091 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A6. Instrumental Regression Models Predicting the Balance Between Expenditures in 
School Supplies and Other Education Expenses 
 Didactic 
Supplies 
Public Utilities 
Transportation Training 
I.V. ENP -0.011 -0.617*** -0.112 -0.006 
 
(0.108) (0.127) (0.113) (0.098) 
Margin of Victory 0.0003 -0.013*** -0.004 0.0005 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Turnout 0.032 -0.105 -0.374** -0.231 
 
(0.172) (0.202) (0.179) (0.156) 
Rural 0.002 0.047 -0.615*** -0.002 
 
(0.078) (0.091) (0.081) (0.070) 
Departmental Capital -0.043 -0.357*** -0.053 -0.032 
 
(0.059) (0.070) (0.062) (0.054) 
Partisan Attachment   -0.0001 -0.001** -0.001 0.001 
 
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Partisan Alignment 0.014 -0.069*** -0.071*** -0.004 
 
(0.022) (0.026) (0.023) (0.020) 
Log(Pop. Density) -0.706 -1.703*** 0.243 0.719* 
 
(0.470) (0.553) (0.490) (0.426) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.001 -0.017 -0.001 0.053*** 
 
(0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.014) 
Poverty -0.002*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.001* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
2009 -0.142*** -0.007 0.249*** 0.221*** 
 
(0.038) (0.045) (0.040) (0.035) 
2010 -0.160*** -0.097** 0.171*** 0.148*** 
 
(0.038) (0.045) (0.040) (0.035) 
2011 -0.122*** -0.129*** 0.137*** 0.121*** 
 
(0.038) (0.044) (0.039) (0.034) 
2012 -0.113*** -0.083* 0.141*** 0.072** 
 
(0.037) (0.044) (0.039) (0.034) 
2013 -0.085** -0.079* 0.053 0.019 
 
(0.036) (0.043) (0.038) (0.033) 
2014 -0.021 -0.025 0.038 0.034 
 
(0.036) (0.043) (0.038) (0.033) 
2015 0.023 0.005 0.002 0.024 
 
(0.036) (0.043) (0.038) (0.033) 
Constant 0.166 2.236*** 0.434 -0.420 
 (0.449) (0.529) (0.469) (0.407) 
N 7800 7800 7800 7800 
R-squared 0.008 -0.195 0.023 0.016 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A6. Instrumental Regression Models Predicting the Balance Between Expenditures in 
School Supplies and Other Education Expenses (cont.) 
 Other Running 
Costs 
Lunches Improvement 
Plans 
Free Schooling 
I.V. ENP -0.189* -0.347*** -0.253*** -0.595*** 
 
(0.098) (0.098) (0.085) (0.106) 
Margin of Victory -0.004 -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.014*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Turnout -0.506*** -0.504*** -0.425*** -0.644*** 
 
(0.156) (0.157) (0.136) (0.169) 
Rural -0.104 -0.165** -0.194*** -0.339*** 
 
(0.070) (0.071) (0.061) (0.076) 
Departmental Capital -0.241*** -0.196*** -0.020 -0.120** 
 
(0.054) (0.054) (0.047) (0.058) 
Partisan Attachment   -0.001 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.001 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Partisan Alignment -0.039* -0.018 -0.016 -0.058*** 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.022) 
Log(Pop. Density) -0.445 -0.576 -0.339 -0.870* 
 
(0.427) (0.428) (0.370) (0.462) 
Log(Total Budget) -0.003 -0.017 0.006 -0.056*** 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) 
Poverty 0.001 -0.002*** 0.0002 0.001** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.001) 
2009 0.105*** 0.118*** 0.037 0.783*** 
 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.030) (0.038) 
2010 0.058* 0.059* -0.024 0.714*** 
 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.030) (0.038) 
2011 -0.280*** 0.028 0.011 0.676*** 
 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.030) (0.037) 
2012 -0.301*** 0.026 0.004 0.668*** 
 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.029) (0.037) 
2013 -0.057* 0.015 -0.005 0.016 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.029) (0.036) 
2014 -0.017 0.015 -0.003 -0.046 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.028) (0.035) 
2015 -0.001 0.027 0.007 -0.066* 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.029) (0.036) 
Constant 0.966** 1.652*** 1.040*** 2.139*** 
 (0.408) (0.409) (0.354) (0.442) 
N 7800 7800 7800 7800 
R-squared 0.007 -0.137 -0.098 -0.014 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A7. Instrumental Regression Models Predicting the Balance Between Expenditures in 
Didactic Supplies and Other Education Expenses 
 Public Utilities Transportation Training 
Other Running 
Costs 
I.V. ENP -0.606*** -0.101 0.005 -0.178* 
 
(0.134) (0.122) (0.108) (0.107) 
Margin of Victory -0.013*** -0.004 0.0001 -0.004 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Turnout -0.137 -0.406** -0.263 -0.538*** 
 
(0.214) (0.195) (0.171) (0.171) 
Rural 0.045 -0.617*** -0.004 -0.106 
 
(0.096) (0.088) (0.077) (0.077) 
Departmental Capital -0.314*** -0.010 0.011 -0.198*** 
 
(0.074) (0.067) (0.059) (0.059) 
Partisan Attachment   -0.001** -0.0004 0.001* -0.0004 
 
(0.001) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Partisan Alignment -0.083*** -0.085*** -0.018 -0.053** 
 
(0.028) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) 
Log(Pop. Density) -0.997* 0.949* 1.425*** 0.261 
 
(0.584) (0.532) (0.468) (0.467) 
Log(Total Budget) -0.018 -0.002 0.053*** -0.004 
 
(0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) 
Poverty 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
2009 0.135*** 0.391*** 0.363*** 0.247*** 
 
(0.048) (0.043) (0.038) (0.038) 
2010 0.062 0.331*** 0.307*** 0.217*** 
 
(0.048) (0.043) (0.038) (0.038) 
2011 -0.007 0.258*** 0.242*** -0.158*** 
 
(0.047) (0.043) (0.037) (0.037) 
2012 0.029 0.253*** 0.185*** -0.188*** 
 
(0.046) (0.042) (0.037) (0.037) 
2013 0.006 0.138*** 0.103*** 0.027 
 
(0.045) (0.041) (0.036) (0.036) 
2014 -0.005 0.059 0.055 0.004 
 
(0.045) (0.041) (0.036) (0.036) 
2015 -0.018 -0.021 0.0004 -0.024 
 
(0.045) (0.041) (0.036) (0.036) 
Constant 2.070*** 0.268 -0.587 0.800* 
 (0.558) (0.508) (0.448) (0.446) 
N 7800 7800 7800 7800 
R-squared -0.144 0.046 0.035 0.018 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A7. Instrumental Regression Models Predicting the Balance Between Expenditures in 
Didactic Supplies and Other Education Expenses (cont.) 
 Lunches Improvement Plans Free Schooling 
I.V. ENP -0.336*** -0.242*** -0.584*** 
 
(0.105) (0.093) (0.115) 
Margin of Victory -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.014*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Turnout -0.535*** -0.457*** -0.676*** 
 
(0.167) (0.148) (0.183) 
Rural -0.167** -0.196*** -0.341*** 
 
(0.076) (0.067) (0.083) 
Departmental Capital -0.153*** 0.023 -0.077 
 
(0.058) (0.051) (0.063) 
Partisan Attachment   0.0002 -0.0003 -0.001 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Partisan Alignment -0.032 -0.030 -0.072*** 
 
(0.022) (0.019) (0.024) 
Log(Pop. Density) 0.130 0.367 -0.164 
 
(0.457) (0.405) (0.500) 
Log(Total Budget) -0.018 0.006 -0.057*** 
 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.017) 
Poverty -0.0003 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
2009 0.260*** 0.180*** 0.925*** 
 
(0.037) (0.033) (0.041) 
2010 0.219*** 0.136*** 0.874*** 
 
(0.037) (0.033) (0.041) 
2011 0.150*** 0.132*** 0.798*** 
 
(0.037) (0.032) (0.040) 
2012 0.139*** 0.117*** 0.781*** 
 
(0.036) (0.032) (0.040) 
2013 0.100*** 0.079** 0.101*** 
 
(0.035) (0.031) (0.039) 
2014 0.036 0.018 -0.025 
 
(0.035) (0.031) (0.038) 
2015 0.004 -0.016 -0.089** 
 
(0.035) (0.031) (0.039) 
Constant 1.486*** 0.873** 1.973*** 
 (0.437) (0.387) (0.478) 
N 7800 7800 7800 
R-squared -0.088 -0.051 0.074 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A8. Instrumental Regression Models Predicting the Balance Between Expenditures in 
Public Utilities and Other Education Expenses 
 Transportation Training 
Other Running 
Costs 
Lunches Improvement 
Plans 
Free Schooling 
I.V. ENP 0.504*** 0.611*** 0.427*** 0.270*** 0.363*** 0.022 
 
(0.129) (0.126) (0.112) (0.104) (0.097) (0.095) 
Margin of Victory 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.005* 0.007*** -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Turnout -0.269 -0.126 -0.401** -0.399** -0.321** -0.539*** 
 
(0.205) (0.201) (0.178) (0.165) (0.155) (0.152) 
Rural -0.662*** -0.049 -0.151* -0.212*** -0.240*** -0.386*** 
 
(0.092) (0.091) (0.080) (0.074) (0.070) (0.069) 
Departmental Capital 0.303*** 0.325*** 0.116* 0.161*** 0.336*** 0.237*** 
 
(0.071) (0.069) (0.061) (0.057) (0.053) (0.052) 
Partisan Attachment   0.001 0.002*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.001* 0.0004 
 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Partisan Alignment -0.002 0.065** 0.030 0.051** 0.053*** 0.011 
 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.023) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
Log(Pop. Density) 1.945*** 2.421*** 1.257*** 1.126** 1.364*** 0.833** 
 
(0.559) (0.548) (0.486) (0.451) (0.423) (0.415) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.016 0.071*** 0.014 -0.0002 0.024* -0.039*** 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Poverty 0.001 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
2009 0.256*** 0.228*** 0.112*** 0.125*** 0.044 0.790*** 
 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.040) (0.037) (0.034) (0.034) 
2010 0.269*** 0.245*** 0.155*** 0.156*** 0.074** 0.811*** 
 
(0.046) (0.045) (0.040) (0.037) (0.034) (0.034) 
2011 0.265*** 0.249*** -0.151*** 0.157*** 0.139*** 0.805*** 
 
(0.045) (0.044) (0.039) (0.036) (0.034) (0.033) 
2012 0.224*** 0.155*** -0.218*** 0.109*** 0.087*** 0.752*** 
 
(0.044) (0.044) (0.039) (0.036) (0.034) (0.033) 
2013 0.132*** 0.097** 0.021 0.094*** 0.073** 0.095*** 
 
(0.043) (0.042) (0.037) (0.035) (0.033) (0.032) 
2014 0.063 0.060 0.009 0.041 0.022 -0.020 
 
(0.043) (0.042) (0.037) (0.035) (0.032) (0.032) 
2015 -0.003 0.018 -0.006 0.022 0.002 -0.071** 
 
(0.043) (0.042) (0.037) (0.035) (0.033) (0.032) 
Constant -1.802*** -2.656*** -1.269*** -0.584 -1.196*** -0.097 
 (0.534) (0.524) (0.464) (0.431) (0.404) (0.396) 
N 7800 7800 7800 7800 7800 7800 
R-squared -0.005 -0.181 -0.063 0.026 -0.021 0.272 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A9. Instrumental Regression Models Predicting the Balance Between Expenditures in 
Transportation and Other Education Expenses 
 Training 
Other Running 
Costs 
Lunches Improvement 
Plans 
Free Schooling 
I.V. ENP 0.106 -0.077 -0.235** -0.141 -0.483*** 
 
(0.110) (0.104) (0.103) (0.091) (0.101) 
Margin of Victory 0.004 0.00003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.010*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Turnout 0.143 -0.132 -0.129 -0.051 -0.269* 
 
(0.175) (0.165) (0.163) (0.145) (0.161) 
Rural 0.613*** 0.511*** 0.450*** 0.421*** 0.276*** 
 
(0.079) (0.074) (0.074) (0.066) (0.073) 
Departmental Capital 0.021 -0.188*** -0.143** 0.033 -0.066 
 
(0.060) (0.057) (0.056) (0.050) (0.056) 
Partisan Attachment   0.001*** 0.00001 0.001* 0.0001 -0.0001 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Partisan Alignment 0.067*** 0.032 0.053** 0.055*** 0.013 
 
(0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) 
Log(Pop. Density) 0.476 -0.688 -0.819* -0.581 -1.113** 
 
(0.477) (0.450) (0.446) (0.397) (0.440) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.055*** -0.002 -0.016 0.008 -0.055*** 
 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) 
Poverty -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
2009 -0.028 -0.144*** -0.131*** -0.212*** 0.534*** 
 
(0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.032) (0.036) 
2010 -0.024 -0.114*** -0.112*** -0.195*** 0.543*** 
 
(0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.032) (0.036) 
2011 -0.016 -0.417*** -0.108*** -0.126*** 0.540*** 
 
(0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.032) (0.035) 
2012 -0.069* -0.442*** -0.115*** -0.137*** 0.528*** 
 
(0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.032) (0.035) 
2013 -0.034 -0.110*** -0.037 -0.058* -0.037 
 
(0.037) (0.035) (0.034) (0.031) (0.034) 
2014 -0.004 -0.054 -0.023 -0.041 -0.084** 
 
(0.037) (0.035) (0.034) (0.030) (0.034) 
2015 0.021 -0.003 0.025 0.005 -0.068** 
 
(0.037) (0.035) (0.034) (0.031) (0.034) 
Constant -0.855* 0.532 1.218*** 0.605 1.705*** 
 (0.456) (0.431) (0.427) (0.379) (0.421) 
N 7800 7800 7800 7800 7800 
R-squared 0.006 0.076 0.015 0.033 0.057 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
108 
 
Table A10. Instrumental Regression Models Predicting the Balance Between Expenditures in 
Training and Other Education Expenses  
 Other Running 
Costs 
Lunches Improvement Plans Free Schooling 
I.V. ENP -0.183* -0.341*** -0.247*** -0.589*** 
 
(0.094) (0.095) (0.083) (0.105) 
Margin of Victory -0.004* -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.014*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Turnout -0.275* -0.273* -0.195 -0.413** 
 
(0.150) (0.151) (0.132) (0.167) 
Rural -0.102 -0.163** -0.191*** -0.337*** 
 
(0.068) (0.068) (0.059) (0.076) 
Departmental Capital -0.209*** -0.164*** 0.012 -0.088 
 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.045) (0.058) 
Partisan Attachment   -0.001*** -0.0005 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Partisan Alignment -0.035* -0.014 -0.012 -0.054** 
 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.022) 
Log(Pop. Density) -1.164*** -1.295*** -1.057*** -1.589*** 
 
(0.409) (0.413) (0.359) (0.457) 
Log(Total Budget) -0.056*** -0.071*** -0.047*** -0.110*** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) 
Poverty -0.0005 -0.003*** -0.001* 0.0004 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.001) 
2009 -0.116*** -0.103*** -0.184*** 0.562*** 
 
(0.033) (0.034) (0.029) (0.037) 
2010 -0.090*** -0.089*** -0.172*** 0.566*** 
 
(0.033) (0.034) (0.029) (0.037) 
2011 -0.400*** -0.092*** -0.110*** 0.556*** 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.029) (0.037) 
2012 -0.373*** -0.046 -0.068** 0.597*** 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.029) (0.036) 
2013 -0.076** -0.003 -0.024 -0.003 
 
(0.031) (0.032) (0.028) (0.035) 
2014 -0.051 -0.019 -0.037 -0.080** 
 
(0.031) (0.032) (0.028) (0.035) 
2015 -0.024 0.004 -0.016 -0.089** 
 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.028) (0.035) 
Constant 1.387*** 2.072*** 1.460*** 2.559*** 
 (0.391) (0.395) (0.344) (0.437) 
N 7800 7800 7800 7800 
R-squared 0.011 -0.143 -0.097 -0.089 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A11. Instrumental Regression Models Predicting the Balance Between Expenditures in 
Other Running Costs and Other Education Expenses  
 Lunches Improvement Plans Free Schooling 
I.V. ENP -0.158* -0.064 -0.405*** 
 
(0.086) (0.074) (0.094) 
Margin of Victory -0.004* -0.002 -0.010*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Turnout 0.003 0.081 -0.137 
 
(0.137) (0.118) (0.150) 
Rural -0.061 -0.089* -0.235*** 
 
(0.062) (0.054) (0.068) 
Departmental Capital 0.045 0.221*** 0.122** 
 
(0.047) (0.041) (0.052) 
Partisan Attachment   0.001* 0.0001 -0.0002 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Partisan Alignment 0.021 0.023 -0.019 
 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.019) 
Log(Pop. Density) -0.131 0.107 -0.425 
 
(0.373) (0.324) (0.409) 
Log(Total Budget) -0.015 0.009 -0.053*** 
 
(0.013) (0.011) (0.014) 
Poverty -0.003*** -0.0004 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) 
2009 0.013 -0.067** 0.678*** 
 
(0.030) (0.026) (0.033) 
2010 0.001 -0.081*** 0.656*** 
 
(0.030) (0.026) (0.033) 
2011 0.308*** 0.290*** 0.956*** 
 
(0.030) (0.026) (0.033) 
2012 0.327*** 0.305*** 0.969*** 
 
(0.030) (0.026) (0.033) 
2013 0.073** 0.052** 0.073** 
 
(0.029) (0.025) (0.032) 
2014 0.032 0.013 -0.029 
 
(0.029) (0.025) (0.031) 
2015 0.028 0.008 -0.065** 
 
(0.029) (0.025) (0.032) 
Constant 0.686* 0.073 1.173*** 
 (0.357) (0.309) (0.391) 
N 7800 7800 7800 
R-squared 0.014 0.062 0.203 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A12. Instrumental Regression Models Predicting the Balance Between Expenditures in 
Lunches and Other Education Expenses  
 Improvement Plans Free Schooling 
I.V. ENP 0.094 -0.248*** 
 
(0.069) (0.081) 
Margin of Victory 0.002 -0.006*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Turnout 0.078 -0.140 
 
(0.110) (0.130) 
Rural -0.028 -0.174*** 
 
(0.050) (0.058) 
Departmental Capital 0.176*** 0.077* 
 
(0.038) (0.045) 
Partisan Attachment   -0.001** -0.001** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
Partisan Alignment 0.002 -0.040** 
 
(0.014) (0.017) 
Log(Pop. Density) 0.238 -0.294 
 
(0.301) (0.354) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.024** -0.039*** 
 
(0.010) (0.012) 
Poverty 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0005) 
2009 -0.081*** 0.665*** 
 
(0.025) (0.029) 
2010 -0.083*** 0.655*** 
 
(0.025) (0.029) 
2011 -0.018 0.648*** 
 
(0.024) (0.028) 
2012 -0.022 0.643*** 
 
(0.024) (0.028) 
2013 -0.021 0.0004 
 
(0.023) (0.027) 
2014 -0.018 -0.061** 
 
(0.023) (0.027) 
2015 -0.020 -0.093*** 
 
(0.023) (0.027) 
Constant -0.612** 0.487 
 (0.288) (0.338) 
N 7800 7800 
R-squared -0.001 0.240 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A13. Instrumental Regression Models Predicting the Balance Between Expenditures in 
Improvement Plans and Other Education Expenses  
 area11_38 
I.V. ENP -0.342*** 
 
(0.074) 
Margin of Victory -0.008*** 
 
(0.002) 
Turnout -0.218* 
 
(0.118) 
Rural -0.146*** 
 
(0.053) 
Departmental Capital -0.099** 
 
(0.041) 
Partisan Attachment   -0.0003 
 
(0.0003) 
Partisan Alignment -0.042*** 
 
(0.015) 
Log(Pop. Density) -0.531* 
 
(0.322) 
Log(Total Budget) -0.062*** 
 
(0.011) 
Poverty 0.001*** 
 
(0.0004) 
2009 0.745*** 
 
(0.026) 
2010 0.738*** 
 
(0.026) 
2011 0.666*** 
 
(0.026) 
2012 0.665*** 
 
(0.026) 
2013 0.021 
 
(0.025) 
2014 -0.043* 
 
(0.025) 
2015 -0.073*** 
 
(0.025) 
Constant 1.099*** 
 (0.308) 
N 7800 
R-squared 0.257 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix B for Chapter 4 
 
Table B1. Instrumental Variable Probit Models Predicting Whether Local Governments Spend 
Any Discretionary Funds in Each Type of Goods in Education 
 Durable Invisible Targeted Collective 
I.V. ENP -0.101 1.050*** -1.102*** -0.720*** 
 (0.288) (0.134) (0.118) (0.203) 
Margin of Victory 0.001 0.025*** -0.022*** -0.014** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Turnout 0.385 1.164** -0.263 -0.943** 
 (0.426) (0.365) (0.432) (0.359) 
Rural 0.281 0.291 -0.014 -0.406* 
 (0.210) (0.193) (0.226) (0.177) 
Departmental Capital 0.107 0.356 -0.037 -0.172 
 (0.141) (0.185) (0.176) (0.195) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.614*** 0.160** 0.237*** 0.368*** 
 (0.062) (0.054) (0.039) (0.050) 
Partisan Attachment -0.001 0.004*** -0.002* -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Partisan Alignment -0.039 0.096 -0.116* -0.131* 
 (0.061) (0.056) (0.053) (0.055) 
Log(Pop. Density) -0.108 4.159*** -2.177* 2.191 
 (1.155) (0.841) (0.923) (1.472) 
Poverty -0.005*** 0.003* -0.014*** -0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
2009 -1.498*** 0.291*** 0.001 -0.098 
 (0.092) (0.066) (0.061) (0.085) 
2010 0.174* 0.083 0.098 -0.309*** 
 (0.070) (0.063) (0.064) (0.081) 
2011 0.317*** -0.197* 0.168* -0.183* 
 (0.073) (0.086) (0.080) (0.092) 
2012 0.048 -0.294*** 0.314*** -0.205* 
 (0.060) (0.078) (0.080) (0.091) 
2013 -0.053 -0.413*** 0.362*** -0.210* 
 (0.057) (0.088) (0.085) (0.094) 
2014 -0.056 -0.429*** 0.388*** -0.211* 
 (0.054) (0.090) (0.089) (0.094) 
2015 0.000 -0.408*** 0.398*** -0.278** 
 (.) (0.089) (0.093) (0.097) 
Constant -5.592*** -6.680*** 1.708 0.986 
 (1.119) (0.415) (0.959) (1.003) 
athrho     
Constant 0.058 -0.956*** 1.068*** 0.563** 
 (0.204) (0.207) (0.211) (0.193) 
lnsigma     
Constant -0.356*** -0.351*** -0.351*** -0.351*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Observations 5804 6292 6292 6292 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B2. Instrumental Variable Probit Models Predicting Whether Local Governments Spend 
Any Discretionary Funds in Each Type of Goods in Health 
 Durable Invisible Targeted Collective 
I.V. ENP 0.923*** 0.171 0.928*** 0.277 
 (0.201) (0.320) (0.172) (0.317) 
Margin of Victory 0.022*** 0.004 0.023*** 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) 
Turnout 1.071* 2.260*** 1.422*** 0.908 
 (0.478) (0.484) (0.338) (0.477) 
Rural 0.461 0.255 0.649*** -0.186 
 (0.242) (0.246) (0.159) (0.256) 
Departmental Capital 0.114 0.223 0.185 0.489** 
 (0.208) (0.157) (0.158) (0.171) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.142* 0.126** 0.033 0.279*** 
 (0.062) (0.039) (0.039) (0.055) 
Partisan Attachment 0.002 0.001 0.002* 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Partisan Alignment 0.115 -0.036 0.078 0.009 
 (0.067) (0.058) (0.055) (0.058) 
Log(Pop. Density) 1.818 0.355 2.942* 0.536 
 (1.170) (1.354) (1.215) (1.324) 
Poverty 0.004 -0.002 0.001 -0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
2009 0.133 0.091 0.088 0.225** 
 (0.121) (0.071) (0.059) (0.072) 
2010 0.254* 0.347*** 0.278*** 0.250*** 
 (0.112) (0.071) (0.060) (0.069) 
2011 0.314** -0.106 0.427*** 0.509*** 
 (0.113) (0.076) (0.068) (0.075) 
2012 0.016 -0.244*** 0.295*** 0.342*** 
 (0.119) (0.073) (0.085) (0.080) 
2013 0.290* -0.520*** 0.105 0.403*** 
 (0.125) (0.076) (0.075) (0.081) 
2014 0.115 -0.466*** 0.001 0.463*** 
 (0.119) (0.077) (0.072) (0.086) 
2015 0.345** -0.458*** -0.250*** 0.495*** 
 (0.131) (0.078) (0.074) (0.085) 
Constant -6.926*** -3.450** -4.686*** -3.852** 
 (0.547) (1.298) (0.675) (1.182) 
athrho     
Constant -0.863*** -0.073 -0.754*** -0.223 
 (0.257) (0.231) (0.211) (0.235) 
lnsigma     
Constant -0.342*** -0.342*** -0.342*** -0.342*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Observations 6370 6370 6370 6370 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
114 
 
Table B3. Instrumental Variable Probit Models Predicting Whether Local Governments Spend 
Any Discretionary Funds in Each Type of Goods in Water supply 
 Durable Invisible Targeted Collective 
I.V. ENP 0.054 0.043 0.338 -0.725*** 
 (0.245) (0.253) (0.269) (0.181) 
Margin of Victory 0.003 -0.004 0.010 -0.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
Turnout 1.223** 1.653*** 1.270* -0.831* 
 (0.383) (0.501) (0.506) (0.392) 
Rural 0.346 0.051 -0.695** -0.058 
 (0.193) (0.208) (0.256) (0.185) 
Departmental Capital -0.094 0.242 -0.359* -0.007 
 (0.146) (0.136) (0.146) (0.168) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.323*** 0.294*** 0.310*** 0.264*** 
 (0.053) (0.040) (0.053) (0.038) 
Partisan Attachment -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Partisan Alignment -0.016 -0.025 0.064 -0.129* 
 (0.058) (0.069) (0.068) (0.058) 
Log(Pop. Density) -1.213 -0.223 0.769 -2.984** 
 (1.069) (1.264) (1.249) (0.993) 
Poverty -0.005** 0.000 -0.008*** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
2009 0.006 -0.127 0.045 0.052 
 (0.094) (0.108) (0.104) (0.091) 
2010 0.006 0.313** 0.088 0.028 
 (0.090) (0.102) (0.101) (0.090) 
2011 0.430*** -0.546*** 0.392*** -0.175* 
 (0.102) (0.112) (0.098) (0.089) 
2012 -1.622*** -0.208 0.396*** 1.416*** 
 (0.093) (0.107) (0.103) (0.147) 
2013 -1.669*** -0.259* 0.311** 1.526*** 
 (0.097) (0.113) (0.106) (0.154) 
2014 -1.683*** -0.188 0.270** 1.554*** 
 (0.098) (0.108) (0.104) (0.158) 
2015 -1.712*** -0.186 0.329** 1.729*** 
 (0.097) (0.111) (0.103) (0.172) 
Constant -3.172** -5.092*** -5.437*** -0.034 
 (0.980) (1.131) (1.116) (1.067) 
athrho     
Constant -0.044 -0.021 -0.201 0.564** 
 (0.179) (0.185) (0.203) (0.179) 
lnsigma     
Constant -0.325*** -0.325*** -0.325*** -0.325*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Observations 5293 5293 5293 5293 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B4. Instrumental Variable Probit Models Predicting Whether Local Governments Spend 
Any Discretionary Funds in Each Type of Goods in Sports 
 Durable Invisible Collective 
I.V. ENP 0.444 0.092 -0.380 
 (0.269) (0.462) (0.267) 
Margin of Victory 0.011 0.001 -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) 
Turnout 0.507 -0.032 -1.205** 
 (0.406) (0.850) (0.408) 
Rural 0.338 -0.079 -0.376 
 (0.214) (0.371) (0.204) 
Departmental Capital -0.182 0.355* -0.283 
 (0.149) (0.169) (0.183) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.272*** 0.182*** 0.183*** 
 (0.058) (0.051) (0.043) 
Partisan Attachment 0.001 0.003 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Partisan Alignment 0.024 0.110 -0.010 
 (0.056) (0.095) (0.060) 
Log(Pop. Density) 0.309 1.603 -0.694 
 (1.135) (1.438) (1.314) 
Poverty -0.006*** 0.000 -0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
2009 0.184* -0.060 0.163 
 (0.075) (0.136) (0.088) 
2010 0.078 0.438*** 0.058 
 (0.074) (0.117) (0.083) 
2011 0.278*** -0.576*** 0.102 
 (0.081) (0.150) (0.090) 
2012 -0.003 -0.676*** 0.219** 
 (0.080) (0.163) (0.083) 
2013 0.078 -0.866*** 0.466*** 
 (0.080) (0.178) (0.088) 
2014 0.101 -0.783*** 0.361*** 
 (0.080) (0.163) (0.087) 
2015 0.272** -1.033*** 0.458*** 
 (0.084) (0.194) (0.091) 
Constant -4.043*** -3.772* 1.387 
 (0.988) (1.907) (1.132) 
athrho    
Constant -0.331 -0.072 0.253 
 (0.216) (0.333) (0.207) 
lnsigma    
Constant -0.336*** -0.336*** -0.336*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Observations 5848 5848 5848 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
116 
 
Table B5. Instrumental Variable Probit Models Predicting Whether Local Governments Spend 
Any Discretionary Funds in Each Type of Goods in Culture 
 Durable Invisible Targeted Collective 
I.V. ENP 0.448 0.182 -0.123 -0.244 
 (0.271) (0.472) (0.328) (0.261) 
Margin of Victory 0.014* 0.003 0.002 -0.006 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) 
Turnout 0.518 -0.050 0.089 -0.489 
 (0.443) (0.883) (0.501) (0.430) 
Rural 0.214 0.001 0.284 -0.150 
 (0.218) (0.375) (0.238) (0.201) 
Departmental Capital -0.169 0.114 -0.187 -0.211 
 (0.149) (0.174) (0.174) (0.160) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.227*** 0.246*** 0.198*** 0.216*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.058) (0.037) 
Partisan Attachment 0.001 0.004* -0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Partisan Alignment -0.041 0.175 -0.052 -0.091 
 (0.062) (0.100) (0.064) (0.055) 
Log(Pop. Density) 2.350 0.464 0.721 0.540 
 (1.207) (1.798) (1.521) (1.183) 
Poverty -0.002 -0.000 -0.008*** -0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
2009 0.182* -0.283 0.036 0.324*** 
 (0.082) (0.153) (0.083) (0.077) 
2010 0.138 0.439*** 0.074 0.123 
 (0.078) (0.116) (0.090) (0.072) 
2011 0.314*** -0.865*** 0.069 0.239** 
 (0.080) (0.183) (0.093) (0.079) 
2012 0.233* -0.537*** 0.153 0.341*** 
 (0.095) (0.158) (0.093) (0.076) 
2013 0.294** -0.793*** 0.309*** 0.451*** 
 (0.093) (0.171) (0.092) (0.077) 
2014 0.256** -0.712*** 0.276** 0.354*** 
 (0.091) (0.171) (0.094) (0.076) 
2015 0.308*** -0.744*** 0.411*** 0.479*** 
 (0.094) (0.171) (0.099) (0.078) 
Constant -4.849*** -4.771* -0.460 -0.764 
 (0.921) (1.943) (1.294) (1.146) 
athrho     
Constant -0.343 -0.068 0.091 0.239 
 (0.219) (0.341) (0.238) (0.197) 
lnsigma     
Constant -0.337*** -0.337*** -0.337*** -0.337*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Observations 6245 6245 6245 6245 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B6. Instrumental Variable Probit Models Predicting Whether Local Governments Spend 
Any Discretionary Funds in Each Type of Goods in Other Public Utilities 
 Durable Invisible Targeted Collective 
I.V. ENP -0.921*** 0.340 -0.945*** 0.928*** 
 (0.201) (0.422) (0.179) (0.207) 
Margin of Victory -0.020*** 0.002 -0.025*** 0.023*** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) 
Turnout -1.603*** 0.548 -0.747 1.913*** 
 (0.361) (0.756) (0.479) (0.367) 
Rural -0.078 -0.086 -0.466* 1.074*** 
 (0.248) (0.348) (0.220) (0.170) 
Departmental Capital -0.228 -0.107 0.090 0.000 
 (0.192) (0.291) (0.204) (0.196) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.159*** 0.122* 0.182*** 0.011 
 (0.041) (0.061) (0.040) (0.046) 
Partisan Attachment -0.004*** 0.005*** -0.002 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Partisan Alignment -0.136* 0.203* -0.022 0.071 
 (0.059) (0.100) (0.076) (0.064) 
Log(Pop. Density) -3.390** -0.866 -3.195** 5.198*** 
 (1.106) (2.451) (1.213) (1.305) 
Poverty -0.004* 0.010*** -0.002 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
2009 0.123 0.168 0.019 -0.055 
 (0.079) (0.168) (0.097) (0.073) 
2010 0.100 0.695*** 0.034 -0.094 
 (0.076) (0.155) (0.097) (0.079) 
2011 0.319** -0.219 0.175 0.131 
 (0.106) (0.169) (0.106) (0.072) 
2012 0.389*** -0.498** 0.166 0.025 
 (0.092) (0.187) (0.104) (0.082) 
2013 0.427*** -0.703*** 0.348** 0.083 
 (0.097) (0.200) (0.107) (0.085) 
2014 0.378*** -0.648*** 0.128 0.151 
 (0.094) (0.189) (0.105) (0.089) 
2015 0.355*** -0.675*** 0.326** 0.149 
 (0.093) (0.180) (0.108) (0.089) 
Constant 3.274*** -5.030** 1.090 -5.721*** 
 (0.935) (1.545) (1.228) (0.665) 
athrho     
Constant 0.731** -0.257 0.897*** -0.764** 
 (0.240) (0.323) (0.245) (0.255) 
lnsigma     
Constant -0.343*** -0.343*** -0.343*** -0.343*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Observations 5940 5940 5940 5940 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B7. Instrumental Variable Probit Models Predicting Whether Local Governments Spend 
Any Discretionary Funds in Each Type of Goods in Housing 
 Durable Invisible Targeted 
I.V. ENP -0.587** 0.250 -0.415 
 (0.210) (0.340) (0.231) 
Margin of Victory -0.015** 0.006 -0.008 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) 
Turnout -1.564*** 0.172 -1.212** 
 (0.312) (0.554) (0.369) 
Rural -0.077 0.096 0.492* 
 (0.209) (0.314) (0.222) 
Departmental Capital -0.226 0.152 0.081 
 (0.157) (0.214) (0.154) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.157*** 0.105* 0.251*** 
 (0.036) (0.049) (0.047) 
Partisan Attachment -0.001 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Partisan Alignment -0.081 0.124 -0.037 
 (0.052) (0.083) (0.055) 
Log(Pop. Density) -2.741* -1.157 -1.277 
 (1.159) (1.792) (1.202) 
Poverty -0.005** 0.001 -0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
2009 0.206* -0.060 0.239** 
 (0.093) (0.118) (0.084) 
2010 0.198* 0.638*** 0.096 
 (0.090) (0.110) (0.080) 
2011 0.409*** -0.678*** 0.511*** 
 (0.093) (0.133) (0.093) 
2012 0.358*** -0.731*** 0.246** 
 (0.088) (0.144) (0.084) 
2013 0.568*** -0.738*** 0.479*** 
 (0.091) (0.141) (0.089) 
2014 0.390*** -0.842*** 0.247** 
 (0.089) (0.145) (0.086) 
2015 0.477*** -0.892*** 0.396*** 
 (0.092) (0.153) (0.089) 
Constant 0.755 -3.508* 0.477 
 (0.977) (1.376) (0.999) 
athrho    
Constant 0.448* -0.127 0.284 
 (0.180) (0.246) (0.179) 
lnsigma    
Constant -0.349*** -0.349*** -0.349*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Observations 6476 6476 6476 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B8. Instrumental Variable Probit Models Predicting Whether Local Governments Spend 
Any Discretionary Funds in Each Type of Goods in Agriculture 
 Durable Invisible Targeted Collective 
I.V. ENP -0.418 0.837*** -0.116 -0.462 
 (0.273) (0.211) (0.307) (0.298) 
Margin of Victory -0.007 0.018** -0.000 -0.009 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Turnout 0.629 1.502** 0.037 -0.828 
 (0.541) (0.510) (0.516) (0.540) 
Rural 0.122 0.414 0.206 -0.104 
 (0.238) (0.246) (0.250) (0.241) 
Departmental Capital 0.218 0.271 -0.265 -0.607** 
 (0.187) (0.191) (0.210) (0.227) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.229*** 0.068 0.148* 0.190*** 
 (0.038) (0.053) (0.060) (0.043) 
Partisan Attachment 0.001 0.004** -0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Partisan Alignment -0.005 0.131 -0.054 -0.130 
 (0.071) (0.073) (0.073) (0.072) 
Log(Pop. Density) -0.209 3.329* -1.366 -0.920 
 (1.491) (1.593) (1.788) (1.620) 
Poverty -0.000 0.008*** -0.008*** -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
2009 0.057 0.190 0.230* -0.148 
 (0.110) (0.119) (0.096) (0.112) 
2010 -0.165 0.787*** 0.139 -0.065 
 (0.106) (0.136) (0.094) (0.109) 
2011 0.017 -0.376* 0.991*** 0.186 
 (0.099) (0.149) (0.118) (0.111) 
2012 0.011 -0.303* 1.105*** 0.136 
 (0.098) (0.136) (0.113) (0.102) 
2013 0.126 -0.558*** 1.170*** 0.150 
 (0.096) (0.158) (0.121) (0.102) 
2014 -0.146 -0.485** 1.034*** 0.105 
 (0.102) (0.148) (0.115) (0.105) 
2015 -0.143 -0.654*** 1.164*** 0.058 
 (0.103) (0.167) (0.122) (0.107) 
Constant -2.528 -6.476*** 0.073 -0.826 
 (1.434) (0.671) (1.265) (1.469) 
athrho     
Constant 0.323 -0.663** 0.101 0.302 
 (0.213) (0.222) (0.218) (0.231) 
lnsigma     
Constant -0.352*** -0.352*** -0.352*** -0.352*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Observations 6442 6442 6442 6442 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B9. Instrumental Variable Probit Models Predicting Whether Local Governments Spend 
Any Discretionary Funds in Each Type of Goods in Transportation 
 Durable Invisible Collective 
I.V. ENP -0.548 0.525 0.855*** 
 (0.337) (0.303) (0.179) 
Margin of Victory -0.016 0.010 0.023*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) 
Turnout -1.116* 1.227* 0.629 
 (0.503) (0.505) (0.400) 
Rural 0.496 -0.019 0.692*** 
 (0.309) (0.278) (0.151) 
Departmental Capital -0.175 0.528*** 0.325 
 (0.205) (0.159) (0.169) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.375*** 0.114* 0.189*** 
 (0.073) (0.050) (0.049) 
Partisan Attachment -0.002 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Partisan Alignment -0.051 0.105 0.144** 
 (0.076) (0.066) (0.051) 
Log(Pop. Density) -0.740 1.724 2.142* 
 (2.061) (1.587) (0.985) 
Poverty -0.013*** 0.006** -0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
2009 0.005 -0.163 0.394*** 
 (0.095) (0.090) (0.074) 
2010 0.377** 0.534*** 0.292*** 
 (0.127) (0.075) (0.071) 
2011 0.940*** -0.696*** 0.458*** 
 (0.207) (0.131) (0.073) 
2012 0.943*** -0.752*** 0.345*** 
 (0.180) (0.114) (0.088) 
2013 0.921*** -0.824*** 0.536*** 
 (0.178) (0.125) (0.098) 
2014 0.815*** -0.920*** 0.479*** 
 (0.167) (0.128) (0.094) 
2015 0.954*** -0.931*** 0.378*** 
 (0.194) (0.126) (0.090) 
Constant 0.627 -4.986*** -6.136*** 
 (1.436) (1.093) (0.559) 
athrho    
Constant 0.397 -0.364 -0.667*** 
 (0.276) (0.248) (0.195) 
lnsigma    
Constant -0.343*** -0.343*** -0.343*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Observations 7235 7235 7235 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B10. Instrumental Variable Probit Models Predicting Whether Local Governments Spend 
Any Discretionary Funds in Each Type of Goods in Environment Protection  
 Invisible Targeted Collective 
I.V. ENP 0.819** 0.486 0.655** 
 (0.263) (0.249) (0.217) 
Margin of Victory 0.020** 0.008 0.016** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
Turnout 0.932 -0.872 0.167 
 (0.578) (0.632) (0.421) 
Rural 0.631* 0.544* 0.490** 
 (0.252) (0.275) (0.173) 
Departmental Capital 0.015 0.220 0.326 
 (0.218) (0.213) (0.208) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.085 0.144* 0.148* 
 (0.054) (0.062) (0.058) 
Partisan Attachment 0.006*** 0.004** 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Partisan Alignment 0.258*** 0.093 0.066 
 (0.076) (0.090) (0.057) 
Log(Pop. Density) 3.621* 3.432** 2.403* 
 (1.602) (1.120) (1.146) 
Poverty 0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
2009 0.173 0.086 0.205* 
 (0.114) (0.138) (0.081) 
2010 0.625*** 0.014 0.120 
 (0.123) (0.131) (0.079) 
2011 -0.465** 0.044 0.583*** 
 (0.160) (0.127) (0.089) 
2012 -0.355** -0.134 0.231** 
 (0.130) (0.140) (0.088) 
2013 -0.622*** -0.216 0.471*** 
 (0.153) (0.148) (0.099) 
2014 -0.800*** -0.259 0.393*** 
 (0.205) (0.147) (0.094) 
2015 -0.744*** -0.235 0.463*** 
 (0.191) (0.144) (0.098) 
Constant -6.390*** -4.343*** -3.352*** 
 (0.853) (1.060) (0.864) 
athrho    
Constant -0.603* -0.375 -0.525** 
 (0.267) (0.202) (0.199) 
lnsigma    
Constant -0.348*** -0.348*** -0.348*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Observations 6248 6248 6248 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B11. Instrumental Variable Probit Models Predicting Whether Local Governments Spend 
Any Discretionary Funds in Each Type of Goods in Jails  
 Durable Invisible Collective 
I.V. ENP 0.635* -0.826* 0.802*** 
 (0.306) (0.363) (0.232) 
Margin of Victory 0.018* -0.024** 0.021*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) 
Turnout -0.123 -1.856* -1.547* 
 (0.652) (0.840) (0.776) 
Rural 0.189 -0.898* 0.481 
 (0.388) (0.404) (0.298) 
Departmental Capital 0.201 -0.073 -0.062 
 (0.212) (0.315) (0.193) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.072 0.168 0.045 
 (0.071) (0.091) (0.061) 
Partisan Attachment 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Partisan Alignment 0.098 -0.083 0.082 
 (0.104) (0.195) (0.087) 
Log(Pop. Density) 2.634 -3.091 2.778 
 (1.610) (1.896) (1.614) 
Poverty 0.002 -0.004 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
2009 0.111 -0.184 -0.031 
 (0.152) (0.258) (0.136) 
2010 -0.240 0.347 -0.158 
 (0.166) (0.269) (0.151) 
2011 -0.129 -0.615* -0.246 
 (0.162) (0.261) (0.151) 
2012 -0.244 -0.463 -0.285* 
 (0.153) (0.325) (0.140) 
2013 -0.139 -0.428 -0.237 
 (0.154) (0.306) (0.140) 
2014 -0.118 -0.643 -0.196 
 (0.150) (0.340) (0.138) 
2015 -0.021 -0.531 -0.050 
 (0.154) (0.321) (0.137) 
Constant -3.980** 1.345 -2.327 
 (1.384) (2.503) (1.368) 
athrho    
Constant -0.508 0.730 -0.640* 
 (0.289) (0.439) (0.256) 
lnsigma    
Constant -0.309*** -0.309*** -0.309*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Observations 2763 2763 2763 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B12. Instrumental Variable Probit Models Predicting Whether Local Governments Spend 
Any Discretionary Funds in Each Type of Goods in Disaster Prevention  
 Durable Invisible Targeted Collective 
I.V. ENP 0.344 0.920*** 0.714*** 0.526* 
 (0.299) (0.163) (0.196) (0.225) 
Margin of Victory 0.006 0.018*** 0.017** 0.014* 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Turnout -0.243 0.592 -0.507 0.133 
 (0.490) (0.495) (0.468) (0.388) 
Rural -0.257 0.404* 0.562*** 0.414* 
 (0.253) (0.193) (0.163) (0.185) 
Departmental Capital -0.046 0.338 0.133 -0.070 
 (0.201) (0.194) (0.158) (0.186) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.144** 0.108* 0.075 0.072 
 (0.046) (0.055) (0.045) (0.043) 
Partisan Attachment 0.002 0.005*** 0.002 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Partisan Alignment 0.027 0.150 0.088 0.109 
 (0.066) (0.081) (0.054) (0.056) 
Log(Pop. Density) 3.239* 2.892* 1.695 0.721 
 (1.283) (1.339) (1.010) (1.546) 
Poverty 0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
2009 0.317** 0.016 0.184* 0.177* 
 (0.118) (0.126) (0.082) (0.087) 
2010 0.373** 0.464*** 0.214** 0.071 
 (0.114) (0.121) (0.078) (0.083) 
2011 0.403*** -0.581*** 0.702*** 0.326*** 
 (0.110) (0.167) (0.093) (0.080) 
2012 0.663*** -0.089 0.146 0.440*** 
 (0.118) (0.124) (0.086) (0.093) 
2013 0.592*** -0.057 0.108 0.560*** 
 (0.117) (0.123) (0.082) (0.095) 
2014 0.558*** -0.068 0.107 0.620*** 
 (0.121) (0.124) (0.085) (0.098) 
2015 0.611*** -0.129 0.118 0.633*** 
 (0.118) (0.126) (0.085) (0.098) 
Constant -3.774** -6.318*** -3.063*** -2.927** 
 (1.166) (0.585) (0.822) (0.922) 
athrho     
Constant -0.242 -0.735*** -0.582** -0.415* 
 (0.226) (0.192) (0.191) (0.189) 
lnsigma     
Constant -0.341*** -0.341*** -0.341*** -0.341*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Observations 6171 6171 6171 6171 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B13. Instrumental Variable Probit Models Predicting Whether Local Governments Spend 
Any Discretionary Funds in Each Type of Goods in Economic Development   
 Durable Invisible Targeted Collective 
I.V. ENP 0.496 0.689** 0.752*** -0.307 
 (0.337) (0.229) (0.200) (0.261) 
Margin of Victory 0.009 0.018** 0.019*** -0.006 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
Turnout 0.265 1.297* 0.268 -0.716 
 (0.565) (0.559) (0.412) (0.439) 
Rural 0.512 0.120 -0.023 0.448 
 (0.269) (0.283) (0.226) (0.249) 
Departmental Capital 0.352 0.411* 0.320* 0.395* 
 (0.180) (0.180) (0.157) (0.175) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.144* 0.140* 0.099 0.272*** 
 (0.065) (0.063) (0.054) (0.042) 
Partisan Attachment 0.000 0.004* 0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Partisan Alignment 0.061 0.100 0.044 -0.001 
 (0.088) (0.097) (0.061) (0.066) 
Log(Pop. Density) 0.967 3.317* 3.402* -0.923 
 (1.591) (1.500) (1.330) (1.283) 
Poverty -0.006 0.008** -0.001 -0.021*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
2009 0.107 0.060 -0.049 0.390*** 
 (0.128) (0.160) (0.088) (0.105) 
2010 0.130 0.724*** -0.036 0.339** 
 (0.128) (0.148) (0.088) (0.104) 
2011 0.117 -0.567** 0.032 0.269** 
 (0.120) (0.193) (0.083) (0.100) 
2012 0.023 -0.335* -0.079 0.403*** 
 (0.126) (0.168) (0.087) (0.101) 
2013 -0.007 -0.517** -0.096 0.573*** 
 (0.131) (0.189) (0.089) (0.101) 
2014 -0.144 -0.665** -0.205* 0.702*** 
 (0.130) (0.208) (0.089) (0.103) 
2015 0.004 -0.624** -0.194* 0.649*** 
 (0.130) (0.199) (0.088) (0.104) 
Constant -4.479*** -6.727*** -3.317*** -1.258 
 (1.130) (0.853) (0.807) (1.187) 
athrho     
Constant -0.394 -0.432* -0.646** 0.254 
 (0.288) (0.201) (0.209) (0.202) 
lnsigma     
Constant -0.328*** -0.328*** -0.328*** -0.328*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Observations 5102 5102 5102 5102 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B14. Instrumental Variable Probit Models Predicting Whether Local Governments Spend 
Any Discretionary Funds in Each Type of Goods in Vulnerable Groups   
 Durable Invisible Targeted Collective 
I.V. ENP 0.848*** -0.649 -0.352 0.243 
 (0.153) (0.384) (0.361) (0.357) 
Margin of Victory 0.019*** -0.017 -0.009 0.010 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Turnout 0.701 -2.339*** -0.685 0.035 
 (0.358) (0.613) (0.577) (0.777) 
Rural 0.467*** -0.949*** -0.125 -0.456 
 (0.140) (0.274) (0.279) (0.338) 
Departmental Capital -0.042 0.175 -0.166 0.012 
 (0.146) (0.217) (0.236) (0.230) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.109* 0.218*** 0.281*** -0.078 
 (0.047) (0.055) (0.064) (0.099) 
Partisan Attachment 0.002* -0.003 0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Partisan Alignment 0.042 0.066 -0.081 0.043 
 (0.052) (0.120) (0.079) (0.136) 
Log(Pop. Density) 2.125 -1.502 0.074 -1.668 
 (1.131) (1.767) (1.827) (2.565) 
Poverty 0.006*** 0.006 -0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
2009 0.356*** -0.336* -0.004 0.000 
 (0.061) (0.171) (0.092) (.) 
2010 -0.103 -0.275 0.002 0.000 
 (0.062) (0.155) (0.098) (.) 
2011 -0.143* -0.114 1.445*** 0.000 
 (0.066) (0.140) (0.272) (.) 
2012 -0.408*** 0.152 0.996*** 4.255 
 (0.058) (0.124) (0.164) (.) 
2013 0.005 0.167 1.265*** 4.597 
 (0.041) (0.115) (0.199) (.) 
2014 -0.216*** -0.031 1.705*** 4.893 
 (0.045) (0.104) (0.320) (.) 
2015 0.000 0.000 1.236*** 5.310 
 (.) (.) (0.204) (.) 
Constant -4.796*** -0.130 0.750 -6.948*** 
 (0.590) (2.093) (1.513) (1.436) 
athrho     
Constant -0.697*** 0.465 0.251 -0.184 
 (0.169) (0.343) (0.275) (0.260) 
lnsigma     
Constant -0.340*** -0.340*** -0.339*** -0.351*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.034) 
Observations 6665 6665 7229 4436 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
126 
 
Table B15. Instrumental Variable Probit Models Predicting Whether Local Governments Spend 
Any Discretionary Funds in Each Type of Goods in Equipment   
 Durable Invisible 
I.V. ENP -0.329 0.634* 
 (0.291) (0.255) 
Margin of Victory -0.007 0.014* 
 (0.008) (0.007) 
Turnout -0.953* 1.192* 
 (0.481) (0.521) 
Rural -0.412* 0.102 
 (0.206) (0.253) 
Departmental Capital -0.001 0.276 
 (0.186) (0.181) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.164* 0.064 
 (0.065) (0.045) 
Partisan Attachment -0.001 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Partisan Alignment -0.138* 0.110 
 (0.068) (0.076) 
Log(Pop. Density) 0.534 2.778 
 (1.775) (1.482) 
Poverty -0.006** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
2009 0.197 0.052 
 (0.102) (0.104) 
2010 0.251* 0.624*** 
 (0.103) (0.099) 
2011 0.747*** -0.482*** 
 (0.135) (0.135) 
2012 0.844*** -0.582*** 
 (0.122) (0.131) 
2013 0.768*** -0.755*** 
 (0.117) (0.147) 
2014 0.726*** -0.920*** 
 (0.115) (0.163) 
2015 0.693*** -0.920*** 
 (0.119) (0.161) 
Constant 1.685 -5.399*** 
 (1.236) (0.943) 
athrho   
Constant 0.254 -0.445* 
 (0.221) (0.225) 
lnsigma   
Constant -0.335*** -0.335*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) 
Observations 6659 6659 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B16. Instrumental Variable Probit Models Predicting Whether Local Governments Spend 
Any Discretionary Funds in Each Type of Goods in Civic Capacity 
 Invisible Targeted Collective 
I.V. ENP 0.368 0.665** 0.021 
 (0.288) (0.208) (0.253) 
Margin of Victory 0.006 0.017** 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) 
Turnout 0.062 -0.682 -0.769 
 (0.700) (0.514) (0.470) 
Rural 0.098 0.381 -0.061 
 (0.285) (0.196) (0.226) 
Departmental Capital 0.217 0.123 -0.151 
 (0.181) (0.137) (0.170) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.145** 0.089 0.165*** 
 (0.053) (0.054) (0.045) 
Partisan Attachment 0.003 0.002* 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Partisan Alignment 0.225* 0.079 0.007 
 (0.101) (0.064) (0.074) 
Log(Pop. Density) 2.010 1.601 -1.347 
 (1.331) (1.245) (1.244) 
Poverty 0.007* -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
2009 -0.130 0.261* 0.001 
 (0.179) (0.105) (0.129) 
2010 0.390** 0.013 0.221 
 (0.151) (0.101) (0.125) 
2011 -0.655*** 0.055 0.225 
 (0.190) (0.097) (0.116) 
2012 -0.675*** 0.157 0.276* 
 (0.189) (0.100) (0.121) 
2013 -0.540** 0.142 0.133 
 (0.171) (0.099) (0.126) 
2014 -0.684*** 0.046 0.246* 
 (0.186) (0.098) (0.122) 
2015 -0.781*** 0.075 0.178 
 (0.198) (0.100) (0.124) 
Constant -4.855*** -2.208* -2.339* 
 (1.192) (1.006) (1.130) 
athrho    
Constant -0.251 -0.573** -0.012 
 (0.229) (0.201) (0.184) 
lnsigma    
Constant -0.327*** -0.327*** -0.327*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Observations 5398 5398 5398 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B17. Instrumental Variable Probit Models Predicting Whether Local Governments Spend 
Any Discretionary Funds in Each Type of Goods in Institutional Capacity 
 Invisible Collective 
I.V. ENP -0.114 0.824*** 
 (0.447) (0.172) 
Margin of Victory -0.005 0.020*** 
 (0.012) (0.005) 
Turnout -0.091 0.116 
 (0.647) (0.436) 
Rural 0.010 0.436** 
 (0.301) (0.162) 
Departmental Capital 0.281 0.413* 
 (0.260) (0.177) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.224** 0.165*** 
 (0.071) (0.049) 
Partisan Attachment 0.003 0.003** 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Partisan Alignment 0.074 0.030 
 (0.094) (0.052) 
Log(Pop. Density) 2.251 3.184** 
 (2.237) (1.002) 
Poverty -0.000 -0.005* 
 (0.003) (0.002) 
2009 0.279* 0.346*** 
 (0.110) (0.067) 
2010 0.454*** 0.199** 
 (0.114) (0.064) 
2011 0.780*** 0.319*** 
 (0.137) (0.064) 
2012 0.988*** 0.613*** 
 (0.139) (0.099) 
2013 0.973*** 0.393*** 
 (0.140) (0.084) 
2014 0.789*** 0.254*** 
 (0.125) (0.075) 
2015 0.896*** 0.266*** 
 (0.133) (0.076) 
Constant -0.661 -4.837*** 
 (1.855) (0.639) 
athrho   
Constant 0.056 -0.664*** 
 (0.321) (0.187) 
lnsigma   
Constant -0.335*** -0.335*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) 
Observations 6999 6999 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B18. Instrumental Variable Probit Models Predicting Whether Local Governments Spend 
Any Discretionary Funds in Each Type of Goods in Justice and Security 
 Durable Invisible Targeted 
I.V. ENP 0.698* 0.986*** -0.088 
 (0.302) (0.168) (0.424) 
Margin of Victory 0.017* 0.020*** -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.011) 
Turnout 0.730 1.038* -0.428 
 (0.534) (0.487) (0.663) 
Rural 0.418 0.236 0.297 
 (0.257) (0.237) (0.304) 
Departmental Capital 0.251 0.230 -0.341 
 (0.148) (0.170) (0.262) 
Log(Total Budget) 0.105 0.068 0.247*** 
 (0.055) (0.050) (0.072) 
Partisan Attachment 0.003** 0.005*** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Partisan Alignment 0.080 0.264*** 0.007 
 (0.066) (0.070) (0.086) 
Log(Pop. Density) 3.013* 3.281** 2.893 
 (1.308) (1.060) (2.010) 
Poverty 0.001 0.007** -0.005* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
2009 -0.888*** -0.152 1.002*** 
 (0.169) (0.099) (0.105) 
2010 -0.710*** 0.119 0.884*** 
 (0.144) (0.082) (0.096) 
2011 -1.220*** -0.818*** 1.728*** 
 (0.215) (0.182) (0.131) 
2012 -1.450*** -0.728*** 1.642*** 
 (0.201) (0.139) (0.120) 
2013 -1.507*** -0.724*** 2.065*** 
 (0.208) (0.140) (0.169) 
2014 -1.531*** -0.894*** 2.037*** 
 (0.214) (0.164) (0.155) 
2015 -1.395*** -0.937*** 2.094*** 
 (0.196) (0.167) (0.166) 
Constant -4.347*** -6.123*** -1.338 
 (1.074) (0.592) (1.687) 
athrho    
Constant -0.541 -0.826*** 0.013 
 (0.287) (0.222) (0.306) 
lnsigma    
Constant -0.334*** -0.334*** -0.334*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Observations 6601 6601 6601 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B19. Instrumental Variable Regression Models Predicting the Amount Spent (in thousands 
of Colombian Pesos) in Each Type of Goods in Education 
 Durable Invisible Targeted Collective 
I.V. ENP -8,135.1*** -572.9*** -1,886.3*** -4,007.6*** 
 (1,655.4) (167.1) (440.4) (766.8) 
Margin of Victory -188.5*** -13.3*** -44.6*** -90.4*** 
 (39.3) (4.0) (10.5) (18.2) 
Turnout -6,049.9* -380.2 -1,324.2* -3,274.0** 
 (2,481.8) (250.5) (660.3) (1,149.6) 
Rural -2,342.3* -71.2 -285.3 -1,166.9* 
 (1,056.7) (106.6) (281.2) (489.5) 
Departmental Capital -3,506.4*** -187.7* -628.2** -1,724.1*** 
 (769.9) (77.7) (204.8) (356.6) 
Log(Total Budget) 4,188.9*** 271.1*** 886.9*** 2,036.4*** 
 (399.2) (40.3) (106.2) (184.9) 
Partisan Attachment -16.6** -1.4* -4.6** -8.5** 
 (6.2) (0.6) (1.7) (2.9) 
Partisan Alignment -694.5 -34.1 -238.7* -374.9* 
 (358.5) (36.2) (95.4) (166.1) 
Log(Pop. Density) -25,869.5*** -1,995.0** -5,340.9** -12,876.9*** 
 (6,655.6) (671.7) (1,770.8) (3,082.8) 
Poverty -26.6* -3.2** -10.6*** -13.9** 
 (11.0) (1.1) (2.9) (5.1) 
2009 473.0 60.1 101.4 295.2 
 (1,046.0) (105.6) (278.3) (484.5) 
2010 848.4 66.2 189.7 589.0* 
 (504.5) (50.9) (134.2) (233.7) 
2011 -233.3 2.6 31.8 -134.8 
 (485.0) (48.9) (129.0) (224.7) 
2012 432.1 38.2 112.3 441.3* 
 (484.1) (48.9) (128.8) (224.2) 
2013 338.1 55.7 132.8 286.1 
 (489.9) (49.4) (130.3) (226.9) 
2014 170.4 25.7 82.3 187.0 
 (493.2) (49.8) (131.2) (228.4) 
Constant -6,743.9 -283.2 -723.8 -2,913.4 
 (5,375.2) (542.5) (1,430.2) (2,489.7) 
Observations 2895 2895 2895 2895 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
131 
 
Table B20. Instrumental Variable Regression Models Predicting the Amount Spent (in thousands 
of Colombian Pesos) in Each Type of Goods in Health 
 Durable Invisible Targeted Collective 
I.V. ENP -3,902.5* -3.7 -3,769.3* -4,116.8* 
 (1,700.8) (3.3) (1,650.1) (1,801.8) 
Margin of Victory -67.7* -0.1 -65.3* -71.2* 
 (34.2) (0.1) (33.1) (36.2) 
Turnout -3,498.2 9.6 -3,362.6 -3,662.9 
 (3,432.5) (6.7) (3,330.2) (3,636.4) 
Rural -1,654.3 -1.5 -1,608.3 -1,765.8 
 (1,226.0) (2.4) (1,189.5) (1,298.9) 
Departmental Capital -2,544.2** -1.1 -2,475.2** -2,714.4** 
 (946.1) (1.9) (917.9) (1,002.3) 
Log(Total Budget) 1,562.6*** 1.3 1,521.2*** 1,674.7*** 
 (389.8) (0.8) (378.2) (413.0) 
Partisan Attachment -19.6* -0.0 -18.9* -20.9* 
 (9.3) (0.0) (9.0) (9.9) 
Partisan Alignment 153.5 -0.1 145.8 159.0 
 (446.0) (0.9) (432.7) (472.5) 
Log(Pop. Density) -9,227.5 -16.8 -8,994.3 -9,829.4 
 (6,104.8) (12.0) (5,922.9) (6,467.5) 
Poverty -16.1 -0.0 -15.4 -16.8 
 (15.1) (0.0) (14.7) (16.0) 
2009 -1,683.1 -0.6 -1,618.3 -1,764.8 
 (1,489.6) (2.9) (1,445.3) (1,578.1) 
2010 -1,451.4 4.3 -1,399.1 -1,524.9 
 (1,295.3) (2.5) (1,256.7) (1,372.3) 
2011 -1,817.6 -1.8 -1,756.7 -1,921.8 
 (1,338.9) (2.6) (1,299.0) (1,418.5) 
2012 -1,917.0 -1.0 -1,854.4 -2,033.7 
 (1,343.7) (2.6) (1,303.6) (1,423.5) 
2013 -1,459.8 -1.1 -1,413.9 -1,551.3 
 (1,170.5) (2.3) (1,135.6) (1,240.1) 
2014 -1,801.0 -0.3 -1,746.3 -1,914.3 
 (1,258.9) (2.5) (1,221.4) (1,333.7) 
2015 -1,992.0 -1.0 -1,940.6 -2,123.3 
 (1,248.9) (2.5) (1,211.7) (1,323.1) 
Constant 3,209.1 -1.9 2,976.2 3,131.3 
 (7,844.8) (15.4) (7,611.1) (8,311.0) 
Observations 322 322 322 322 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B21. Instrumental Variable Regression Models Predicting the Amount Spent (in thousands 
of Colombian Pesos) in Each Type of Goods in Water Supply 
 Durable Invisible Targeted Collective 
I.V. ENP -15,532.8*** -111.3 -509.1*** -747.3** 
 (3,886.8) (69.2) (143.9) (246.5) 
Margin of Victory -377.1*** -2.9 -12.5*** -18.5** 
 (98.9) (1.8) (3.7) (6.3) 
Turnout -12,745.5* -63.8 -353.1 -686.7 
 (6,345.8) (112.9) (234.9) (402.4) 
Rural -8,629.5** -24.8 -169.6 -316.8 
 (2,949.5) (52.5) (109.2) (187.0) 
Departmental Capital -8,090.8*** -69.9 -315.2*** -388.4** 
 (2,072.0) (36.9) (76.7) (131.4) 
Log(Total Budget) 6,111.5*** 79.1*** 268.0*** 295.9*** 
 (625.6) (11.1) (23.2) (39.7) 
Partisan Attachment -1.3 -0.4 -0.1 -0.5 
 (14.0) (0.2) (0.5) (0.9) 
Partisan Alignment 35.1 -21.0 -48.4 11.2 
 (768.3) (13.7) (28.4) (48.7) 
Log(Pop. Density) -31,585.4* -205.4 -1,232.8* -1,610.7 
 (15,393.8) (273.9) (569.9) (976.2) 
Poverty -24.5 0.5 -1.6 -2.7 
 (26.7) (0.5) (1.0) (1.7) 
2009 -2,898.9* -79.5** -156.7** -113.0 
 (1,380.4) (24.6) (51.1) (87.5) 
2010 -3,650.2** -82.3*** -178.6*** -148.5 
 (1,362.3) (24.2) (50.4) (86.4) 
2011 -4,176.8** -116.9*** -231.0*** -212.8* 
 (1,362.4) (24.2) (50.4) (86.4) 
2012 -5,357.8** -89.9** -259.8*** 124.9 
 (1,831.3) (32.6) (67.8) (116.1) 
2013 -4,331.4* -73.4* -219.5** -140.7 
 (1,876.6) (33.4) (69.5) (119.0) 
2014 -4,162.4* -95.5** -226.1** -139.1 
 (1,897.5) (33.8) (70.3) (120.3) 
2015 -4,941.9** -105.1** -252.1*** -166.3 
 (1,860.1) (33.1) (68.9) (118.0) 
Constant 9,464.5 -233.5 -283.3 478.8 
 (15,931.2) (283.5) (589.8) (1,010.3) 
Observations 2546 2546 2546 2546 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B22. Instrumental Variable Regression Models Predicting the Amount Spent (in thousands 
of Colombian Pesos) in Each Type of Goods in Recreation 
 Durable Invisible Collective 
I.V. ENP -2,835.8*** -1.9** -564.7*** 
 (539.3) (0.7) (81.0) 
Margin of Victory -72.0*** -0.0 -13.5*** 
 (13.9) (0.0) (2.1) 
Turnout -2,046.2* -1.3 -614.1*** 
 (927.9) (1.1) (139.4) 
Rural -1,201.4** -0.6 -206.9** 
 (459.6) (0.6) (69.1) 
Departmental Capital -1,408.8*** -0.6 -200.4*** 
 (311.7) (0.4) (46.8) 
Log(Total Budget) 1,536.5*** 0.8*** 272.2*** 
 (114.6) (0.1) (17.2) 
Partisan Attachment -3.6 -0.0 -1.3*** 
 (2.4) (0.0) (0.4) 
Partisan Alignment -244.9 -0.0 -51.9** 
 (132.7) (0.2) (19.9) 
Log(Pop. Density) -9,520.3*** -5.2 -1,587.0*** 
 (2,431.5) (3.0) (365.4) 
Poverty -5.5 -0.0 -1.0 
 (3.5) (0.0) (0.5) 
2009 -787.5** -0.3 -201.4*** 
 (286.1) (0.4) (43.0) 
2010 -1,131.8*** 0.5 -243.8*** 
 (281.9) (0.3) (42.4) 
2011 -1,439.1*** -0.7* -310.5*** 
 (276.5) (0.3) (41.6) 
2012 -1,113.7*** -0.5 -225.5*** 
 (274.8) (0.3) (41.3) 
2013 -1,126.5*** -0.5 -231.0*** 
 (270.6) (0.3) (40.7) 
2014 -1,227.7*** -0.6 -249.6*** 
 (271.4) (0.3) (40.8) 
2015 -1,315.1*** -0.6 -265.0*** 
 (267.2) (0.3) (40.2) 
Constant -1,683.6 0.4 120.2 
 (2,153.1) (2.7) (323.6) 
Observations 3680 3680 3680 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B23. Instrumental Variable Regression Models Predicting the Amount Spent (in thousands 
of Colombian Pesos) in Each Type of Goods in Culture 
 Durable Invisible Targeted Collective 
I.V. ENP -1,002.6*** -18.4* -990.1*** -1,179.0*** 
 (232.5) (8.1) (199.4) (288.5) 
Margin of Victory -20.3*** -0.2 -23.2*** -28.7*** 
 (5.8) (0.2) (5.0) (7.2) 
Turnout -583.2 -8.8 -561.0 -1,062.8* 
 (400.2) (14.0) (343.2) (496.5) 
Rural -472.1** -2.1 -335.5* -559.4* 
 (183.2) (6.4) (157.1) (227.3) 
Departmental Capital -504.4*** -7.4 -426.2*** -414.7* 
 (144.3) (5.1) (123.7) (179.0) 
Log(Total Budget) 469.5*** 9.5*** 520.3*** 399.2*** 
 (52.2) (1.8) (44.8) (64.8) 
Partisan Attachment -1.6 -0.0 -2.8** -3.3* 
 (1.1) (0.0) (0.9) (1.3) 
Partisan Alignment 24.8 2.7 8.2 65.8 
 (56.3) (2.0) (48.3) (69.8) 
Log(Pop. Density) -3,364.4** -71.4 -3,153.8*** -3,924.8** 
 (1,078.9) (37.8) (925.3) (1,338.5) 
Poverty -2.2 -0.0 -0.2 -3.4 
 (1.6) (0.1) (1.4) (2.0) 
2009 -220.6 -3.8 -112.9 -646.7*** 
 (141.5) (5.0) (121.4) (175.6) 
2010 -12.9 6.5 -66.8 -516.8** 
 (137.8) (4.8) (118.2) (171.0) 
2011 -339.2* -5.1 -199.0 -671.0*** 
 (132.7) (4.6) (113.8) (164.7) 
2012 -276.1* -4.0 -193.6 -610.4*** 
 (135.1) (4.7) (115.8) (167.6) 
2013 -353.4** -5.7 -283.2* -695.5*** 
 (134.2) (4.7) (115.1) (166.5) 
2014 -297.9* -4.4 -222.0 -625.1*** 
 (134.0) (4.7) (115.0) (166.3) 
2015 -326.2* -5.3 -188.8 -647.6*** 
 (133.7) (4.7) (114.6) (165.8) 
Constant -244.6 -21.6 -898.1 1,849.3 
 (888.3) (31.1) (761.9) (1,102.2) 
Observations 1668 1668 1668 1668 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B24. Instrumental Variable Regression Models Predicting the Amount Spent (in thousands 
of Colombian Pesos) in Each Type of Goods in Other Public Utilities 
 Durable Invisible Targeted Collective 
I.V. ENP -2766.752*** -32.846** -79.873*** -336.110*** 
 (443.565) (11.840) (23.815) (72.164) 
Margin of Victory -68.146*** -0.823** -1.977*** -7.611*** 
 (10.999) (0.294) (0.591) (1.789) 
Turnout -2735.675*** -27.541 -59.197 -334.411** 
 (662.814) (17.693) (35.586) (107.834) 
Rural -1026.685** -11.775 -24.436 -178.771** 
 (337.146) (9.000) (18.101) (54.851) 
Departmental Capital -610.454* -10.280 -14.119 -128.104** 
 (259.689) (6.932) (13.942) (42.249) 
Log(Total Budget) 1,339.148*** 16.538*** 31.669*** 150.398*** 
 (81.743) (2.182) (4.389) (13.299) 
Partisan Attachment -6.870*** -0.083 -0.167 -0.544* 
 (1.633) (0.044) (0.088) (0.266) 
Partisan Alignment -311.366*** -6.820** -4.371 -36.375* 
 (93.505) (2.496) (5.020) (15.212) 
Log(Pop. Density) -9020.157*** -95.286 -123.328 -849.273** 
 (1,913.115) (51.069) (102.713) (311.247) 
Poverty -9.498*** -0.055 -0.263* -1.130** 
 (2.406) (0.064) (0.129) (0.392) 
2009 -433.577* -16.911** 11.588 -16.339 
 (194.763) (5.199) (10.457) (31.686) 
2010 -424.458* -16.663*** -5.335 -13.315 
 (188.142) (5.022) (10.101) (30.609) 
2011 -838.867*** -19.952*** -10.282 -68.105* 
 (181.419) (4.843) (9.740) (29.515) 
2012 -533.505** -16.314*** -4.946 -8.067 
 (181.116) (4.835) (9.724) (29.466) 
2013 -633.879*** -17.448*** -6.087 -32.290 
 (180.804) (4.826) (9.707) (29.415) 
2014 -612.176*** -17.033*** -6.011 -33.123 
 (182.081) (4.860) (9.776) (29.623) 
2015 -760.822*** -18.935*** -6.464 -50.275 
 (182.441) (4.870) (9.795) (29.682) 
Constant 110.239 1.148 33.405 92.155 
 (1,680.503) (44.859) (90.224) (273.403) 
Observations 4699 4699 4699 4699 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B25. Instrumental Variable Regression Models Predicting the Amount Spent (in thousands 
of Colombian Pesos) in Each Type of Goods in  
 Durable Invisible Targeted 
I.V. ENP -2,105.3*** -0.8 -3,090.9** 
 (480.3) (0.6) (1,152.3) 
Margin of Victory -43.6*** -0.0 -87.6** 
 (12.9) (0.0) (31.0) 
Turnout -946.3 0.6 -1,551.9 
 (789.4) (0.9) (1,893.8) 
Rural -886.0* -0.8 115.6 
 (400.3) (0.5) (960.3) 
Departmental Capital -771.0* -0.2 -1,790.0* 
 (337.7) (0.4) (810.1) 
Log(Total Budget) 1,312.0*** 0.1 2,788.0*** 
 (108.4) (0.1) (260.0) 
Partisan Attachment -0.6 0.0 -2.6 
 (2.1) (0.0) (5.1) 
Partisan Alignment -465.3*** 0.1 -642.0 
 (139.8) (0.2) (335.5) 
Log(Pop. Density) -9,057.3** -6.7* -14,835.7* 
 (2,854.5) (3.4) (6,848.0) 
Poverty -8.1* -0.0 -14.7 
 (3.2) (0.0) (7.7) 
2009 -342.3 0.1 -2,807.7*** 
 (338.3) (0.4) (811.6) 
2010 -369.3 1.0** -3,084.9*** 
 (326.9) (0.4) (784.3) 
2011 -858.7** 0.2 -3,433.1*** 
 (304.6) (0.4) (730.8) 
2012 -464.2 0.0 -2,719.6*** 
 (317.1) (0.4) (760.8) 
2013 -563.8 0.0 -2,956.6*** 
 (312.8) (0.4) (750.4) 
2014 -554.7 -0.0 -2,903.8*** 
 (319.4) (0.4) (766.3) 
2015 -702.3* -0.0 -3,027.7*** 
 (314.6) (0.4) (754.8) 
Constant -3,355.5 1.4 -11,108.6* 
 (1,923.7) (2.3) (4,615.1) 
Observations 1599 1599 1599 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B26. Instrumental Variable Regression Models Predicting the Amount Spent (in thousands 
of Colombian Pesos) in Each Type of Goods in  
 Durable Invisible Targeted Collective 
I.V. ENP -2,022.2** -28.0 -1,720.5** -11.9* 
 (653.1) (15.7) (541.1) (5.1) 
Margin of Victory -40.0** -0.5 -32.6** -0.3* 
 (14.4) (0.3) (11.9) (0.1) 
Turnout -1,231.4 13.4 -1,470.8 -11.1 
 (1,069.7) (25.8) (886.2) (8.4) 
Rural -535.2 -8.4 -136.2 -3.2 
 (494.0) (11.9) (409.3) (3.9) 
Departmental Capital -1,769.3*** 20.3 -1,406.4*** -8.5* 
 (450.4) (10.8) (373.1) (3.5) 
Log(Total Budget) 1,216.6*** 13.8*** 1,032.2*** 5.6*** 
 (149.1) (3.6) (123.6) (1.2) 
Partisan Attachment -10.6** -0.1 -6.9* -0.0 
 (3.5) (0.1) (2.9) (0.0) 
Partisan Alignment -482.2* -4.6 -377.7 -3.8* 
 (238.0) (5.7) (197.2) (1.9) 
Log(Pop. Density) -2,910.6 -181.6 -7,720.3* -37.0 
 (4,241.8) (102.2) (3,514.4) (33.2) 
Poverty -6.9 -0.2 -6.2 -0.0 
 (5.0) (0.1) (4.2) (0.0) 
2009 512.2 -18.4* 0.6 4.0 
 (385.6) (9.3) (319.4) (3.0) 
2010 847.7* -22.1* -365.5 2.5 
 (386.5) (9.3) (320.2) (3.0) 
2011 95.0 -23.2** -536.9 4.0 
 (339.5) (8.2) (281.3) (2.7) 
2012 333.2 -20.6* -256.8 3.7 
 (368.6) (8.9) (305.4) (2.9) 
2013 225.0 -21.5* -339.3 3.3 
 (365.5) (8.8) (302.8) (2.9) 
2014 352.4 -20.2* -203.4 4.3 
 (409.3) (9.9) (339.1) (3.2) 
2015 36.7 -24.1** -368.5 2.6 
 (372.6) (9.0) (308.7) (2.9) 
Constant -3,303.1 -13.5 -2,159.7 -5.1 
 (2,444.6) (58.9) (2,025.4) (19.1) 
Observations 777 777 777 777 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B27. Instrumental Variable Regression Models Predicting the Amount Spent (in thousands 
of Colombian Pesos) in Each Type of Goods in  
 Durable Invisible Collective 
I.V. ENP -19,256.2*** -426.7*** -1,078.3*** 
 (2,323.4) (111.1) (211.3) 
Margin of Victory -467.4*** -10.4*** -27.8*** 
 (59.2) (2.8) (5.4) 
Turnout -17,624.9*** -339.5 -1,073.2** 
 (3,711.6) (177.6) (337.5) 
Rural -8,206.7*** -136.8 -306.9* 
 (1,681.8) (80.5) (152.9) 
Departmental Capital -5,642.0*** -85.5 -307.8** 
 (1,207.7) (57.8) (109.8) 
Log(Total Budget) 7,913.1*** 173.5*** 526.4*** 
 (392.5) (18.8) (35.7) 
Partisan Attachment -46.1*** -1.5*** -4.0*** 
 (8.7) (0.4) (0.8) 
Partisan Alignment -1,688.6*** -52.4* -141.5** 
 (487.3) (23.3) (44.3) 
Log(Pop. Density) -52,973.0*** -1,442.8** -2,463.4** 
 (10,081.2) (482.3) (916.8) 
Poverty -50.8*** -1.6* -2.6* 
 (13.5) (0.6) (1.2) 
2009 -3,660.2*** -182.7*** -56.4 
 (942.3) (45.1) (85.7) 
2010 -4,550.5*** -181.2*** -258.0** 
 (920.0) (44.0) (83.7) 
2011 -6,424.9*** -209.7*** -339.3*** 
 (921.7) (44.1) (83.8) 
2012 -3,933.9*** -170.1*** -204.7* 
 (890.6) (42.6) (81.0) 
2013 -4,185.8*** -186.3*** -274.7*** 
 (894.4) (42.8) (81.3) 
2014 -5,087.8*** -187.7*** -279.0*** 
 (897.1) (42.9) (81.6) 
2015 -5,689.5*** -204.0*** -332.5*** 
 (904.3) (43.3) (82.2) 
Constant 13,057.7 377.6 13.6 
 (9,359.2) (447.7) (851.2) 
Observations 6982 6982 6982 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B28. Instrumental Variable Regression Models Predicting the Amount Spent (in thousands 
of Colombian Pesos) in Each Type of Goods in  
 Invisible Targeted Collective 
I.V. ENP -912.4** -2,833.9 -3,440.2*** 
 (346.4) (1,867.8) (715.3) 
Margin of Victory -13.1 -90.6 -78.4*** 
 (8.9) (52.1) (18.0) 
Turnout 90.1 -3,350.0 -3,046.3** 
 (744.4) (3,719.9) (1,143.2) 
Rural 171.4 1,068.5 -1,682.3** 
 (339.7) (906.5) (527.9) 
Departmental Capital -848.8** -2,082.1** -1,418.2*** 
 (321.8) (771.0) (379.6) 
Log(Total Budget) 648.2*** 1,571.5*** 1,763.0*** 
 (106.4) (303.8) (140.3) 
Partisan Attachment -6.1* -1.3 -10.8*** 
 (3.0) (7.3) (3.1) 
Partisan Alignment -82.3 -595.3 -294.0 
 (152.6) (491.3) (169.7) 
Log(Pop. Density) -7,776.6 -7,244.7 -11,393.0*** 
 (4,011.0) (3,898.1) (3,199.7) 
Poverty -11.2 -11.1 -2.2 
 (6.5) (11.3) (4.7) 
2009 -316.2 -3,818.5** -741.6 
 (264.3) (1,175.0) (381.3) 
2010 -326.2 -3,988.1** -205.6 
 (236.2) (1,217.2) (371.5) 
2011 -194.6 -4,140.1*** -1,327.9*** 
 (346.2) (1,150.4) (353.7) 
2012 -179.1 -2,573.4** -719.4* 
 (301.8) (783.5) (344.8) 
2013 -479.7 -3,105.9*** -953.8** 
 (370.3) (879.8) (342.8) 
2014 -740.5 -2,961.0*** -974.2** 
 (454.1) (839.1) (344.0) 
2015 -513.9 -3,726.5*** -1,173.9*** 
 (413.8) (923.3) (346.1) 
Constant -2,139.6 257.1 -1,089.2 
 (1,751.1) (7,323.2) (2,876.8) 
Observations 199 225 5209 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B29. Instrumental Variable Regression Models Predicting the Amount Spent (in thousands 
of Colombian Pesos) in Each Type of Goods in  
 Durable Invisible Collective 
I.V. ENP -781.6* 1,173.1 -310.9*** 
 (346.2) (854.2) (64.0) 
Margin of Victory -20.5* 28.7 -9.1*** 
 (9.6) (34.3) (2.0) 
Turnout 260.9 -1,115.8 -172.6 
 (368.7) (3,020.2) (110.1) 
Rural -1,162.5* 1,794.7 -193.0** 
 (573.5) (1,350.8) (70.4) 
Departmental Capital -69.0 -508.2 -130.2*** 
 (109.6) (910.0) (37.7) 
Log(Total Budget) 211.9*** 853.8** 158.8*** 
 (57.6) (304.1) (15.2) 
Partisan Attachment -3.1 4.8 -1.7*** 
 (1.9) (11.1) (0.4) 
Partisan Alignment -220.1 183.0 -84.1** 
 (120.5) (557.3) (26.7) 
Log(Pop. Density) -3,923.9* 36,937.9 -1,592.3*** 
 (1,832.2) (23,691.0) (409.4) 
Poverty 1.7 44.0 -1.3* 
 (1.9) (33.5) (0.6) 
2009 -1.3 1,370.0 -46.7 
 (149.1) (954.8) (44.9) 
2010 -98.2 -784.7 -46.6 
 (165.8) (826.7) (44.9) 
2011 -130.1 -1,253.2 -99.2* 
 (138.6) (1,254.6) (40.3) 
2012 -45.7 -1,800.6 -30.6 
 (146.5) (1,502.8) (41.7) 
2013 -54.1 255.2 -39.7 
 (141.0) (1,216.4) (41.9) 
2014 -32.6 -1,634.6 -63.6 
 (142.5) (2,054.8) (40.9) 
2015 -170.3 -239.7 -79.0* 
 (131.1) (1,374.1) (39.6) 
Constant 1,346.6 -14,409.9* 23.9 
 (1,261.5) (5,723.5) (299.9) 
Observations 365 30 1283 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B30. Instrumental Variable Regression Models Predicting the Amount Spent (in thousands 
of Colombian Pesos) in Each Type of Goods in  
 Durable Invisible Targeted Collective 
I.V. ENP -501.0** -127.0** -1,055.7*** -574.8*** 
 (170.4) (46.8) (158.8) (113.2) 
Margin of Victory -12.7** -3.4* -26.5*** -14.3*** 
 (4.4) (1.6) (4.1) (2.9) 
Turnout -163.1 -123.0 -851.8*** -302.4 
 (329.7) (125.3) (239.9) (171.5) 
Rural -70.4 43.6 -286.3* -149.2 
 (162.5) (55.3) (114.9) (84.6) 
Departmental Capital -366.5** -63.6* -321.2*** -289.5*** 
 (117.4) (31.2) (80.2) (59.3) 
Log(Total Budget) 377.0*** 81.0*** 511.0*** 338.7*** 
 (43.2) (16.5) (31.6) (26.1) 
Partisan Attachment -4.3** -0.9 -4.1*** -2.5*** 
 (1.4) (0.5) (0.8) (0.5) 
Partisan Alignment -190.0** -1.3 -126.8*** -55.6* 
 (68.6) (20.1) (38.3) (26.7) 
Log(Pop. Density) -1,733.9 -570.1 -2,982.4*** -1,935.2*** 
 (913.8) (332.3) (650.4) (518.3) 
Poverty -0.7 -1.4 -3.7*** -2.2** 
 (1.6) (0.9) (1.0) (0.7) 
2009 -27.7 14.3 -454.5*** -17.7 
 (169.1) (47.1) (89.8) (66.1) 
2010 196.8 -56.9 -374.1*** -49.6 
 (162.9) (38.8) (84.8) (64.9) 
2011 -135.1 -111.9 -457.5*** -176.5** 
 (155.3) (67.4) (78.7) (59.5) 
2012 -5.6 -32.5 -330.8*** -77.2 
 (156.6) (43.4) (79.8) (58.9) 
2013 -34.6 -49.5 -386.3*** -102.3 
 (159.0) (42.3) (80.1) (58.3) 
2014 -36.0 -73.1 -390.3*** -109.4 
 (159.3) (41.9) (80.4) (58.2) 
2015 -59.4 -98.4* -458.1*** -122.5* 
 (159.8) (43.8) (80.4) (58.3) 
Constant -1,396.3 -124.3 81.1 -724.8 
 (795.2) (329.4) (614.6) (408.8) 
Observations 1245 278 3756 3395 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B31. Instrumental Variable Regression Models Predicting the Amount Spent (in thousands 
of Colombian Pesos) in Each Type of Goods in  
 Durable Invisible Targeted Collective 
I.V. ENP -4,902.6 -13,299.3 -1,466.3*** -1,429.5*** 
 (3,234.8) (8,393.7) (228.8) (299.6) 
Margin of Victory -108.5 -343.0 -38.9*** -34.6*** 
 (74.2) (260.1) (6.1) (7.5) 
Turnout -2,704.1 13,486.1 -1,238.2** -753.6 
 (3,514.3) (22,922.7) (393.1) (430.3) 
Rural -3,343.1 2,095.3 -382.5* -560.5** 
 (2,611.0) (8,991.0) (191.4) (217.4) 
Departmental Capital -676.4 -9,047.9 -566.6*** -275.5* 
 (744.3) (5,621.1) (124.1) (129.7) 
Log(Total Budget) 1,039.5** 9,504.3*** 754.6*** 565.9*** 
 (357.9) (2,108.8) (52.4) (70.1) 
Partisan Attachment -6.4 -66.6 -3.5** -5.6*** 
 (7.2) (53.7) (1.2) (1.4) 
Partisan Alignment -334.0 402.4 -166.0** -221.4** 
 (543.8) (2,813.1) (62.1) (82.2) 
Log(Pop. Density) -28,777.0 -52,717.5 -4,743.0*** -5,638.9*** 
 (19,427.5) (48,702.8) (1,037.4) (1,345.1) 
Poverty -26.5 -96.8 -6.2*** -4.9* 
 (23.4) (113.3) (1.7) (2.2) 
2009 -3,202.9 -10,064.0 -647.0*** -824.7*** 
 (1,816.6) (6,217.5) (144.4) (189.3) 
2010 -2,764.7 -12,293.7* -774.8*** -772.0*** 
 (1,584.8) (5,200.8) (140.5) (180.4) 
2011 -3,025.8 -14,305.7 -859.8*** -962.4*** 
 (1,630.0) (7,505.5) (130.7) (181.6) 
2012 -1,967.4 -18,731.2** -654.8*** -677.8*** 
 (1,054.4) (7,002.8) (129.2) (169.2) 
2013 -1,801.5 -15,569.1* -725.8*** -727.1*** 
 (1,000.4) (7,269.6) (129.2) (166.5) 
2014 -1,334.1 -14,347.1 -651.8*** -750.1*** 
 (975.7) (8,007.5) (130.5) (166.1) 
2015 -1,902.2 -7,148.4 -784.9*** -783.7*** 
 (1,007.0) (8,070.4) (131.1) (167.2) 
Constant 13,162.7 -34,865.1 -151.9 1,424.1 
 (13,601.8) (52,973.5) (913.3) (1,054.8) 
Observations 438 134 3071 2187 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B32. Instrumental Variable Regression Models Predicting the Amount Spent (in thousands 
of Colombian Pesos) in Each Type of Goods in  
 Durable Invisible Targeted Collective 
I.V. ENP -2,904.4*** -274.6 -4,116.5*** -70.6 
 (518.5) (327.7) (473.7) (172.7) 
Margin of Victory -74.2*** -6.3 -99.1*** -1.7 
 (13.5) (8.1) (12.0) (4.3) 
Turnout -3,591.0*** 61.2 -3,478.7*** -194.5 
 (937.1) (198.7) (789.4) (485.7) 
Rural -1,026.8** -162.8 -1,656.1*** -87.1 
 (379.4) (252.5) (365.9) (227.1) 
Departmental Capital -725.2** 8.5 -978.4*** -64.7 
 (263.7) (118.8) (272.1) (146.4) 
Log(Total Budget) 1,272.7*** 29.7 1,813.2*** 29.3 
 (84.3) (39.7) (81.7) (56.2) 
Partisan Attachment -9.2*** 0.7 -13.0*** -0.4 
 (2.1) (1.2) (2.0) (0.8) 
Partisan Alignment -501.5*** 80.9 -496.2*** -20.3 
 (134.8) (101.8) (111.8) (47.8) 
Log(Pop. Density) -8,972.6*** -2,182.2 -13,095.7*** -142.9 
 (2,379.9) (2,679.8) (2,250.5) (415.2) 
Poverty -4.3 -1.7 -10.4*** 0.1 
 (3.3) (2.4) (2.9) (0.2) 
2009 484.3** 11.2 -617.8**  
 (175.3) (92.7) (212.2)  
2010 192.5 -78.3 -908.2***  
 (184.5) (151.0) (208.7)  
2011 -254.5 102.7 -1,259.8***  
 (173.0) (126.6) (206.2)  
2012 167.1 54.2 -807.8*** 21.9 
 (180.8) (77.8) (204.8) (60.2) 
2013 161.5 39.7 -911.0*** 9.7 
 (157.5) (59.3) (205.1) (27.4) 
2014 143.2 46.2 -978.2*** -3.4 
 (167.9) (83.4) (205.1) (10.1) 
2015   -1,173.3***  
   (207.0)  
Constant 1,051.8 607.7 1,620.9 149.0 
 (2,491.0) (1,476.7) (1,996.1) (529.9) 
Observations 2951 113 6985 172 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B33. Instrumental Variable Regression Models Predicting the Amount Spent (in thousands 
of Colombian Pesos) in Each Type of Goods in  
 Durable Invisible 
I.V. ENP -3,895.0*** -1,061.1** 
 (458.4) (357.4) 
Margin of Victory -95.1*** -25.8* 
 (11.7) (11.7) 
Turnout -4,027.6*** -795.9 
 (764.8) (852.0) 
Rural -1,600.0*** -313.2 
 (353.0) (371.4) 
Departmental Capital -950.2*** -245.7 
 (251.4) (264.7) 
Log(Total Budget) 1,673.7*** 574.6*** 
 (86.8) (96.2) 
Partisan Attachment -13.1*** -3.0 
 (2.0) (2.1) 
Partisan Alignment -486.8*** -70.8 
 (109.7) (123.9) 
Log(Pop. Density) -12,066.6*** -5,529.5 
 (2,143.5) (3,413.3) 
Poverty -12.1*** -7.4 
 (2.8) (4.9) 
2009 -738.2** -224.7 
 (225.2) (227.8) 
2010 -999.7*** -336.1 
 (216.9) (195.2) 
2011 -1,436.3*** -326.7 
 (212.6) (284.4) 
2012 -886.7*** -242.5 
 (207.5) (286.7) 
2013 -1,098.8*** -196.4 
 (208.3) (336.1) 
2014 -1,044.1*** -476.0 
 (208.7) (378.2) 
2015 -1,259.2*** -738.7 
 (210.4) (385.1) 
Constant 2,710.8 -398.4 
 (1,893.5) (1,974.4) 
Observations 6260 338 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B34. Instrumental Variable Regression Models Predicting the Amount Spent (in thousands 
of Colombian Pesos) in Each Type of Goods in  
 Invisible Targeted Collective 
I.V. ENP 743.4 -601.8*** -560.8** 
 (6,105.0) (90.2) (187.4) 
Margin of Victory 16.9 -15.5*** -12.4** 
 (131.3) (2.4) (4.4) 
Turnout 439.5 -367.5* -691.8* 
 (3,345.0) (156.3) (309.3) 
Rural 688.6 -108.4 -91.9 
 (5,564.9) (76.5) (104.5) 
Departmental Capital 50.8 -175.7** 68.6 
 (532.6) (56.3) (92.2) 
Log(Total Budget) -46.8 330.1*** 222.1*** 
 (515.1) (20.0) (37.8) 
Partisan Attachment -0.9 -2.7*** -1.4* 
 (7.9) (0.5) (0.7) 
Partisan Alignment 245.1 -92.2*** -86.8 
 (2,010.8) (27.3) (44.8) 
Log(Pop. Density) -305.8 -1,740.4*** -1,388.3 
 (2,425.4) (472.0) (881.9) 
Poverty 2.2 -1.6* -1.8 
 (17.2) (0.6) (1.1) 
2009 160.0 -283.1*** -25.8 
 (1,330.6) (60.5) (108.0) 
2010 156.8 -288.3*** -54.4 
 (1,412.3) (58.9) (95.9) 
2011 -5.6 -426.0*** -96.0 
 (266.0) (55.7) (92.4) 
2012 98.7 -308.1*** 9.3 
 (955.7) (54.5) (91.0) 
2013 283.9 -308.2*** -4.4 
 (2,478.1) (54.8) (93.8) 
2014 129.9 -338.6*** -43.8 
 (1,210.7) (54.9) (90.8) 
2015 -104.5 -369.3*** -86.3 
 (826.8) (55.1) (91.7) 
Constant -2,849.1 -297.3 401.8 
 (22,066.0) (388.1) (662.4) 
Observations 119 4240 864 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B35. Instrumental Variable Regression Models Predicting the Amount Spent (in thousands 
of Colombian Pesos) in Each Type of Goods in  
 Invisible Collective 
I.V. ENP -6,296.9*** -1,735.7*** 
 (775.3) (317.8) 
Margin of Victory -158.7*** -43.4*** 
 (20.0) (8.3) 
Turnout -5,566.2*** -1,104.0* 
 (1,305.1) (459.4) 
Rural -2,610.4*** -757.2** 
 (588.0) (278.2) 
Departmental Capital -1,859.0*** -634.3*** 
 (435.1) (148.5) 
Log(Total Budget) 2,772.9*** 802.9*** 
 (140.7) (64.8) 
Partisan Attachment -16.4*** -6.1*** 
 (3.3) (1.5) 
Partisan Alignment -603.6** -217.9** 
 (183.9) (82.7) 
Log(Pop. Density) -18,632.4*** -6,555.3*** 
 (3,623.3) (1,356.7) 
Poverty -16.2*** -6.9*** 
 (4.8) (2.0) 
2009 -952.7** -445.2** 
 (366.9) (170.6) 
2010 -1,098.2** -447.7** 
 (352.7) (165.7) 
2011 -1,495.4*** -657.8*** 
 (353.7) (161.0) 
2012 -994.5** -268.3 
 (347.1) (155.4) 
2013 -1,257.3*** -290.9 
 (348.1) (158.2) 
2014 -1,352.7*** -369.0* 
 (348.3) (162.2) 
2015 -1,618.6*** -466.0** 
 (351.3) (161.9) 
Constant 2,294.7 289.8 
 (3,240.8) (1,229.1) 
Observations 6736 3201 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B36. Instrumental Variable Regression Models Predicting the Amount Spent (in thousands 
of Colombian Pesos) in Each Type of Goods in  
 Durable Invisible Targeted 
I.V. ENP -814.2* -374.3 -2,313.5*** 
 (335.1) (252.4) (262.2) 
Margin of Victory -14.9 -13.0 -56.8*** 
 (7.6) (8.7) (6.7) 
Turnout -298.6 -17.4 -2,034.2*** 
 (626.2) (269.9) (442.8) 
Rural -152.9 -100.7 -799.2*** 
 (209.4) (181.6) (206.5) 
Departmental Capital -367.7* -183.5* -851.5*** 
 (144.1) (84.7) (153.8) 
Log(Total Budget) 417.4*** 170.0*** 1,136.7*** 
 (55.9) (38.3) (50.6) 
Partisan Attachment -3.3* -1.6 -8.1*** 
 (1.5) (1.4) (1.2) 
Partisan Alignment -173.7* 29.6 -278.6*** 
 (87.4) (51.9) (63.2) 
Log(Pop. Density) -2,402.7 -828.2 -7,282.8*** 
 (1,243.2) (736.9) (1,229.2) 
Poverty -5.3 -2.9 -8.1*** 
 (3.6) (2.4) (1.7) 
2009 -85.0 -118.8 -425.3** 
 (115.4) (74.7) (149.2) 
2010 -235.8* -80.1 -501.0*** 
 (98.0) (66.4) (144.2) 
2011 -492.4*** 5.0 -690.7*** 
 (125.7) (148.5) (139.3) 
2012 -382.9** 10.9 -344.8* 
 (143.9) (126.5) (138.5) 
2013 -346.1* -142.5 -485.7*** 
 (150.6) (94.9) (138.3) 
2014 -187.1 -357.2* -482.4*** 
 (168.0) (165.9) (138.3) 
2015 -220.3 -204.8 -584.0*** 
 (160.8) (123.2) (139.1) 
Constant -398.9 8.0 -132.5 
 (1,325.8) (904.8) (1,088.6) 
Observations 503 243 6289 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix C for Chapter 5 
 
Table C1. Models Predicting Projects Proposed to the Colombia Humanitaria Program for Road 
Construction 
 Any Project 
Proposed 
Any Project 
Approved 
Funds Requested Funds Approved 
I.V. ENP 0.635* -0.366 -447.196** -241.011** 
 (0.263) (0.507) (145.189) (78.988) 
Margin of Victory  0.016* -0.002 -9.539* -6.042** 
 (0.007) (0.014) (3.725) (2.076) 
Turnout 4.053*** -0.378 -498.330 -235.989 
 (0.430) (1.162) (308.334) (169.990) 
Rural 1.452*** 0.651 -204.806 -147.476* 
 (0.212) (0.539) (115.642) (70.523) 
Capital City 0.052 -0.308 -39.750 -27.632 
 (0.239) (0.363) (102.682) (67.697) 
Partisan Attachment 0.000 -0.002 -0.582 -0.125 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.486) (0.265) 
Partisan Alignment -0.047 0.047 22.425 9.060 
 (0.079) (0.110) (27.854) (15.469) 
Log(Pop. Density) 0.296*** 0.115 -57.190 -41.916* 
 (0.083) (0.134) (32.553) (18.944) 
Poverty 0.005* -0.010** -1.860* -0.845 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.856) (0.489) 
Total Requested    0.114* 
    (0.048) 
Number of Projects    8.565 
    (4.690) 
Constant -5.638*** 2.062 2,064.710** 1,114.023** 
 (1.015) (2.439) (705.381) (388.621) 
 (0.253) (0.333)   
athrho     
Constant -0.482* 0.418   
 (0.243) (0.406)   
lnsigma     
Constant -0.323*** -0.337***   
 (0.021) (0.026)   
Observations 1095 725 722 592 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table C2. Models Predicting Projects Proposed to the Colombia Humanitaria Program for 
Landslide Fixes 
 Any Project 
Proposed 
Any Project 
Approved 
Funds Requested Funds Approved 
I.V. ENP 0.143 -0.286 -191.589 -19.451 
 (0.347) (0.566) (101.517) (27.485) 
Margin of Victory  -0.000 -0.013 -4.093 -0.354 
 (0.010) (0.014) (2.590) (0.714) 
Turnout 2.285*** -2.082 -316.914 -23.928 
 (0.651) (1.486) (273.778) (56.255) 
Rural 0.434 -0.242 -61.294 -18.594 
 (0.297) (0.605) (109.028) (28.198) 
Capital City 0.272 0.119 18.254 13.173 
 (0.266) (0.533) (84.840) (10.573) 
Partisan Attachment -0.000 0.000 -0.448 -0.059 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.531) (0.113) 
Partisan Alignment -0.010 -0.018 31.993 -1.634 
 (0.085) (0.161) (27.462) (3.788) 
Log(Pop. Density) 0.273** 0.227 -12.346 -4.252 
 (0.097) (0.206) (33.830) (4.580) 
Poverty 0.002 -0.001 -0.494 -0.009 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.808) (0.131) 
Total Requested    0.737*** 
    (0.077) 
Number of Projects    -5.507*** 
    (1.537) 
Constant -3.338* 2.312 898.620 107.043 
 (1.552) (2.829) (517.032) (138.187) 
athrho     
Constant -0.193 0.213   
 (0.259) (0.403)   
lnsigma     
Constant -0.323*** -0.402***   
 (0.021) (0.044)   
Observations 1095 261 259 152 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table C3. Models Predicting Projects Proposed to the Colombia Humanitaria Program for 
Bridges 
 Any Project 
Proposed 
Any Project 
Approved 
Funds Requested Funds Approved 
I.V. ENP 0.097 1.205* -675.321 -35.173 
 (0.370) (0.538) (809.626) (121.958) 
Margin of Victory  0.002 0.035** -18.230 -0.947 
 (0.010) (0.012) (21.504) (3.370) 
Turnout 2.079** 2.058 -1164.561 -72.765 
 (0.731) (1.651) (1,624.311) (306.528) 
Rural 0.177 1.024 -528.442 -30.809 
 (0.319) (0.546) (686.385) (77.427) 
Capital City 0.167 -0.317 -20.757 8.703 
 (0.284) (0.617) (219.710) (51.651) 
Partisan Attachment -0.001 0.001 -0.485 -0.094 
 (0.002) (0.003) (1.275) (0.096) 
Partisan Alignment -0.025 -0.035 62.583 6.942 
 (0.085) (0.180) (91.761) (18.126) 
Log(Pop. Density) 0.042 -0.125 -86.150 -2.773 
 (0.101) (0.326) (98.351) (16.285) 
Poverty 0.007* 0.005 -0.765 0.167 
 (0.003) (0.007) (1.824) (0.267) 
Total Requested    0.920*** 
    (0.073) 
Number of Projects    -0.391 
    (11.830) 
Constant -2.771 -5.491 3,363.277 171.158 
 (1.762) (3.289) (4,024.098) (613.605) 
athrho     
Constant -0.042 -1.152   
 (0.271) (1.336)   
lnsigma     
Constant -0.323*** -0.328***   
 (0.021) (0.044)   
Observations 1095 258 257 174 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table C4. Models Predicting Projects Proposed to the Colombia Humanitaria Program for Water 
Channeling 
 Any Project 
Proposed 
Any Project 
Approved 
Funds Requested Funds Approved 
I.V. ENP -0.094 -0.091 -187.004 -108.378 
 (0.360) (0.728) (148.919) (56.616) 
Margin of Victory  -0.011 -0.004 -6.363 -2.463 
 (0.010) (0.021) (4.265) (2.557) 
Turnout 1.250 -2.115 -126.819 -65.996 
 (0.793) (1.585) (339.800) (134.109) 
Rural -0.096 -0.888 -278.274 -56.440 
 (0.327) (0.825) (180.363) (68.095) 
Capital City 0.000 0.000   
 (.) (.)   
Partisan Attachment -0.001 0.002 -1.170 -0.352 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.742) (0.352) 
Partisan Alignment 0.066 0.016 -61.915 -13.321 
 (0.096) (0.213) (43.319) (22.173) 
Log(Pop. Density) 0.201 -0.611* -61.516 -17.722 
 (0.115) (0.268) (54.304) (26.152) 
Poverty 0.009** -0.000 -0.730 -0.220 
 (0.003) (0.006) (1.259) (0.572) 
Total Requested    -0.011 
    (0.110) 
Number of Projects    -1.077 
    (11.011) 
Constant -2.101 3.026 1,119.894 512.141 
 (1.783) (3.450) (746.536) (308.587) 
athrho     
Constant 0.081 0.200   
 (0.266) (0.519)   
lnsigma     
Constant -0.324*** -0.372***   
 (0.022) (0.055)   
Observations 1064 164 164 74 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table C5. Models Predicting Projects Proposed to the Colombia Humanitaria Program for 
Aqueducts 
 Any Project 
Proposed 
Any Project 
Approved 
Funds 
Requested 
Funds 
Approved 
I.V. ENP 0.575* 0.095 -16.226 -16.226 
 (0.289) (1.113) (13.410) (13.410) 
Margin of Victory  0.015 0.007 -0.380 -0.380 
 (0.008) (0.025) (0.337) (0.337) 
Turnout 2.391*** 0.050 4.110 4.110 
 (0.549) (1.889) (36.379) (36.379) 
Rural 0.675** 0.788 -16.562 -16.562 
 (0.262) (0.812) (16.946) (16.946) 
Capital City -0.154 0.000 6.628 6.628 
 (0.311) (.) (15.745) (15.745) 
Partisan Attachment -0.001 0.007 0.013 0.013 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.090) (0.090) 
Partisan Alignment 0.107 0.130 -4.801 -4.801 
 (0.086) (0.212) (4.997) (4.997) 
Log(Pop. Density) 0.074 -0.386 -4.318 -4.318 
 (0.097) (0.270) (6.271) (6.271) 
Poverty 0.002 -0.007 0.117 0.117 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.141) (0.141) 
Total Requested   0.778*** 0.778*** 
   (0.057) (0.057) 
Number of Projects   -15.533*** -15.533*** 
   (3.401) (3.401) 
Constant -4.726*** -0.030 86.680 86.680 
 (1.192) (5.072) (64.160) (64.160) 
athrho     
Constant -0.502 -0.122   
 (0.261) (0.741)   
lnsigma     
Constant -0.323*** -0.423***   
 (0.021) (0.049)   
Observations 1095 207 127 127 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table C6. Models Predicting Projects Proposed to the Colombia Humanitaria Program for Dikes 
 Any Project 
Proposed 
Any Project 
Approved 
Funds Requested Funds Approved 
I.V. ENP 0.231 -0.895 -1310.185 -75.062 
 (0.345) (0.555) (1,414.786) (101.727) 
Margin of Victory  0.002 -0.011 -30.097 -1.838 
 (0.010) (0.018) (33.623) (2.560) 
Turnout 1.214 -2.546** 415.278 -7.009 
 (0.659) (0.875) (2,008.856) (61.150) 
Rural 0.144 -1.341** -432.318 -38.770 
 (0.306) (0.460) (1,376.244) (46.088) 
Capital City 0.045 0.041 218.833 -21.621 
 (0.278) (0.588) (821.210) (42.202) 
Partisan Attachment -0.001 -0.003 -5.378 -0.200 
 (0.002) (0.003) (5.312) (0.307) 
Partisan Alignment 0.022 0.076 308.215 4.315 
 (0.085) (0.158) (255.372) (10.157) 
Log(Pop. Density) -0.005 -0.336 -193.497 -17.377 
 (0.100) (0.201) (386.853) (17.491) 
Poverty 0.004 -0.008 -2.096 -0.557 
 (0.003) (0.004) (9.356) (0.832) 
Total Requested    0.615** 
    (0.228) 
Number of Projects    -2.911 
    (7.023) 
Constant -2.430 6.234** 4,514.192 330.334 
 (1.588) (2.001) (6,807.589) (425.236) 
athrho     
Constant -0.216 0.808   
 (0.262) (0.644)   
lnsigma     
Constant -0.323*** -0.379***   
 (0.021) (0.046)   
Observations 1095 241 240 150 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table C7. Models Predicting Projects Proposed to the Colombia Humanitaria Program for 
Machinery 
 Any Project 
Proposed 
Any Project 
Approved 
Funds 
Requested 
Funds 
Approved 
I.V. ENP -0.700* -1.453*** -178.879 -23.278* 
 (0.279) (0.179) (104.469) (9.685) 
Margin of Victory  -0.012 -0.032*** -4.137 -0.563* 
 (0.008) (0.007) (2.517) (0.238) 
Turnout 1.351 -2.122 -210.468 6.876 
 (0.905) (1.101) (221.214) (22.972) 
Rural 0.091 -0.438 -98.241 -2.197 
 (0.331) (0.562) (80.154) (8.230) 
Capital City 0.150 0.550 -12.975 1.151 
 (0.284) (0.609) (74.022) (12.046) 
Partisan Attachment 0.001 -0.005 -0.711 -0.113* 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.419) (0.047) 
Partisan Alignment -0.045 0.148 38.451 5.888 
 (0.084) (0.159) (22.795) (3.295) 
Log(Pop. Density) 0.061 0.188 -11.768 -1.885 
 (0.106) (0.205) (26.440) (3.994) 
Poverty -0.001 -0.003 -0.450 -0.168 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.499) (0.112) 
Total Requested    0.671*** 
    (0.045) 
Number of Projects    -10.844*** 
    (2.484) 
Constant 0.335 6.075*** 819.902 99.598* 
 (1.769) (1.229) (473.177) (43.684) 
athrho     
Constant 0.573* 1.584**   
 (0.277) (0.590)   
lnsigma     
Constant -0.323*** -0.477***   
 (0.021) (0.047)   
Observations 1095 222 218 150 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table C8. Models Predicting Projects Proposed to the Pacto Agrario Program for New 
Businesses 
 Any Project 
Proposed 
Any Project 
Approved 
Funds 
Requested 
Funds 
Approved 
I.V. ENP -0.258 0.552 -122.912*** -2.031 
 (0.227) (0.360) (26.404) (4.468) 
Margin of Victory  -0.000 0.011 -1.884** 0.039 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.578) (0.088) 
Turnout 0.589 0.999 -6.043 9.176 
 (0.632) (1.001) (67.798) (9.589) 
Rural -0.237 0.468 -74.557* -5.408 
 (0.295) (0.491) (33.499) (5.016) 
Capital City 0.354 0.228 1.768 -0.416 
 (0.267) (0.415) (27.968) (3.965) 
Partisan Attachment -0.003 0.003 -0.817** -0.016 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.283) (0.044) 
Partisan Alignment -0.240* 0.172 -26.701 0.309 
 (0.117) (0.207) (13.709) (2.016) 
Log(Pop. Density) -0.172 0.183 -35.391*** 1.499 
 (0.092) (0.157) (9.804) (1.483) 
Poverty 0.001 0.006 -0.749** 0.030 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.282) (0.043) 
Total Requested    0.071*** 
    (0.017) 
Number of Projects    0.562 
    (0.895) 
Constant 0.918 -4.387* 600.102*** -1.743 
 (1.286) (1.846) (142.296) (22.575) 
athrho     
Constant 0.149 -0.338   
 (0.167) (0.260)   
lnsigma     
Constant -0.365*** -0.479***   
 (0.023) (0.035)   
Observations 910 413 413 413 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table C9. Models Predicting Projects Proposed to the Pacto Agrario Program for Rural 
Employment 
 Any Project 
Proposed 
Any Project 
Approved 
Funds Requested Funds Approved 
I.V. ENP -0.549* -0.447 -93.596** 5.702 
 (0.226) (0.528) (31.257) (8.909) 
Margin of Victory  -0.010 -0.005 -1.526* 0.323 
 (0.006) (0.014) (0.746) (0.201) 
Turnout -1.155 2.480 -37.997 49.296** 
 (0.642) (1.678) (70.646) (18.748) 
Rural 0.325 0.593 -35.653 13.390 
 (0.343) (0.651) (30.434) (8.191) 
Capital City -0.450 0.868 21.202 8.913 
 (0.384) (0.913) (50.249) (13.399) 
Partisan Attachment -0.001 0.007 -0.436 0.141* 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.257) (0.070) 
Partisan Alignment -0.069 0.220 -17.131 4.210 
 (0.130) (0.296) (14.385) (3.877) 
Log(Pop. Density) 0.017 -0.150 4.590 -5.746 
 (0.105) (0.260) (12.875) (3.392) 
Poverty -0.009*** -0.017** -0.624* -0.189* 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.313) (0.092) 
Total Requested    0.455*** 
    (0.059) 
Number of Projects    -8.189** 
    (2.761) 
Constant 2.062 -0.313 393.860** -41.513 
 (1.318) (2.804) (142.590) (39.871) 
athrho     
Constant 0.314 0.460   
 (0.183) (0.392)   
lnsigma     
Constant -0.365*** -0.449***   
 (0.023) (0.048)   
Observations 910 218 218 218 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table C10. Models Predicting Projects Proposed to the Pacto Agrario Program for Rural 
Housing 
 Any Project 
Proposed 
Any Project 
Approved 
Funds Requested Funds Approved 
I.V. ENP 0.219 0.606 -177.889** 42.651 
 (0.257) (0.558) (67.406) (30.983) 
Margin of Victory  0.004 0.038** -4.374* 1.613 
 (0.007) (0.013) (1.964) (0.842) 
Turnout -0.172 0.010 48.632 36.882 
 (0.700) (1.493) (150.009) (52.611) 
Rural 0.242 2.214*** -159.517* 51.092 
 (0.331) (0.574) (79.565) (33.192) 
Capital City -0.354 0.000 -6.568 15.045 
 (0.320) (.) (71.534) (25.075) 
Partisan Attachment 0.000 0.004 -1.120 0.198 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.592) (0.243) 
Partisan Alignment 0.093 -0.083 -45.440 2.799 
 (0.134) (0.306) (29.245) (11.482) 
Log(Pop. Density) -0.003 0.532* -89.668*** 17.505 
 (0.104) (0.213) (23.424) (11.487) 
Poverty -0.003 0.007 -0.633 0.523* 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.602) (0.227) 
Total Requested    0.323*** 
    (0.071) 
Number of Projects    -7.574 
    (6.079) 
Constant -1.430 -5.393 938.633* -251.905 
 (1.440) (2.757) (378.565) (168.950) 
athrho     
Constant -0.147 -0.519   
 (0.188) (0.470)   
lnsigma     
Constant -0.365*** -0.395***   
 (0.023) (0.052)   
Observations 910 188 192 192 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix D for Chapter 6 
 
Table D1. Hierarchical Model Predicting the Tendency to Give Positive Service Evaluations 
 Tendency to Provide Positive Service 
Evaluations (α) 
Female 0.006 
 (0.016) 
Age -0.002* 
 (0.001) 
Education Level -0.006** 
 (0.002) 
Rural -0.034 
 (0.023) 
Effective Number of Candidates 0.078** 
 (0.029) 
Perceived Responsiveness 0.199*** 
 (0.021) 
Effective Number of cancidates * Perceived Responsiveness -0.028*** 
 (0.008) 
Margin of Victory  0.002 
 (0.001) 
Partisan Alignment -0.001** 
 (0.000) 
Poverty -0.004*** 
 (0.001) 
Turnout -0.388 
 (0.212) 
Log (Pop. Density) -0.046 
 (0.034) 
2004 0.000 
 (.) 
2005 0.070** 
 (0.022) 
2006 0.062** 
 (0.024) 
2007 0.049* 
 (0.023) 
Constant 3.544*** 
 (0.212) 
Region  
Constant -22.517 
 (22.038) 
Department  
Constant -2.344*** 
 (0.307) 
Municipality  
Constant -2.855*** 
 (0.428) 
Residual  
Constant -0.711*** 
 (0.023) 
Observations 3740 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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